






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



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




Special Issue: The Best of CAIB



• The CIA in Africa • Israeli Arms in Central America • Invasion of Grenada



• CIA and Media • The National Security Agency • Noam Chomsky on Libya



Tenth Year Anniversary

About This Issue

When we started *CAIB* in 1978, we never worried about how long the publication would last. Like the overall progressive struggle of which we were a part, we worked from day to day, scrambling as each issue was published to raise the funds to put out the next.

That, as our loyal readers know, has not changed. Nor have we always been on time, to say the least; but while we staggered, we never stopped. And, we think, the magazine has become steadily better, with broader coverage, more pages, better illustrations, more excellent outside authors, and continuing revelations and exposés.

It is typical of our plight that we publish this Tenth Anniver-

sary Issue as we near the end of our eleventh year! Still, we hope that you, our readers, will enjoy this compendium of some of our most interesting and informative articles.

This "Best of..." issue unfortunately, contains only an edited sampling of our best articles. Space constraints made it necessary to leave out many others. We urge our readers who are interested in the larger scope of our work to order our back issues. You will get interesting and valuable information and, at the same time, help us financially.

Our next issue, at which we have been hard at work, will concentrate on the personalities and possibilities of the Bush administration.

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CAIB staff, 1979: William Schaap, Ellen Ray, and Louis Wolf.



CAIB staff, today: Louis Wolf, Ellen Ray, William Schaap, and William Vornberger.

Who We Are

Editors' Note: This brief explanation of who we are and what the goal of CAIB is appeared in our first issue which we published in July 1978. Since then, a lot has happened to CAIB. We now print over 70 pages per issue, compared to our original 24. The current issues, as before, are filled with information on the CIA and the right wing not found anywhere else. Over the years, we have published books on the CIA, consulted on research projects, documentaries and movies all about the CIA. We have testified before Congress opposing laws designed to protect the illegal nature of CIA covert activities. In our ten years of publishing CAIB, we have a lot to be proud of.

One and a half years ago the last issue of *CounterSpy Magazine* appeared. Although the scope of coverage, the depth of research, and the impact of *CounterSpy* around the world were on the rise, personal and political disputes coupled with CIA harassment led to an impasse among the staff. Those of us who had been working most closely with Phil Agee left the magazine to continue research, and others stayed on, ostensibly to continue the magazine. They were not successful.

We have felt, since the beginning, that there is an important and vital role to be played by the sort of exposés for which *CounterSpy* had become world-famous. We decided that the dissemination of such information must resume. That *CounterSpy* and its uncovering of CIA personnel and operations around the world were so violently hated by the Agency was our best endorsement. The compliments and encouragement we received from progressive people everywhere con-

vinced us that we could not leave this void in the mosaic of struggles against the U.S. intelligence complex.

We begin modestly with a small Bulletin which we intend to publish approximately bi-monthly. This first issue is being distributed at no charge. We are confident that there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, the FBI, military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression throughout the world. We know that there is much information and research needing to be published.

A major step in that battle has already been taken. Two of our group, Phil Agee and Lou Wolf, have edited and prepared a new book, *Dirty Work*, just published by Lyle Stuart, Inc. This book describes how to expose CIA personnel, including dozens of articles from many countries which have done just that, and presents, in Appendix form, detailed biographies of more than 700 undercover CIA and NSA personnel lurking in embassies and military installations in virtually every country.

One of our group was a CIA case officer for twelve years; two others worked in finance and support for the CIA for nine years; the rest of us have devoted much of the past several years to direct research on U.S. intelligence operations.

We encourage everyone to keep in touch with us, to correspond, to submit leads, tips, suggestions and articles. We will try to track down all your leads. Most especially, we will never stop exposing CIA operations whenever and wherever we find them. We hope that we can put this experience to valuable use through the pages of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. We hope you will agree, and will support us. ●

CAIB — Eleven Years in Retrospect

By Philip Agee

Editors' Note: This article was written expressly for this issue.

It was January 1978 and a handful of U.S. activists were meeting in a Kingston, Jamaica hotel. Our purpose: to start a magazine dedicated to exposing U.S. covert interventions around the world, a new beginning, carrying on from *CounterSpy*, which had shut down due to serious differences among its staff.

Our backgrounds were as diverse as they were similar. Ellen Ray was a filmmaker and journalist originally from Nebraska, who had studied there and at Harvard and worked with Jim Garrison in his investigation into the JFK assassination. In the mid-70s she joined *CounterSpy* and endured the groundless attacks on the magazine following the assassination in Athens of the CIA's Chief of Station. Those attacks, from the CIA and corporate media as well as death threats from the right, contributed to the collapse of *CounterSpy*.

Ellen's husband, Bill Schaap, was a lawyer and editor of the *Military Law Reporter* who had studied at Cornell and the University of Chicago. For many years he and Ellen defended U.S. military personnel in trouble for resisting the Vietnam War. Their work took them abroad for extended stays in Okinawa, Italy, and West Germany.

Louis Wolf was a journalist and conscientious objector who had spent several years in Asia, first in Laos as a community development volunteer, and then in the Philippines. The destruction he saw from U.S. bombing in Laos led him to dedicate his life to opposing American intervention wherever it occurred. While living in London in the 1970s, Lou set up shop in the British Museum archives, and there he became the world's leading researcher on identification of CIA personnel through published State Department documents.

I had worked as a CIA operations officer in the 1950s and 60s, mostly in Latin America, but had resigned and decided to go public. Since 1975, when *Inside the Company* appeared, I had worked with journalists from many countries to investigate and expose CIA operations and personnel. Now, in early 1978, the U.S. government's reaction was fierce. During the previous year I had been deported under U.S. pressure from Great Britain and France, and deportation proceedings were under way in the Netherlands where I had resettled.

Target CIA

Our principal target for the new magazine was, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, the main government instrument for covert interventions. We realized we could not soon expect to change the U.S. policy of secret interventions abroad — a policy which had been continuous under Democrats and Republicans alike since World War II. But we could contribute to building public opposition and to weakening the instrument. We saw exposure as the best method, both of what the CIA does, and of the people who do it. Secrecy, after all,

was the necessary cloak under which Harry Truman and every President since him had sought to manipulate and control the lives of other peoples, their resources, and their markets.

The fundamental political agreement that brought us together in Jamaica was anti-imperialism and its corollaries: the need to achieve real democracy at home and to fight intervention abroad. We understood well that the human cost of CIA covert interventions was astronomical, that the Vietnam War, as only one example, began with secret U.S. programs, and that far too few Americans comprehended this.

This ideological identification, as much as the personal friendship among us, provided the glue that kept us together for more than a decade. When hard times did come, we rode them out, responded aggressively to the many attacks on our patriotism, and never thought of giving up. Our commitment from the beginning was permanent.

We had a considerable advantage in the avalanche of revelations of secret government operations during the previous three to four years, not only of those conducted by the CIA but by the FBI, military intelligence, and police departments as well. Those revelations, in part connected with the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation, bore the authentication stamp of the Congress. They thus obviated the efforts to discredit as disgruntled malcontents former CIA officers like myself, Victor Marchetti, John Stockwell, Joseph Smith and Frank Snepp — all of us with recently published exposés.

Yet for all the revelations and attendant scandals of the mid-70s, the few legislative initiatives to prohibit covert actions went nowhere. The prevailing conventional view was that "abuses" and "excesses" had occurred, that the "system" itself was still the best of all possible worlds, and that "corrective measures" such as congressional oversight of the security establishment would prevent future problems. The truth was that the CIA, FBI, and other services had been functioning exactly as they were supposed to, and the only abuse, excess, or malfunction was the revelation of what they were doing.

Publication Plans


To get the magazine going, we put together such funds of our own as we could, supplemented by contributions of American benefactors who had supported our work in the past. The main editorial work would be done in Washington, D.C. by Ellen, Bill, and Lou. My contribution would be necessarily limited since I did not know where I would be living in the months ahead, or whether the NATO allies would force me back to the U.S. for a long trial and perhaps even prison.

Books were also a major component of our plans. Lou and I had put together a reader on CIA operations in Western Europe consisting of articles that had appeared in U.S. and European publications. Ellen and Bill edited the work and arranged for publication by Lyle Stuart, Inc., as *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*.

Six months after our Jamaica meeting the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* was a reality, albeit a modest 24-page free "trial edition." It called for worldwide exposure of CIA operations and personnel, and had articles on terrorism by U.S.-based Cuban exiles and on undercover political canvassing in Jamaica. But the article that would create *CAIB*'s public identity was Lou's column: "Naming Names." With the career of the Agency's new Chief of Station in Jamaica, the magazine launched its most controversial activity—one that would provoke the most hysterical official wrath against a U.S. publication in this country's history.

The same outrage resulted from *Dirty Work*, which came out just as our first *CAIB* appeared. The book had the "official" biographies of more than 600 CIA officers and employees including the posts where they had served or were serving, and the covers they had used through the years.

Immediately the CIA and its friends in the media attacked us with the charge that we were publishing "hit lists," and were trying to get people killed. Our response was that we wanted



no one killed, that the people we named should return to the U.S. and should stay here. We made no secret that disruption was our purpose, and that CIA people, because of what they do, enjoyed no immunity from responsibility. In all this, no one accused us of falsely naming people who were not CIA, and in fact no one was threatened or attacked. But we did succeed in disruption—as the CIA later made amply clear.

In the coming year four more issues of *CAIB* appeared with articles on CIA recruitment methods and its operations in such countries as Cuba, Angola, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and Spain. The "Naming Names" column uncovered dozens of CIA officers and stimulated wire stories and local headlines with each issue, prompting the Agency spokesperson to call the practice "incredible" and "unbelievable." Meanwhile, in the Senate Lloyd Bentsen (Dem.-Texas) introduced legislation to criminalize "naming names" by former government employees. Though immediately dubbed the anti-Agee bill, the CIA and its friends in Congress had to know that I had nothing to do with the lists—all the names were discovered through research of public documents in Washington.

Similarly, the Agency and U.S. media continually referred to *CAIB* as "Agee's publication," even though I performed no editing function and had only contributed a couple of articles. The technique, clearly, was to couple the magazine to my presumably discredited name and to allege that the names were of people I had known in the Agency. CIA Director Stansfield Turner, for his part, denounced *CAIB* bitterly and vowed that covert action operations would continue.

By mid-1979, we also had another book under way, to be entitled *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*, with identities and career postings of more than 700 CIA officers who had served, or were serving, in African countries. In early 1980 the Justice Department, on behalf of the CIA, sought a Federal Court injunction against publication of the book, only to learn that the book was already in bookstores and could not be suppressed.

Pressures for Criminalization

Reaction to *Dirty Work 2* and to the *Bulletin*'s continuing revelations included the introduction of new bills to criminalize "naming names." These bills would not only make it a crime for former government employees like me to identify officers and agents, but also for any journalist. [Editors' Note: See the discussion of these bills in *From Our Editorials* in this issue.] Since the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was quite clearly aimed at stopping the "Naming Names" column and our *Dirty Work* series, the *Bulletin* staff (Ray, Schaap, and Wolf) requested, and were granted, an appearance before the House Intelligence Committee. Although they showed during the lengthy session that all names in the *Bulletins* and the books were culled from research from public documents, the Representatives were unmoved by "freedom of press" and First Amendment considerations.

Major media institutions like the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* editorialized against criminalizing the product of open research, but still called us "contemptible scoundrels." The *Washington Post* actually labeled us "terrorists of the pen"! Yet at the same time the major print and electronic media were in regular contact with the *Bulletin* seeking identities of CIA personnel in different countries—even in Iran after the Embassy staff were taken hostage, identifications the *Bulletin* refused to make.

None of the anti-*CAIB* legislation went beyond committee hearings, and by the time Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980, *Bulletin* No. 10 was 60 pages in length. By now *CAIB* was by far the world's leading publication on secret government operations with subscriptions and newsstand sales passing 6000 with each edition. The quality and scope of articles had improved and widened. Among the more prominent were reports on CIA interference in the 1980 Jamaica elections, terrorism against the new revolutionary government in Grenada, a secret CIA manual on use of "deep cover," probable CIA operations against the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, technical collection operations, and CIA propaganda techniques with ties to private media.

It took the "Reagan revolution" to get the Intelligence Identities Protection Act passed. By summer 1982, when the law was approved, Reagan's anti-Soviet, New Cold War pro-

gram was in place. Anti-terrorism had replaced human rights as America's ostensible priority abroad, while anti-terrorism at home was replacing anti-communism as the justification for domestic political control. In anticipation of passage of the Identities Act, the Bulletin dropped the "Naming Names" column. Altogether, between *CAIB* and the *Dirty Work* series, more than 2000 identifications of CIA personnel had been made in less than four years.

The Reagan Doctrine Years

Central America, Grenada, Cuba, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Angola, Libya, and Lebanon were areas where the so-called Reagan Doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict was applied. Hardly "low intensity" for the hundreds of thousands who died as a result, but with noted exceptions they were foreigners not Americans, and Congress gave the necessary money—even voting openly to foment civil war in Nicaragua, a country with which the United States was formally at peace. *CAIB* published in-depth analyses on U.S., mainly CIA, intervention in each country and area.

Throughout the Reagan years, as the CIA budget soared, *CAIB* continued to present in-depth analyses and regular exposures of clandestine activities. Entire issues were devoted to the CIA and the media, the U.S. "religious right," drugs, and mercenaries. Major reports included a series on the CIA and assassination operations and an expose of the crude efforts to blame the Soviet Union for the shooting of Pope John Paul II. CIA connections with the Vatican, Opus Dei, and the Knights of Malta were also examined, as were increasing domestic surveillance and repression by the CIA, NSA, FBI, and other official agencies and by private groups as well.

The 1980s also brought writers of enormous talent and dedication to publish in the *Bulletin*. Ken Lawrence was one, with his column on "Sources and Methods." Another was Fred Landis, an astute analyst of CIA covert propaganda in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua. Jonathan Bloch and Pat Fitzsimons, experts on British intelligence, wrote of British support for U.S. efforts to police the Caribbean.

Others followed: Philip Wheaton on propaganda against Grenada; William Preston, Jr. on government disinformation programs; Edward S. Herman on Central American election coverage; Sara Diamond on the Religious Right in the U.S.; Ward Churchill on *Soldier of Fortune* and mercenaries plus exposes on terrorist operations against the American Indian Movement; Sean Gervasi on CIA links with South Africa; Peter Dale Scott on the CIA's use and protection of Nazi war criminals; Noam Chomsky on U.S.-sponsored state terrorism; Peggy Robohm on Iranian arms dealers; Robert Lederer on chemical-biological warfare and the origin of AIDS; and many others, some under pseudonyms to protect their access.

Together, the 31 *CAIB*s published over nearly eleven years constitute an enormous fund of information for researchers, students, activists, and journalists, and constant sales of back issues reflect their current importance. To no one's surprise, *CAIB*'s circulation long ago passed the 10,000 mark.

In 1986, William Vornberger joined the Washington staff as co-editor, and Dolores Neuman, Lou's wife, as photogra-

phy consultant. Ellen and Bill moved to New York, where they founded the Institute for Media Analysis, Inc. (IMA), and continued as *CAIB* co-editors.

Book Publications

Books remained a high priority. In 1981, in response to the Reagan-Haig "White Paper on El Salvador," Warner Poelchau, a Hamburg journalist, and I produced an analysis that reduced the "White Paper" to sensationalist trash. In the 19 "captured" documents on which the White Paper was based, we found translation errors, inaccuracies, embellishments, and fabrications—all of which exposed the false claim that the Soviet Union and Cuba were directing a world-wide arms support operation for the Salvadoran FMLN.

For publication of the "White Paper" analysis in book form, Ellen and Bill, along with New York attorney Michael Ratner, formed Sheridan Square Publications which brought out our work as *White Paper? White Wash: the CIA and El Salvador*.

Other books followed at Sheridan Square: Ralph McGeehee's account of his CIA career in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines (*Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA*); Melvin Beck's description of his deep cover CIA career in Cuba and Mexico (*Secret Contenders: The Myth of Cold War Counterintelligence*); and Edward Herman's and Frank Brodhead's exposure of the disinformation that communist countries were behind the plot to kill Pope John Paul II (*The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection*).

Most recently, in early 1989, Sheridan Square, now a division of IMA, published Judge Jim Garrison's account of his investigation of the John Kennedy assassination, *On the Trail of the Assassins*, clearly describing the conspirators from the CIA and FBI, and the hitmen and coverup artists from the Cuban exiles, the Mafia, the Secret Service, and the Dallas police. The motives, Garrison lucidly demonstrates, were to destroy Kennedy's plans to withdraw from Vietnam, for a rapprochement with Cuba and a relaxation of Cold War tensions.

Conclusion

Looking back, it seems that the most important contribution of *CAIB* during these eleven years has been to help keep alive the flame of resistance. On four long speaking tours of the U.S., I have found people everywhere who read *CAIB* and find it valuable, both for information and for inspiration.

With former CIA Director George Bush now in the White House, the need for *CAIB*'s exposures remains as great as ever. CIA interventions continue in Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea, and Central America, preventing negotiated settlements of those conflicts. In El Salvador alone the death squads supported by the CIA killed nearly 2,000 people last year—added to the 70,000 or more killed since the U.S. counterinsurgency program began there nearly ten years ago.

CAIB begins its twelfth year just as it started, dedicated to raising consciousness and resistance among Americans and promoting solidarity with the victims of U.S. interventions. Liberation struggles abroad are our struggles, their victories are our victories. We are confident that *CAIB* will continue to help inspire domestic opposition to foreign adventures. ●

Where Myths Lead To Murder

by Philip Agee

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 1, July 1978. It is a good illustration of how the CIA justifies or excuses, what are in many cases, blatantly illegal activities. It also reminds us that the individual members of the CIA — whose activities often lead to the loss of lives — must be held accountable for their actions.

Today the whole world knows, as never before, how the U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly intervening in country after country to corrupt politicians and to promote political repression. The avalanche of revelations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the CIA, shows a policy of secret intervention that is highly refined and consistently applied.

Former President Ford and leading government spokesmen countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA to retain, and to use when necessary, the capability for executing the kinds of operations that brought to power the military regime in Chile. Ford even said in public that he believed events in Chile had been "in the best interests of the Chilean people." And even with President Carter's human rights campaign there has been no indication that the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive dictatorships in Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and other bastions of "the free world."

The revelations, though, have not only exposed the operations of the CIA, but also the individual identities — the names, addresses, and secret histories — of many of the people who actually do the CIA's work. Yet, with all the newly available information, many people still seem to believe the myths used to justify this secret political police force. Some of the myths are, of course, actively spread by my former CIA colleagues; others come from their liberal critics. But whatever the source, until we lay the myths to rest, they will continue to confuse people and permit the CIA — literally — to get away with murder.

Myth Number One: The CIA is primarily engaged in gathering intelligence information against the Soviet Union.

This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myth, going back to the creation of the Agency in 1947 and the choice of the name "Central Intelligence Agency." As the Agency's backers explained the idea to the American Congress, afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into unwanted foreign adventures, the CIA was needed to find out what a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the United States from a surprise attack. Americans at the time still shared a vivid

memory of the unexpected Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, and with the likelihood that the new enemy — the Soviet Union — would soon have atomic bombs, no one could really doubt the need to know if and when an attack might come.

The real success in watching the Soviets, however, came from technological breakthroughs like the U-2 spy plane and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intelligence fell increasingly to the technically sophisticated U.S. National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course, and it also provided centralized processing of information and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to put its emphasis on covert action — financing friendly politicians, murdering suspected foes, and staging *coups d'etat*.

This deeply involved the Agency in the internal politics of countries throughout Western Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet bloc. And even where CIA officers and agents did act as spies, gathering intelligence information, they consistently used that information to further their programs of action.


The CIA's operatives will argue that the ultimate goal of discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions requires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin — that the Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures. This argument may influence some people, because theoretically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only give a few minutes warning, whereas a person in the right place can report on decisions as soon as they are made, giving perhaps days or weeks of warning. Such a spy might also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation.

Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from varying motivations and psychological pressures operating on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's strengthening of repressive foreign security services, necessary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.), can scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record.

Today, notwithstanding recent "reforms," the CIA remains primarily an action agency — doing and not just snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the Marines, and

their targets in most countries remain largely the same: governments, political parties, the military, police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the public information media. In each of these, the CIA continues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies, while its goal remains the furthering of U.S. hegemony so that American multinational companies can intensify their exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign lands.

Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence or preventing another Pearl Harbor, while it has a lot to do with the power of certain privileged groups within the United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the myth of



CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia.

“intelligence gathering” in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing.

Myth Number Two: The major problem is lack of control; that is, the CIA is a “rogue elephant.”

This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility for control, while the executive branch continues to insist—rightly—that the Agency’s covert action operations have, with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive presidents and their National Security Councils. As former Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike’s Intelligence Investigating Committee, “Every operation is personally approved by the President.”

For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official report, first published in “leaked” form by the *Village Voice*, that “all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.”

So the problem is said to be with the presidents—Democratic and Republican—who, over the past 30 years, have given the green light to so many covert operations. But

why were the operations necessary? And why secret? The operations had to be secret, whether they involved political bribes, funding of anticommunist journals, or fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied either government control of supposedly non-governmental institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government was going to subvert free, democratic and liberal institutions, it would have to do so secretly.

There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy—and for the CIA. Successive administrations—together with American-based multinational corporations—have continually demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets, labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give muscle to this demand for the “open door,” recent presidents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen those foreign groups who cooperate—and to destroy those who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such as Chile under Allende, of Iran 20 years earlier under Mosaddegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on some form of socialism to ensure national control of economic resources.

The CIA’s covert action operations abroad are not *sui generis*. They happen because they respond to internal U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through fantasies of some enlightened President or Congress who would end American subversion of foreign peoples and institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative initiative that would have prohibited covert action programs by the CIA.

Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to secret intervention by the CIA and multinational corporations—not less. Increasingly important will be the repressive capabilities of the Agency’s “sister” services abroad.

Myth Number Three: Weakening the CIA opens wider the door for Soviet expansion and eventual world domination.

This myth is peddled especially hard at times when liberation movements make serious gains. Former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the CIA’s ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it again as liberation movements seek Soviet and Cuban help in their struggle against the apartheid policies of the white Rhodesians and South Africans.

The problem for America, however, is not “Soviet expansionism,” despite all the anticommunism with which we are indoctrinated practically from the cradle. The problem, rather, is that the American government, preeminently the CIA, continues to intervene on the side of “friends” whose property and privileges rest on the remnants of archaic social systems long since discredited. The political repression required to preserve the old order depends on American and other Western support which quite naturally is turning more and more people against the United States—more effectively, for sure, than anything the KGB could ever concoct.

As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on British television, "I'm apt to think that the Russians are going to choose (sides) better than we will choose nine times out of ten. After all, we're two hundred years away from our revolution; we're a very conservative country."

Myth Number Four: Those who attack the CIA, especially those who have worked in the intelligence community, are traitors, turncoats, or agents of the KGB.

This has been the Agency's chief attack on me personally, and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred with the same brush is keeping many CIA veterans from voicing their own opposition. But as with earlier efforts to find the "foreign hand" in the American antiwar movement, the CIA has failed to produce a shred of evidence that any of its major American (or European) critics are in the service of any foreign power.

Would be "reformers" of the CIA have also discovered how the Agency reacts to criticism. According to Representative Pike, the CIA's Special Counsel threatened to destroy Pike's political career. In a conversation with Pike's chief investigative staff person, the Special Counsel was quoted thus: "Pike will pay for this

(directing the vote to approve the committee report on the CIA)—you wait and see. I'm serious. There will be political retaliation. Any political ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. We will destroy him for this."

CIA veterans must not be intimidated by the Agency's false and unattributed slander. We have a special responsibility for weakening this organization. If put at the service of those we once oppressed, our knowledge of how the CIA really works could keep the CIA from ever really working again. And though the CIA will brand us as "traitors," people all over the world, including the United States, will respond, as they have already, with enthusiastic and effective support.

Myth Number Five: Naming individual CIA officers does little to change the Agency, and is done only to expose innocent individuals to the threat of assassination.

Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up more anger than the publishing of the names and addresses of CIA officials in foreign countries, especially since the killing of the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA spokesmen—and journals such as the *Washington Post*—were quick to accuse me and the *CounterSpy* magazine of having "fingered" Welch for the "hit," charging that in publishing his name, we were issuing "an open invitation to kill him." The Agency also managed to exploit Welch's death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more obvious abuses. Subsequent research, noted in *Dirty Work*, makes abundantly clear that *CounterSpy* had nothing to do with the Welch killing.

The result of the Agency's manipulations isn't hard to predict. The CIA, for all its sins, came out of the recent inves-

tigations *strengthened* by the Ford "reforms," while the Congress may attempt to pass an official secrets act that will attempt to make it a crime for any present or former government official ever again to blow the whistle by making public classified information. No more *Pentagon Papers*. No more Watergate revelations. No more *CIA Diaries*.

Nonetheless, the naming goes on. More and more CIA people can now be held personally accountable for what they and the Agency as an institution do—for the real harm they cause to real people. Their military *coups*, torture chambers, and terrorism cause untold pain, and their backing of multinational corporations and local elites helps push millions to the edge of starvation, and often beyond. They are the Gestapo and SS of our time, and as in the Nuremberg Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their individual responsibility simply because they were following a superior's orders.

But apart from the question of personal responsibility, the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure of its secret operations—and secret operatives—remains the most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Already a handful of journalists and former intelligence officers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of

hundreds of CIA people, and even the *Washington Post*—which condemns us for doing it—has admitted that our efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization. We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency was forced to step up its security precautions and to transfer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to inflict harm on others.

Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens, violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA will protect the operatives named—and also the lives of their potential victims.

From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gathering" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers," these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA—and its allies—will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose these myths and the crimes they cover up.

Together, people of many nationalities and varying political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated. The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in all the other countries where liberation movements are rapidly gaining strength.

We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for socialism in the United States itself. ●

The CIA spreads the myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing.

The Saga of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act:

From Our Editorials

Editors' Note: The following are excerpts from editorials in CAIB Numbers 3 through 15. They show the progress of lawmakers intent on stopping the magazine and describe many of the changes brought about by the Reagan administration.

From Number 3 (January 1979)

From the moment *CAIB* appeared last summer, the CIA and its supporters used it as a foil for mounting new attacks against critics who would expose their crimes and personnel, charter their activities, or, better yet, legislate them out of existence.

The CIA's "station for Congress," along with selected agents in the press corps, used the strategy in 1975, blaming the assassination of Richard Welch on *CounterSpy* magazine, turning investigations of their illegal clandestine activities into forums on how to protect their own people's safety, while expanding their covert operations abroad. All this was successfully pulled off, despite public horror over what the investigations had revealed: CIA involvement in secret wars and coups, assassination plots with Mafia gangsters, domestic spying and drug experimentation, and on and on.

Since the conclusion of the ill-fated Church Committee hearings there has not been a single law passed to control the Machiavellian activities of any of the intelligence agencies. Toothless committees have been set up in the House and Senate to oversee secret operations. A "reform" bill has been proposed, but many critics fear it will only strengthen covert action, its passage legitimizing assassinations, coups and the like. As a counterthrust to the attempt at intelligence "chartering," friends of the CIA have introduced their own legislation, proposing drastic curbs on First Amendment rights. Dubbed the "anti-Agee" bill, it criminalizes exposures of intelligence personnel and operations by present or former government employees — even if the activity exposed is illegal.

Why is the Agency mobilizing all its forces for a new campaign against opponents? It does not have the public support or trust needed for a clear mandate to move against its critics, regardless of its opportunistic but fickle congressional cronies.

From Number 5 (July 1979)

The multifarious attacks which have been launched against *CAIB* by the Agency and its friends, especially those in Congress, has been stepped up, both in frequency and in stridency, and are being used as a smokescreen for the CIA's real objectives: against a strong intelligence charter, against the Freedom of Information Act, and in support of Sen. Bentsen's bill against naming names.

The majority of the attacks have not come from underlings, but from the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA. In March, Admiral Turner gave a speech in Washington to the Johns Hopkins University Alumni Association, in which he inveighed against *CAIB*, "headquartered just a few blocks from here." He also made reference to the Welch case, intimating that his exposure in a magazine had been the cause of his death. When confronted by someone in the audience with the truth, that the naming of Welch's name had nothing to do with his death, Turner conceded that perhaps that was true; "but," he added, "that's irrelevant."

In April, Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, testifying before Congress on FOIA legislation, took the opportunity to point out that "the difficulty in protecting intelligence information arises from more than the FOIA." He waved a copy of *CAIB* at the members of Congress. "This publication is dedicated to exposing our undercover employees and operations overseas," he said. But the CIA, he added, is "trying to deal" with it.

Then, in May, Turner sent a long letter to Sen. Bentsen, supporting the so-called anti-Agee bill. The letter, reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, amounts to an unsolicited testimonial: We have named, he said, "some 1200 alleged CIA personnel. Security considerations preclude our confirming or denying specific instances of purported identification of CIA personnel. Suffice it to say that a substantial number of these allegations have been accurate."

Finally, he gets to the heart of the matter. "The professional effectiveness of officers so compromised is substantially and sometimes irreparably damaged. They must reduce or break contact with sensitive covert sources....Some CIA officers must be removed from their assignments....Replacement of officers thus compromised is difficult and, in some cases, impossible."

Most recently, on June 20, Frank Carlucci devoted much of an address at the Secretary of State's "Open Forum" to another attack on *CAIB*. He said that the CIA was working closely with the FBI, through a joint counter-intelligence task force, to "dry up" our sources. He admitted that what we did was not illegal, but said it ought to be.

All this attention might seem flattering, but Turner and Carlucci are merely using the *Bulletin* as a vehicle; the real target is the proposed charter for the CIA. In this they have been extremely effective. Not long ago, there was a strong movement for tight legislative controls on the Agency, a real beginning. But now, hopes for meaningful reform appear doomed. The Agency has asserted control over the committees and their staffs. Any bill which reaches the floor will be to increase

the Agency's powers, not to diminish them.

From Number 6 (October 1979)

Our battle with the CIA and its friends continues. Readers may have seen the NBC-TV program about us on July 8, 1979. We had no delusions the program would be fair and objective, and had decided to take our chances because of the national exposure it would afford. We did not expect balanced coverage, but hoped to make some points.

For the first time, the CIA, through Deputy Director Carlucci, stated publicly that the Agency was proposing a law to "target in on people who deliberately and maliciously expose people that they know are undercover performing legitimate activities on behalf of the United States government." When the correspondent pointed out to Carlucci, "You're trying to legislate against private citizens using public records," Carlucci hedged: "It's not an easy issue because you get into such questions as freedom of the press and the First Amendment. It's also fair to say that the situation has become much more serious in recent months." An interesting doctrine; if the situation gets serious, perhaps we should ignore the First Amendment.

At the time, in fact, the CIA was busily drafting the "Carlucci bill," for submission to the intelligence committees. Members and staff were shocked, however, by his remarks on TV, convinced that the bill he was talking about was obviously unconstitutional. If the Agency wants such a bill to reach Congress, they will have to ask one of their hacks to introduce it for them. For our part, we continue to rely on the Constitution. We know what we do is lawful. We also think it is necessary—to expose the anti-democratic and oftentimes brutal excesses of the U.S. intelligence complex. Freedom of the press must apply to us as it does to all journalists.

From Number 7 (December 1979)

We owe our readers an apology. In our last editorial we suggested that the legislation being urged by Deputy CIA Director Carlucci to criminalize our "Naming Names" column was so obviously unconstitutional he would have to get a hack to introduce it. To our surprise, on October 17, the entire House Select Committee on Intelligence introduced the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. It combines an anti-Agee bill with an anti-CAIB bill.

When introducing the bill, Rep. Boland admitted, "I fully realize that this latter provision will be controversial. It could subject a private citizen to criminal prosecution for disclosing unclassified information obtained from unclassified sources." Precisely. This is the first time a genuine Official Secrets Act has been on the floor of Congress in some time. Though not aimed solely at us, that is what the Agency would like people to believe. The primary victims of such legislation would be both whistleblowers inside the government and investigative journalists outside. That it is limited to information which

This bill authorized, in some instances, burglaries and mail-openings against U.S. citizens not suspected of crimes, specifically authorizing the use of journalists, academics, and the clergy as agents...

identifies officers or agents is of little significance, because it is virtually impossible to expose illegal or immoral conduct within government without disclosing who is responsible for, or involved with, the crimes. As we have always said, you cannot separate the

operations from the operators.

From Number 8 (March 1980)

In recent months there has been a flurry of legislative activity centering around the role of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Late last year a spate of Intelligence Identity Protection bills were introduced—purportedly aimed at this *Bulletin*, but in fact threatening the entire journalistic community. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan has added two new elements, a proposal to exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act, and another to limit, if not eliminate altogether, congressional oversight of covert action. Finally the Senate version of the long-awaited Foreign Intelligence Charter was introduced.

This bill was, in some respects, worse than anything the administration had been publicly asking for, authorizing in some instances burglaries and mail-openings against U.S. citizens not suspected of crimes, specifically authorizing the use of journalists, academics, and the clergy as agents, and other clear steps backwards. Sen. Huddleston, the chief sponsor of the bill, noted that the committee had been able to overcome "purist attitudes" about such minor inconveniences as bugging, tapping, and burglarizing innocent people.

From Number 9 (June 1980)

At the time of the Church Committee Report in 1976, there were calls for massive intelligence reforms and serious restrictions on the CIA. By a sophisticated mixture of stalling, stonewalling, and deal-making, the CIA and its supporters managed, in three years, to reverse the trend completely. There were demands to "unleash" the CIA.

A first draft charter proposed some restrictions, but the administration attacked them all. This led to a new version of the charter, designed to exempt the CIA from the FOIA, to repeal the requirement of prior notice to Congress of covert actions, to criminalize disclosure of intelligence officers, agents, and sources, and to authorize a wide range of covert operations at home and abroad.

The major public debate involved prior notice. Should Congress be notified of major covert operations before they occurred? The cynicism of this focus has two facets. First of all, to a large extent the debate was fatuous; the CIA has always ignored reporting requirements whenever it felt it was necessary. More importantly, the discussion of *when* to report covert actions ignored the moral issue of *whether* to undertake covert operations at all, or in what circumstances. We believe

covert actions are morally wrong. They involve the manipulation of events in other countries, events which should be left to the people of those countries to decide. There is little congressional support for this view, and no discussion of it.

From Number 10 (August 1980)

When the hysterical rush to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection bills began in early July, editorial writers jumped on the bandwagon without thinking. The *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, and many others hastened to prove their patriotism by calling for the passage of the act. Deference to the First Amendment, to freedom of the press, was muted. "It's a ticklish task," the *Bulletin* admitted, but "we hope Congress can draft a law that will provide our agents with the carefully defined protection they need." The *New York Times* was more direct, if also more egotistical: "A law that would punish Mr. Wolf for publishing secret names in his CovertAction Information Bulletin could also punish a newspaper that identified an agent in the valid and necessary reporting of events or in the course of a legitimate study of the CIA.... Let us look at laws that might get them, but let us not in the process compound the damage they do." That is, get *CAIB* but don't get the *New York Times*.

In a press conference we called, and in numerous letters we wrote, we stressed that since we did not obtain the names from classified sources, there was no law that could "get" us and not also get the *New York Times* and everyone else. The establishment press shed some of their delusions of sanctity and began to see the point. The *New York Times* actually reversed its stand: "So long as they aren't caught using secrets that Mr. Agee learned at the agency, or stealing secret documents, they are free to guess at the identities of agents and to publish their speculations in newsletters." The *Washington Post* agreed: "To the extent possible, the CIA can remove from the public domain the materials that permit a Louis Wolf to operate. Beyond that, however, ...his mischief cannot be the cause of an abridgment of the freedoms that the population as a whole enjoys."

Congress went to extraordinary lengths to draft a law aimed at *CAIB*. The House language criminalized anyone who, "in the course of an effort to identify and expose covert agents" did so; the Senate criminalized one who, "in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose agents" did so.

It is obvious that the contorted language is an attempt to give the law the appearance of being a threat only to *CAIB*. But it is so vague and slippery it could be applied to almost any investigative journalists. What concerns us is the apparent apathy on the part of leading investigative journalists and their publishers. Some of our friends say we are making life more difficult for them; it would be much easier if we did not publish the magazine. Then Congress would not be attempting to ban it. This argument was made to us when we planned the publication of *Dirty Work*. People said if we published a book listing names of CIA officers Congress might try to make it illegal. Wonderful, we responded. If we did not publish the book they would not even have to try. The point is that jour-

nalists, publishers, and all civil libertarians should be screaming against these bills. For the first time, Congress is contemplating passing an Official Secrets Act, to make it a crime to publish something which isn't secret in the first place.

From Number 11 (December 1980)

The regular session of Congress ended without any floor action on the bill designed to prevent the exposure of intelligence abuses and personnel. However, Deputy Director Carlucci announced that the Agency will be pushing for its passage once again as soon as Congress is back in session. The mood of the country is by no means liberal. Ronald Reagan will be the next President; George Bush—former Director of Central Intelligence—will be Vice-President, and the new Congress will be more to the right. Not that the Carter administration has been a bulwark of liberalism. The fight for one law after another designed to unleash the CIA and the other arms of the intelligence octopus have all been led by Democrats in a Democratic-controlled Congress.

From Number 12 (April 1981)

The Reagan administration has moved into Washington, filling nearly every available government post with ultra-conservatives so far to the right that the fears of everyone before the inauguration have been shown to be inadequate.

One of the most serious moves is the establishment of a Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, which represents the cutting edge of a return to the Cold War and McCarthyism. There are plans for a new Un-American Activities Committee in the House, and the government has announced that it intends to amend the Executive Order of the Carter administration which attempted to place some minimal limitations on illegal FBI and CIA activities. Moves to exempt the FBI and CIA from the FOIA are well under way. And, of course, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act is moving through the new, more conservative Congress.

From Number 13 (July 1981)

The Reagan administration's decision to replace the already bankrupt and hypocritical Carter human rights policy with the emotionally charged and paranoid concept of terrorism was long in the making. The American Security Council, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies had sounded the alarm, paving the way for the change. As terrorism replaces human rights in policy as well as in practice, dictators get off the hook, massive military aid is justified, torture and disappearances are condoned, and rightist and state terrorism is redefined and made acceptable as a weapon.

In part because of "unauthorized" leaks, and because the administration wants to control which aspects of its machinations become public, there is a many-pronged attack on open government. These include the Intelligence Identities bill, the attempt to repeal or gut the FOIA, the move to repeal the Clark Amendment, and the proposed Executive Order to legitimize increased covert operations in the U.S.

The leaks are not the only problem the administration faces

with its new policies. Western allies are not going along with it all. They did not buy the "White Paper" on El Salvador and they do not buy the communist/terrorist conspiracy line. But Reaganites do not give up easily, and there are undoubtedly difficult times ahead.

From Number 14-15 (October 1981)

The administration is now committed to CIA dirty tricks on a scale not seen since the Agency's heyday. During the election campaign the CIA complained that President Carter had tied its hands. But now the CIA is "expanding its most secret clandestine, covert and paramilitary operations overseas" (*Washington Post*, June 15, 1981). There are so many moves afoot to shroud this administration's actions in secrecy that we can only briefly list them.

- The CIA has abolished its Office of Public Affairs and appointed an assistant to the Director to deal with the press by what he calls "inverse public relations."

- The CIA is sharply curtailing its publication of unclassified reports and analyses.

- According to the Associated Press (August 3, 1981), the CIA announced it is "willing to provide 'background' information to newsmen about to embark on trips abroad, provided that when they return, they brief the agency on the countries they visited." This open admission of the use of journalists as intelligence agents did not generate any controversy in the press.

- The Reagan administration Executive Order on domestic spying is nearing implementation. It will eliminate the minimal 1978 Carter guidelines and authorize widespread covert operations by the CIA within the United States. It will legitimize infiltration and manipulation of lawful political organizations.

- The government is taking further steps to stifle criticism and whistleblowing by disillusioned intelligence personnel. The revocation of the "Snepp guidelines," minimal restrictions on prior censorship of publications, is one such step.

- A strong move is under way to repeal the FOIA, or to exempt completely the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA and other intelligence agencies from its coverage.

- The government is pushing for the power to conduct warrantless searches of newsrooms when officials suspect national security offenses.

- Then there are "black-bag" warrants, authorizing surreptitious entries for the purpose of installing, repairing, and removing electronic surveillance devices. The Carter administration began submitting requests for such warrants to the courts, but the Reagan administration has now announced that it will not bother even to submit such applications.

- But the most vicious assaults on the First Amendment are found in the Philip Agee passport case and in the Intelligence Identities Protection Act.

The Supreme Court ruling gave the Secretary of State the authority to revoke the passport of any American who travels and speaks out against U.S. foreign policy. And it goes beyond that. The Court stated:

Agee's disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution.

This effectively criminalized certain categories of speech, not even based on the content of the speech but on the intent of the speaker.

Sadly, but not unexpectedly, it now appears that the Intelligence Identities Protection Act will become law in one form or another—probably the worst. The campaign against the Act collapsed in part because of what

we believe were indefensible actions, a compromising of the First Amendment by representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union. Although many progressive people who opposed the bill believed the proper strategy was to delay and gain time to educate legislators, ACLU representatives, though they had publicly stated that *all* versions of the bill were unconstitutional, determined that since some sort of bill was going to pass, the correct strategy was to negotiate over specific language to end up with a "less unconstitutional" version.

ACLU representatives met secretly with the CIA at Langley and agreed that in exchange for CIA acceptance of the narrower language which they preferred, they would urge the Judiciary Committee not to have hearings and also urge people not to delay any further a final vote on the bill. This in fact is what happened, except that the ACLU was double-crossed by the CIA. When the narrow version was introduced on the floor of the House, the reactionary Rep. John Ashbrook, introduced an amendment to reinstate the original, "more unconstitutional" language. It was discovered that the CIA had actively lobbied for the amendment. Ashbrook knew all about the negotiations and said that the President and the CIA preferred his language to the "ACLU version." The amended bill passed overwhelmingly.

Whether the ACLU acted in self-interest and a desire to appear respectable, or in the sincere belief that it is not a violation of one's principles to promote the passage of an unconstitutional law, we must all cope with the results. Although the bill is clearly unconstitutional, given the nature of the present Supreme Court, a victory there is at best uncertain.

We want our readers, to know that we have no intention to cease publication. On the contrary, we believe that the rest of our magazine, beyond Naming Names, represents the most valuable contribution we can make to the struggle against U.S. interventionism. Regardless of the duration or success of the struggle against this law, *CAIB* will not disappear. ●

The administration is now committed to CIA dirty tricks on a scale not seen since the Agency's heyday...the CIA is "expanding its most secret clandestine, covert and paramilitary operations overseas."

Naming Names

by Louis Wolf

Editors' note: The last Naming Names column appeared in CAIB Number 14-15, October 1981. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act was passed with the primary intent of outlawing this column.

Duane R. "Dewey" Clarridge (a.k.a. "Dewey Maroni"): *From Number 12 (April 1981):* Clarridge is a case officer posted to Rome in August 1979. Clarridge has served in Kathmandu, Nepal; New Delhi and Madras, India; Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey—where, from 1971 till at least 1973 he was Deputy Chief of Station.

Update 1989: Clarridge joined the CIA in 1958. In the Spring of 1981 Clarridge was named Western Hemisphere Division operations chief and took charge of the new *contra* account. He personally delivered the CIA-authored assassination manual to the FDN leadership in Tegucigalpa in October 1983, and fashioned the plan to mine Nicaragua's harbors in early 1984. He visited South Africa in April 1984 urging the regime to contribute money and arms to the *contra* cause (which it did), and first introduced Lt. Col. Oliver North to *contra* leaders. In April 1988 he was forced into "retirement" as a result of his participation in the Iran-*contra* affair. In July, he joined General Dynamics Corporation in San Diego, California as military-electronic products marketing director. Ranking as the Pentagon's second largest supplier, General Dynamics is a major CIA and NSA contractor.

Thomas Alan Twetten: *From Number 5 (July-August 1979):* Twetten is the CIA Chief of Station in New Delhi, India. He served as a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1961-62, when he was assigned to the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy as Assistant Attache and political officer. In April 1966 he was transferred to the Benghazi, Libya Office, still a political officer. In 1968 he returned to Headquarters, till April 1970, when he appeared as Second Secretary and political officer at the Accra, Ghana Embassy. In 1973 he returned again to Headquarters, and in August of 1976 moved to New Delhi as Chief of Station.

Update Number 10 (August-September 1980): The January 1980 Amman Diplomatic List shows that the very month Twetten's name appeared in *CAIB* (1979) he was transferred to the Amman, Jordan Embassy.

Update 1989: In 1983, Twetten was moved in to head the CIA Near East/South Asia operations division. By late 1985, he had become commander of the Reagan administration's secret Iran arms-for-hostages deal. He was also one of the architects of the disinformation campaign against Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi. By April 1988, he was appointed to the number two slot in the CIA's operations directorate.

Vincent M. Cannistraro: *From Number 12 (April 1981):* The August 1980 Rome Diplomatic List confirms

Cannistraro's continued presence in Italy.

Update 1989: Cannistraro, who has undertaken CIA operational assignments in Africa and Europe since the early 1970s, became chief of the Agency's Nicaragua Task Force. He rose to Senior Director for Intelligence in the National Security Counsel with principal responsibility, under North, to monitor covert operations. Since Iran-*contra*, he has been reassigned to the CIA's counterterrorism section.

James Roderick Lilley: *From Number 16 (March 1982):* Lilley was assigned in November as head of the Taipei-based American Institute in Taiwan, headquarters for U.S. dealings with the Republic of China since diplomatic relations were broken in 1979. Lilley held CIA posts in Manila, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Hong Kong and Peking.

Update 1989: Lilley received the CIA's Distinguished Intelligence Medal in 1979. After stints at the NSA and in Taiwan, he became deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, and was Ambassador to Korea from 1986-88. He is now President Bush's envoy to China.

Nestor D. Sanchez: *From Number 16 (March 1982):* Sanchez spent tours in Morocco, Venezuela, as Chief of Station in Guatemala, Colombia, and recently, in Spain from 1976-79. He was named, on August 7, 1981 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs.

Update 1989: During a 1967-71 CIA tour as Chief of Station in Guatemala, some of Sanchez's Agency colleagues sought transfers in protest to his ties with rightwing death squads. His Pentagon reign from 1981 until January 1987 was marked by close working liaisons with Casey, North and others. *CAIB* has learned that Sanchez recently served on a State Department-created "consultative committee" on Panama. Currently, he is still a Pentagon consultant.

James M. Potts: *From Number 9 (June 1980):* Potts spent ten years undercover as an "analyst" with the Department of the Army. From 1960-64 and from 1968-72 he served in Athens, Greece, first as Deputy Chief of Station, and then, after a tour at Headquarters, as Chief of Station. In 1972 he returned to Langley as Deputy Chief of the Africa Division, moving up, in 1974 to Chief of the Division. He spent his next two years as the director of CIA Angola operations. He was also intimately involved in the Space Research Corporation scandal involving the illegal shipment of arms to South Africa.

Update 1989: Potts retired in 1980. In 1984, he authored a 10-page Heritage Foundation "Backgrounder" titled "Angola and the U.S.: The Shape of a Prudent Compromise," explicitly advocating repeal of the nine year-old Clark Amendment prohibiting covert aid to UNITA guerrillas. Today he is employed at the Parvus Company and its subsidiary, Information Security International, Inc., both in Silver Spring, MD. ●

The Biggest Eavesdropper of Them All:

The National Security Agency

Editors' Note: This exclusive interview was published in CAIB Number 11, December 1980. It goes without saying that under Ronald Reagan, the NSA increased its budget and expanded its activities. While several lawsuits have challenged the NSA's ultra-secrecy and illegal surveillance, none have successfully shed light on the enormous scope and breadth of NSA activities. This super-secret agency, which few Americans know anything about, intends to remain that way.

NSA is hardly a household acronym, even today. Few know that its headquarters are at Fort Meade in Maryland. It is a standing joke at Fort Meade that NSA stands for "Never Say Anything." But the implications of the NSA's activity are anything but funny.

Established in 1952 by President Truman, in an executive order which has remained secret to this day, the prime mission of the NSA was supposed to be the protection of U.S. communications from foreign interception and the cracking of foreign codes. However, the existence today of genuinely unbreakable codes calls into question the very reason for the NSA to exist. The days of breaking Japanese naval codes are over. The NSA's mandate therefore must be larger than originally called for. It is clear that, from its inception, the NSA has been deeply involved in the interception of any communications thought by it to be of national security interest.

Until 1976, the government consistently denied that it was intercepting the private communications of American citizens. Then, in the aftermath of Watergate, Congressional investigations revealed the tip of the iceberg. In hearings before the Church Committee, the director of the NSA, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, admitted that the NSA had been reading Americans' telegrams and listening to their phone calls. This was known as Operation Shamrock and while its alleged purpose was to search for evidence of foreign involvement in the anti-war movement, after extensive surveillance, no such evidence was found. [Similar to the findings in the FBI's CISPES probe of recent years.]

The NSA is a big operation. Its Fort Meade headquarters are said to be bigger than the CIA's building in Langley, Virginia, and more modern than the Pentagon. Its annual budget is estimated at between \$1.5 billion and \$15 billion. It has the most powerful computers in the world. Former *New York Times* foreign correspondent Harrison Salisbury has reported that the agency destroys 20 tons of paper a day, using the waste paper to heat its buildings. But it is the information that the NSA keeps which is truly frightening. It is not difficult to determine that the NSA monitors nearly all telephone calls and telegrams coming into and going out of the United States. Beyond this, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the NSA monitors a great deal of domestic telephone traffic.

Exclusive Interview

The interview which follows was conducted with two experts on communications intelligence, one an NSA veteran. For obvious reasons, they cannot be identified here.

Q. You are experts in the interception of broad-band electronic communication. Could you explain briefly what this is?

A. The ordinary citizen regards wiretapping as a person operating a tape recorder, where the person makes a direct connection into the private line of the individual citizen. Decades ago this was the predominant technique used by intelligence and law enforcement people. It is still employed in some large measure.

Today, however, the bulk of interception and acquisition of information sent by citizens is being done by the intelligence community at select points in the long lines telecommunication system in this country and around the world. These are at places where there is a great concentration of circuits. We call them pinch points, or points of constriction.

Q. What kind of interception takes place at that point?

A. There are two kinds of interception operations. One would be a cooperative interception operation, where the communications common carrier, such as ATT in the U.S., is cooperating with the intelligence operation. The other is the covert operation, where the communications common carrier is *not* cooperating with the intercepting agency. Many covert operations involve interception of microwave multi-channel telecommunications circuits by a hidden antenna — in fact two antennas, one aimed at each link of microwave towers.

Q. The governments of the world can't listen to every word being transmitted. How do they narrow down what they analyze?

A. The intelligence agencies involved in communications intelligence (COMINT) use extremely sophisticated equipment to separate out targeted communications, and then subject these communications to further analysis. It is as if the communications pass through a series of sieves each having a finer mesh.

The first and second level of screening are done on a non-oral basis, on the header information. This is the beedle-de-beep one hears after dialing a long distance call. This information is used by NSA computers to screen phone calls and telex communications...and the computer decides immediately whether or not to drop a tape recording into the circuit.

It would be wrong to state that every telephone in this country is tapped. There is, however, reason to believe that a large percentage of domestic long distance telephone calls are being analyzed by non-oral means to retrieve messages of interest to the intelligence community.

Q: You are saying that all traffic, where one or both parties are outside the U.S. is being intercepted?

A: You are using the word "intercepted." The NSA chooses to use the word "interception" when a computer analysis of the dialing information is done, but no recording is made. In the Wiretap Act of 1968, the word "interception" occurred over a hundred times. Its companion act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, does not use the word "interception" once. If they used the word "interception" they would have to define it. "Interception" is defined in the Wiretap Act and includes the temporary acquisition and analysis of information.

Now, the question is, are all international phone calls and



NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.

telexes being intercepted? Under the definition in the Wiretap Act of 1968, virtually all. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, what is done is not defined as interception in most cases. But from the digital standpoint, the address information, virtually all international calls are analyzed.

Q: Is there a pre-determined formula to decide what will be recorded and read or listened to, or is this left in some degree to the judgment of the individual agent?

A: Both cases. There are lists of key words; hundreds and thousands of them. Quite often a phone number, or a combination of phone numbers is targeted, so that if A's phone calls B's phone, a recording is made of that conversation. Or, all calls from A's phone may be targeted; or all calls to A's phone, or both.

But, as sophisticated as the computer is, and as comprehensive as the guidelines may be, there is no substitute for the skill of the intelligence analyst.

Q: Are more calls recorded than listened to by human analysts?

A: Perhaps so, but I would say that of those conversations that are recorded, a greater portion are listened to. In the case of non-oral communications, even more sophisticated automatic analysis is done before the human looks at it. In the case of a telegram, it would be projected on a cathode ray

screen, and the analyst would quickly scan it to determine if it is of intelligence interest.

Q: Suppose a person that the NSA is interested in uses a pay phone?

A: The telephone company's telecommunications system computer is available to the NSA. That computer knows all the pay phones in the country. If a call is made between two pay phones, the assumption is made that nefarious activity is more likely to be going on.

Now, suppose you are a person involved in political activity not to the liking of the NSA. They can develop a profile of your dialing habits—whom you talk to. As a result, if you have spoken to a person several times, they will know this and his telephone will be included in the octopus surrounding you, and they may have surveillance on your friend's phone because of his association with you.

Q: If an agency has a tap on a phone, can they tell where an incoming call is dialed from?

A: Yes. An ordinary tap will not do this, but there are systems that will.

Q: How quickly?

A: Immediately. You should understand that with the TSPS system, where you dial 0 and then the long distance number, the operator has in front of him or her on an illuminated screen, both the number you are calling from and the number you are calling.

Q: Is there a computer technology to screen conversations on the basis of key words?

A: Yes, they can do voice key word analysis. However, this technique is not in widespread use on oral communications, because there are other processes that will allow them to zero in on conversations of interest. They can do it, but it requires a great deal of expense and computer time. This is because your pronunciation of the word "oil" will be different from mine, and my pronunciation will vary. O-I-L will be spelled the same way virtually all the time when transmitted over telex. But there is variation in the inflection of the voice, and it is generally not cost-effective to screen oral communications by automatic electronic analysis.

Now, I must say again that these techniques have been developed and are being used, but not on as broad a scale as is popularly thought, on oral communications.

Q: Can you tell us about the one-way telephone connections between Hunters Stones and Menwith Hill in England.

A: In the British publication *New Statesman*, Duncan Campbell revealed the existence of an underground coaxial cable between the Hunters Stones microwave terminal, which is the central part of the backbone of the British long lines telecommunication system, and the NSA's British listening facility at Menwith Hill. Hunters Stones is a centroid of the British microwave long lines network. It is also the hub through which much of the national security information, radar, and other sensing devices pass. So it would be unfair to say that *all* activity passing from Hunters Stones to Menwith Hill is intercepted domestic or international telecommunications. However, the circuit capacity in existence is much beyond that necessary for non-communications intel-

ligence, that is signals intelligence.

Q: Does the same situation exist with the one-way lines going between the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suitland and the NSA's facility at Fort Meade, and which backs up against ATTs long distance telephone microwave link in Waldorf, Maryland?

A: That is correct. The circuit capacity in these cases is much greater than is necessary for non-communications intelligence. It is in terms of tens of thousands of one-way parallel circuits. There is no need, generally speaking, for one-way circuits in ordinary communications. One can count on one's hand the very limited necessity for one-way circuits. One is broadcasting, another weather service, another news circuitry, and the stock ticker. But the capacity of the NSA to suck up communications far exceeds these needs, or signals intelligence, or the relatively few wiretaps they admit. So we see that a great vacuum cleaner exists.

With Duncan Campbell's material, there is yet another vacuum cleaner being serviced by extremely broad-banded multi-circuited channels going from Hunters Stones.

Q: Is the sole consumer the NSA and other U.S. agencies?

A: The NSA, often other U.S. agencies, and its hosts in some foreign countries.

Q: Does the CIA do this kind of broad-band interception also, or is it done exclusively by the NSA?

A: The CIA is engaged in this kind of activity. However, it is not the prime mover in this business. There is a cooperative effort between the CIA and the NSA. In those few cases where a friendly relationship cannot be effectuated between the NSA and the host country's officials, the CIA will install the equipment of the NSA in a totally covert operation.

Q: You have talked about the vast computer facilities of the NSA. Is it possible to describe, in numbers or in area, how much is involved.

A: As the years go by, more sophisticated computers are being developed, while the size of these computers is diminishing. If one were to travel to Fort Meade and look at the buildings, one would be impressed by the size of the facility, but not overly impressed. The reason is that their capability is dispersed around the world—in Texas, throughout the U.S., in England, and around the world. Their computers are dispersed around the world, but linked together by telecommunications. All of these computers are in effect one computer, a giant octopus that reaches around the world. The NSA is so intertwined with the computer industry that much of the development of modern computers was funded through the NSA: into IBM, into Univac, into Sperry Rand. And this is continuing.

Q: What is the historical practice of the NSA in giving the CIA intercepted information on U.S. citizens?

A: It's not just the CIA, it's the FBI and other agencies too. The problem is that there are channels and a proliferation of much of this intercepted information, which filters through to the Justice Department, the local police, and into regulatory agencies, even into licensing agencies, such as the American Bar Association, medical boards, and boards of educational certification. ●

How the CIA uses Bugs

by Ken Lawrence

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 6, October 1979.

According to Robert E. Lubow, the CIA uses insects for surveillance. In his book, *The War Animals*, Lubow told how the Agency used cockroaches to learn whether a certain man was visiting the Fifth Avenue apartment of a prominent New York socialite who was believed to be serving as a drop-off for a group of foreign agents.

The CIA's technique employed a pheromone, a chemical secreted by female cockroaches which sexually excites males. In closely confined quarters, male roaches exhibit severely agitated behavior in the presence of the female pheromone, even if only minute quantities are present.

A CIA agent followed the target onto a crowded subway car during rush hour and deposited a small smear of the pheromone on the man's jacket while crushed against him. Later, CIA agents surreptitiously entered the socialite's apartment with a cage of male cockroaches. When the roaches went wild, the CIA concluded the man had been there, as they had suspected all along.

This exotic method was also very costly. Lubow says it once took the U.S. Department of Agriculture nine months to extract 12.2 milligrams of pheromone from 10,000 virgin female roaches. This would have been enough, however, for the CIA to repeat its surveillance trick many times. But recently science has come to the rescue of the buggers. This year a team of chemists and biologists succeeded in synthesizing the pheromone and published their results (*Journal of the American Chemical Society*, April 25, 1979).

The first public reports of the synthesis suggested that the discovery might lead to a breakthrough in cockroach control. In a cover story, *Chemical and Engineering News* (April 30, 1979) speculated that the substance—called *periplanone B*—might be used to confuse the males and prevent them from mating. *Science News* (May 5, 1979) suggested the same thing. Although such research is continuing, W. Clark Still, the chemistry professor at Columbia University who solved the chemical mystery that made the synthesis possible, is much more cautious. He says *periplanone B* is only effective as an attractant over short distances.

Dr. Still was surprised to learn of the CIA's use of the pheromone. "It doesn't worry me too much," he said, when asked how his discovery might benefit the covert operators. Then he added, "I've given away a number of samples. As far as I know they're all to reputable pharmaceutical houses." Maybe so, but if the roaches in your kitchen seem like they're acting a little crazy, you might begin to wonder. ●

The Executive Order

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 16, March 1982. E.O. 12333 was the first step that Ronald Reagan took to curtail political rights in the U.S. One example of unchecked intelligence power is the FBI's illegal CISPES investigation. (It is interesting to note that five FBI agents reprimanded in the CISPES probe have since been promoted.)

From a civil liberties standpoint, the Carter Executive Order of 1978 was far from exemplary, and contained a number of unconstitutional authorizations. In brief, it allowed extensive spying on, and intrusions into the lives of people who were not suspected of engaging in, or attempting to engage in, any crime. But the Reagan Executive Order of December 4, 1981 (E.O. 12333) authorized much activity which was prohibited under the Carter version and, more importantly, set an entirely different tone and philosophy for intelligence activities.

For example, the old Order was "intended to achieve the proper balance between protection of *individual rights* and acquisition of essential information." The new Order says that "collection of such information is a priority objective," and calls for "the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of *individual interests*." The old Order allowed such activities "as *permitted* by this Order," while the new version allows activities "*consistent with*" the Order.

The Carter Order stated that senior officials must ensure that activities "are carried out in accordance with applicable law," a provision deleted from the new version. It also required reporting of activities "which raise *questions of legality or propriety*," while the new Order requires reporting of activities "they have reason to believe may be unlawful."

The Carter Order also required that collection of information "must be conducted in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties." While it can be shown that the spirit of this provision was often ignored, the Reagan Order eliminates it entirely.

These differences are subtle indeed compared to the substantive changes in Part 2 of the Reagan Order, "Conduct of Intelligence Activities." For example, while the Carter Order also allowed the CIA to engage in collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence within the U.S., the latter was "subject to the approval of the Attorney General." Under the new order, such collection is to be conducted "as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General." Thus specific CIA activities will not be subject to particularized scrutiny.

Most significantly the new Order allows the CIA for the first time to engage in covert operations in the U.S., so long as they are "not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media." How this

qualification can ever be enforced is unclear.

The Carter Order allowed physical surveillance by the CIA of a U.S. person abroad only if the person "is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power, engaging in international terrorist activities, or engaging in narcotics production or trafficking." The Reagan Order allows such surveillance merely to obtain "significant" foreign intelligence. Since foreign intelligence is defined to include "information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons," it is obvious that virtually any American overseas, dealing with any foreigners, will be subject to such surveillance.

The Reagan Order now allows warrantless unconsented physical searches, mail surveillance, monitoring, and similar techniques, if "there is probable cause to believe that the technique is *directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power*." The former version of the Order required "probable cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a foreign power." It is unclear what the Reagan administration means by a technique "directed against a foreign power." One cannot search, follow, or monitor a "foreign power." The new language would seem to authorize such intrusive techniques to be used against a person who is *not* suspected of being a foreign agent, merely if the person is in contact with foreigners.

The provisions relating to undisclosed participation in domestic organizations have also been substantially modified. The agency heads, rather than the Attorney General, may now approve such tactics, and they determine whether "lawful purposes" are to be achieved.

Finally, it has been reported that 30 pages of secret-guidelines are being prepared to implement the new Executive Order. It is likely that here, under cover of secrecy, the dangerous orientation of the new administration will be given effect.

MOVING?

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Accuracy in Media Rewrites the News

By Louis Wolf

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 21, Spring 1984. The original, lengthy article remains the definitive investigation of this notorious group.

"We're not for hire," claims Accuracy in Media (AIM). A Washington-based organization which touts itself as "America's only citizen's watchdog of the news media," its chairman, Reed Irvine, has picked fights with nearly every major media outlet in the United States, claiming they have strayed from AIM's alleged cause of media "accuracy," "balance," and "fairness."

Irvine's rhetoric and tactics give his game away. He and his group work tirelessly to convince the public there is a creeping Red Menace in much of the U.S. media.

AIM's beginnings were modest. With a reported \$200 initial capital, AIM was formed in September 1969, and incorporated in June 1971, by **John K. McLean**, an investment broker and past publisher of *Underground Conservative*; **Abraham H. Kalish**, who worked from 1949-58 with the U.S. Information Agency and from 1958-71 at the U.S. Army's Defense Intelligence School; and **Reed John Irvine**, who served in the Marine Corps as a Japanese language officer in the Pacific, and later with the War Department as a member of the U.S. Occupation forces in Japan.

In its early years, AIM was run by Kalish, but in 1971, when he was not rehired at his Defense Intelligence School job, Irvine assumed a larger role in the group, while, at first, he still held his Federal Reserve job as an economist. Irvine's influence was seen as a positive change by foundation and corporate donors. AIM's 1971 tax return showed expenditures of only \$5,047. In 1972, it rose to \$51,430.

AIM's Leading Lights

An examination of past and present officers, directors, and members of the national advisory board confirms AIM's sharp rightward tangent, belying its claim of nonpartisanship:

- **Murray Baron**, AIM associate and president since 1976, was a union official with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in New Jersey, and then a labor and industrial relations consultant to various U.S. and overseas corporations. He was a trustee of Freedom House, a member of the CIA-funded Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, and of the arch-conservative Committee of One Million, a defense appropriations lobby; and a co-founder of the CIA-sponsored Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam.

- Vice-president **Wilson C. Lucom** is best known for his disinformation campaign during the early 1970s against the President of Chile, Salvador Allende. He collaborated close-

ly with rightwing New York public relations entrepreneur Marvin Liebman who received funds from Chile's United Nations mission to publish *Chile la Verdad* (Chile The Truth), an openly anti-Allende propaganda sheet distributed throughout the United States.

- AIM co-founder and communications director since 1974, **Bernard Yoh** was born in Shanghai, China, and emigrated to the U.S. in 1947. He was a personal advisor in counterinsurgency techniques to former South Vietnamese puppet president Ngo Dinh Diem, serving under the CIA's infamous General Edward Lansdale. Yoh participated in covert missions into North Vietnam, having set up the Sea Swallows, an elite paramilitary and intelligence-gathering unit. He was the conduit through which CIA funds to that program were passed. Though Yoh is now considered a has-been by Agency stalwarts, he still collaborates with Washington-area rightwing Vietnamese exiles.

- Board member **Elbridge Durbrow** joined the State Department in 1930 and served as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 1957-61. Before retiring in 1968, he was an advisor to the commander of Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. In 1971 he was appointed director of the Freedom Studies Center of the American Security Council.

Other AIM advisory board members include:

- **Clare Boothe Luce**, at 80, the unchallenged duchess of rightwing philanthropy, supporting AIM financially since 1972.

- **Marx Lewis**, a former trade union official, at 85, fighting communism as chairman of the Council for the Defense of Freedom (formerly the Council Against Communist Aggression established in 1951). CDF publishes and distributes, jointly with AIM, the sensationalist *Washington Inquirer*.

- **Eugene Lyons**, a former senior editor of *Reader's Digest* who sits on the board of the extreme right Young Americans for Freedom and has served on the American Conservative Union board.


- **Frank Newton Trager**, formerly a National War College professor, since 1966 head of the National Strategy Information Center in New York and Washington.

- Retired Admiral **Thomas H. Moorer**, former Chief of Naval Operations and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman during the Nixon administration, a superhawk.

- Retired Marine Corps General **Lewis W. Walt**.

- Retired Rear Admiral **William Chamberlain Mott**, former special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, and now president of the conservative Capital Legal Foundation. Mott is also vice-president of Trager's National Strategy Information Center.

- **William E. Simon**, former Treasury Secretary and energy czar in the Nixon and Ford administrations; Heritage Foundation trustee; and wealthy funder of rightwing causes.
- **Dr. William Yandell Elliott**, onetime Harvard University government professor, a trustee of Radio Liberty.
- **Dr. Eugene P. Wigner**, chairman of the International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, a Rev. Moon front.
- **Dr. Frederick Seitz**, executive committee chairman of the pro-nuclear Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc., also involved with Rev. Moon.
- **Dr. Harry David Gideonse**, chairman of the Freedom House board of directors.
- **Alphons J. Hackl**, founder of the Acropolis Books publishing house, which has produced books of tremendous importance to the CIA.



Credit: Elaine Osowski

Reed Irvine.

Who Bankrolls AIM?

It is evident that these people are selected to raise money for AIM. As noted earlier, the fortunes of the organization began to improve in 1972. For several years, the annual budget was about \$60,000-\$100,000. In 1977, it exceeded \$200,000; in 1979 it was up to about \$513,000; and by 1981, the budget had risen sharply to over \$1.1 million. The current annual budget is over \$1.5 million.

AIM rewards its largest benefactors with a seat on its national advisory board. **Shelby Cullom Davis** a New York investment banker, joined AIM's board in 1972, and sits on the boards of the Heritage Foundation and the anti-union National Right to Work Foundation. Between November 1975 and February 1983, Davis's foundation gave AIM \$448,000.

Robert H. Kriebel, chairman of the board of the Loctite Corporation in Connecticut, has made substantial contributions to AIM since 1978.

AIM contributor and board member **Henry Salvatori** is the founder and retired head of Western Geophysical Company, a Houston-based Litton Industries subsidiary specializing in seismic petroleum exploration.

Karl Robin Bendetsen, retired chairman of the Connec-

ticut-based Champion International Corporation, has made frequent large donations to AIM.

Sir James Michael Goldsmith, rightwing British industrialist; **Lloyd Hilton Smith**, director of the Paraffine Oil Corporation; and **Lawrence Fertig**, conservative New York author and economist, are also large contributors.

But perhaps the most significant spoke in AIM's wheel of fortune is **Richard Mellon Scaife**, whose foundations have given approximately \$433,000 to AIM since 1977. Based in Pittsburgh, Scaife is a kingpin of both Old Right and New Right media projects. He was a witting partner with the CIA in creating and maintaining the Agency's London-based propaganda front, Forum World Features, until it was exposed in 1975 by European and American journalists. Since 1973, conservative causes and institutions have received over \$37 million from Scaife's foundations.

Buttering Up the Boardrooms

There is a correlation between some of the issues AIM takes up and some of the corporate money it receives. *Soho News* (July 15, 1981) revealed funding AIM was receiving from the oil companies. A Mobil Oil spokesman confirmed that it has given AIM some \$40,000. Irvine took up Mobil's case with the media on several occasions. In June 1980, he wrote to the board chairman of RCA, which owns NBC, claiming the network was guilty of an "anti-business" leaning, setting forth what must have been Mobil's own bottom line: "One solution would be to permit businesses such as Mobil to air opinion programs." In June 1981, at AIM's annual meeting, Mobil Oil was given an AIM award praising the firm for its hard-hitting television and newspaper advertising offensive, concluding that "corporations need not be timid." Texaco, Exxon, Chevron, Getty, and Phillips have also contributed to AIM.

In February 1976, during a gasoline price crisis, NBC's New York City affiliate aired a 5-part series on the issue. In April, beneath the headline, "NBC Zaps the Oil Companies," *AIM Report* said the program showed an "antipathy toward business." Highlighting statements by Mobil and Exxon, AIM called the oil companies "victims" who should be given a right of reply under the fairness doctrine.

In August 1982, Irvine attacked a Bill Moyers CBS story about pesticide use, defending the manufacturer, Union Carbide. Later Moyers commented that Irvine "is to accuracy in media what Cleopatra was to chastity on the Nile."

In Vietnam and Laos, thousands of mothers have had stillborn and deformed babies, and in the United States, over 20,000 Vietnam veterans have been disabled because of the effects of Agent Orange. AIM, however, has featured several denunciations of the widespread questions about Agent Orange and sponsored a luncheon starring retired Air Force Col. Charlie Hubbs, who claimed that in Vietnam, he would "slurp the stuff to demonstrate its harmlessness."

AIM Disinformation

Reed Irvine's preoccupation with the creeping communist menace is legendary. In 1983, at a conference on "The Lessons of Vietnam," he branded former *New York Times* cor-

respondent Harrison Salisbury a "purveyor of disinformation" for the views he expressed about the American role in Vietnam. Irvine's colleague Cliff Kincaid accused Don Luce, longtime peace advocate, of fabricating "the false story" about Vietnamese prisoners being held in what became known as "tiger cages." Three days after KAL 007 was shot down, *Washington Post* writer Michael Getler suggested U.S. intelligence involvement. Irvine retorted that Getler "seems to have planted ideas in the heads of the Russians," even though TASS had made the same claim the day before Getler's article appeared.

Irvine constantly blames the media for the Watergate scandal and the American military defeat in Indochina. Irvine went so far as to suggest that Walter Cronkite was serving the communist cause by some of his CBS evening news reportage, and said he had been told that "any correspondent who spends any length of time in Moscow and comes away not expressing revulsion for the communist system must be suspected of having been recruited." Cronkite was the CBS Moscow bureau chief from 1946-48.

AIM Tactics

On September 21, 1976, exiled Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and his assistant Ronni Karpen Moffitt were killed by a car bomb. Some newspaper reports referred to documents allegedly found in Letelier's briefcase which "proved" he was on the Cuban payroll. But after months of investigation, the federal prosecutor, Eugene Propper, said in court that he "had gone over the briefcase papers carefully and found no evidence Letelier is or ever has been an intelligence asset of the Cuban Government." Irvine charged an FBI coverup, and asked, "Now the question is, will the media tell the truth about Letelier even if the FBI won't?"

Whenever the major media come up with a hard story on U.S. military or intelligence agency operations, at home or abroad, AIM cries "disinformation." Witness AIM's treatment of Ray Bonner, the *New York Times* El Salvador correspondent. Bonner had been reporting consistently on deepening U.S. involvement there, on the heinous activities of the death squads, and about bloody wholesale massacres perpetrated by U.S.-trained armed forces and police. According to Reed Irvine, Bonner was "worth a division to the communists in Central America." AIM issued six stories in the first half of 1982, denigrating Bonner and accusing him of "conveying guerrilla propaganda." It published an "analysis" of Bonner's reports by Daniel James, a rightwing journalist with acknowledged CIA ties. The unremitting anti-Bonner campaign achieved its goal. Hundreds of *AIM Report* readers wrote to the *Times* and its advertisers to complain about Bonner. Ultimately, Bonner was reassigned, and AIM claimed a victory.

A frequent AIM tactic is to purchase small amounts of stock in media organizations, to attend stockholder meetings, and to stage confrontations with corporate officers. AIM's tactics have not always been legal. In April 1975, they spent nearly \$13,000 on a *Wall Street Journal* advertisement urging CBS and RCA stockholders to vote for AIM resolutions. The

Securities and Exchange Commission informed AIM that this amounted to an illegal effort to secure proxies and that the ad itself was misleading. AIM had to return all the \$15 donations people had sent in response to the ad.

AIM's Ties to the Teamsters

Since 1978, the Allied Educational Foundation has given AIM at least \$550,000. The grants represent a masterstroke of AIM president Murray Baron, who contacted his old friend and union crony, George D. Barasch, administrator of the foundation. In 1965, Barasch, former secretary-treasurer of Teamsters Local 815 in New Jersey, was charged by the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations with having misappropriated almost \$5 million in union and welfare pension funds. An Allied Educational Foundation employee told *CAIB* that Barasch is "a sort of consultant" to the foundation trustees, and described the organization as "a charitable educational foundation" which "works on anything that violates the Constitution," but would not explain what kinds of violations he was referring to. He stressed that the Allied Educational Foundation "has no direct connection with Accuracy in Media," a statement contradicted in AIM literature and mailings.

The installation of Jackie Presser as Teamsters president has been helpful to AIM. *CAIB* was told that AIM already functions in part as "a Teamster public relations front."

AIM and the Moonies

In July 1982, Rev. Moon's *Washington Times* invited some 200 U.S. editors and journalists to attend the October "World Media Conference" in Seoul, South Korea, all expenses paid, including spouses'. Only about a dozen accepted, including Reed Irvine and fellow AIMers Allan Brownfeld and Petr Beckmann. AIM-Moonie links go considerably deeper; Dan Holdgreiwe, who was associate editor of the defunct Moon paper, *The Rising Tide*, is now managing editor of the *Washington Inquirer*, which shares offices with AIM. *Washington Times* editor James R. Whelan, was the *Inquirer* publisher in 1979. Irvine also has a regular column in the *Washington Times*. The *Ripon Forum* (January 1983) charged that AIM receives volunteers or "low-cost workers" from the Moon organization.

Conclusion

Whether viewed from AIM's own narrow perspectives and priorities or from an independent, impartial standpoint, AIM has achieved a substantial impact both upon its limited following, and upon the print and electronic media which it targets with intensity. But are they more interested in accuracy in the media or in coercing media to propagate a one-sided presentation of the news ideologically acceptable to AIM? Is AIM so wedded to its large corporate and philanthropic donors that its daily work has turned into performing propaganda tasks which serve the donors' vested political and/or financial interests? Does AIM consider itself a judge or a jury of the media, or both? ●

Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown

by Ward Churchill *

Editors' Note: Since this article first appeared in CAIB Number 22, Fall 1984 Soldier of Fortune's role in the Nicaragua contra war has grown. SOF members have funded and trained the contras, in violation of the Neutrality Act, while the U.S. government looked the other way. Testimony in the Iran/contra hearings showed that Robert Brown worked with John Singlaub and Robert Owen to equip and train the contras.

There is a law in the United States (Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 959) popularly known as "The Neutrality Act." It reads in part: "Whoever, within the United States...retains another...to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States to be enlisted in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people as a soldier or a marine...shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both."

Robert K. Brown, editor and publisher of a magazine titled *Soldier of Fortune: The Journal of Professional Adventurers*, based in Boulder, Colorado, says he is not in violation of this law, nor of any others.

Yet, since 1975, Brown has been running classified advertisements in his magazine such as the following:

EX ARMY VET, Viet 65-66, 2/7 Cav., 37 yrs. old, seeks job as merc or security. Combat experience. Good physical condition. Will travel worldwide. You pay expenses.

He has also run full-page display ads (outside, rearcover, prime placement) featuring color reproductions of official Rhodesian National Army recruitment posters on a gratis basis and interviews with individuals like Major Nick Lamprecht, former Rhodesian National Army Recruitment Officer. Earlier, he financed the start-up of his magazine through the selling of "overseas employment opportunity packets" consisting of enlistment materials for the armies of Rhodesia and Oman through classified ads run in periodicals such as *Shotgun News*.

Bob Brown in Person

The aura of *Soldier of Fortune's* proprietor is, on its face, so absurd as to virtually command dismissal by the serious minded. The notion of a middle-aged man with a congenital back defect and a hearing impairment scurrying about the streets of Boulder, the veritable buckle of the granola belt, wearing the latest in camouflage fatigues and military berets is immediately laughable.

But there is another aspect to Brown and his enterprise which tends to be overlooked when he is dismissed as an objectionable, though thoroughly frivolous, phenomenon. For

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starters, two of *Soldier of Fortune's* staff editors have been killed while performing what can only be regarded as outright mercenary activities in the field. George W. Bacon III, the magazine's underwater combat editor who died in a 1976 ambush, was an unabashed combatant fighting for Holden Roberto's CIA-sponsored FNLA in Angola. Michael Echanis, martial arts director, was killed in a bomb blast aboard an aircraft in Nicaragua while serving as military advisor to Anastasio Somoza — and as tactical commander of the dictator's infamous National Guard in late 1978.

The Sandinista bomb which claimed Echanis also killed his assistant, a U.S. national named Charles Sanders, and a Vietnamese on U.S. green card alien status, euphemistically known as "Nguyen Van Nguyen" (approximately the equivalent of "Smith, John Smith"). Nicknamed "Bobby," he had long worked for the CIA and Special Forces, and had accompanied Echanis and Sanders to Nicaragua to work with the other person killed by the blast, National Guard commander Brigadier General José Ivan Allegrett Perez. Around *Soldier of Fortune* they showed copies of a cable from Secretary of State Vance to Echanis asking that he be careful to spare non-combatants in the course of performing his duties. Echanis's reply, if any, is unknown.

Investigations Thwarted

This combination of circumstances was enough to lead Colorado Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder and others to call for an investigation into the activities of Brown and those associated with his publications, all subsidiaries of another Brown-headed company, Omega Group, Ltd. It is apparently named after the anti-Castro Cuban terrorist group, Omega Seven, which shared responsibility for the assassination of Chilean diplomat, Orlando Letelier, and his colleague Ronni Moffitt, in Washington, D.C.

Brown and Omega Group, including Robert Himber, one time Army Intelligence operative attached to the CIA's Phoenix assassination program in Vietnam, ran feature articles on the deaths of Bacon and Echanis in the magazine.

Schroeder's investigation's demands, made in 1976 and again in 1979, have met with a rather curious response from the U.S. Department of Justice. In effect, Justice informed Schroeder that Brown and his cohorts had indeed been placed under investigation, and that the investigation would continue until the activities being investigated stopped. Details of any ongoing criminal investigation could not, of course, be divulged. Hence, the net result of Schroeder's attempts to bring the doings of the Omega Group into the light of day has been to clamp the mantle of official secrecy tightly about the individuals and organizations involved.

Links to the CIA

Brown is particularly touchy on this subject, branding it "pure bullshit" and often terminating conversations when questions drift toward possible associations between his organization and the CIA.

A longtime Boulder anti-mercenary activist says, "There is more than one level to what is going on at *Soldier of Fortune*. These guys go out of their way to come across as clowns to people who might otherwise tend to oppose them. It's a tactic designed to defuse the potential of effective criticism.

"Meanwhile, there's a very effective gray propaganda operation being conducted right under our very noses. A whole range of the American public is now being conditioned to accept the notion that mercenaries and small, contained, privately fought 'brushfire wars' are not only okay, but somehow glamorous. *Soldier of Fortune* did that.

"The mercenary activities revolving around *Soldier of Fortune* and Omega Group are being handled both ways, packaged and hidden. It's a very sophisticated operation in its way, and you just don't get this sort of finesse from a bunch of apparent dum-dums in the private sector. The whole thing smacks of a CIA operation, although admittedly a very weird one."

To be sure, both the intelligence community and Brown vehemently deny that any linkage between them exists, or has existed in the past. The record, however, shows something rather different. For example, a 1962 letter written by Brown and recently obtained from the archives of an arch-conservative California based institution reveals that he spent the period from 1954 to 1957 as a lieutenant in the U.S. Army's highly selective and very secretive Counterintelligence Corps. Not to be confused with the larger and more diversified Military Intelligence units, Counterintelligence has always had extremely close linkages (indeed, major overlaps) with the CIA.

Brown's 1962 letter was written to Marvin Leibman, then head of the New York based "American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters," a CIA front group engaged in drumming up sympathy and organizing material support for the so-called "5 Commando" of European mercenaries active during the Congo Civil War. In credentialing himself to Leibman, Brown revealed that he had been a domestic undercover operative, infiltrating "Fair Play for Cuba" committees for the notorious Chicago Police Subversive Squad. He then inquired as to whether Leibman had information concerning how American nationals might circumvent the provisions of the Neutrality Act in order to become mercenary combatants in places like the Congo.

Brown reentered the Army during the second half of the 1960s as a Special Forces captain. Posted to the Pleiku region of Vietnam's Central Highlands, he headed a detachment supporting a Special Forces/CIA joint venture code-named "Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group." Actually, MACVSOG—or "the SOG," as it was called stood for "Special Operations Group." The unit was responsible for direct intelligence gathering, and ran highly secret missions into Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam,

and some say southern China, during the Vietnam War.

Brown's detachment was also involved in NLF/NVA political cadre identification for liquidation by the assassins of the CIA's "Operation Phoenix." The captain himself, of course, was responsible for liaison with CIA personnel, given his unit's operational capacity.

Brown's Publications

In the early 1970s, having mustered out of the Army for the second time he was "retired" due to physical infirmities including scoliosis (a congenital spinal disease) and deafness in one ear for which he claims to have been awarded the Purple Heart. Brown set out to establish his mercenary clearing house operation and accompanying trade journal. One of the steps he took along the way was to resume a career as publisher he



SOF Leader and Mentor, Robert K. Brown.

had undertaken in partnership with a Coloradan named Peter Lund before his last military enlistment.

Together, Brown and Lund had founded a company called "Panther Press." The purpose of this venture was to reprint army weapons and field manuals (obtainable free of charge from appropriate government agencies at the time) for sale to the public. Involvement in Panther Press resulted in one of the few times Bob Brown was brought to court by the government, but not for the act of "borrowing" government publications in this fashion. Rather, the government was concerned that because of its name the enterprise was an undertaking of the Black Panther Party. Once it was firmly established that the press was a rightwing rather than leftwing activity, the case was quietly dismissed.

In any event, according to various versions of events he has told, either publicly or privately, Brown then proceeded to sell his share of Panther Press (renamed Paladin Press), market his Oman/Rhodesia "employment packets," and/or obtain a loan from his mother in order to actualize *Soldier of Fortune*.

By his account, Brown founded the credibility of his new endeavor upon the active involvement of a number of former "super soldiers." Again, the facts belied his claim. For example, editor George Bacon, before his death consistently portrayed as a former Green Beret, turned out actually to have been a member of the CIA field station in Laos and winner of

the country's highest clandestine decoration, the Intelligence Star.

Similarly, Mike Echanis was never a member of Special Forces, albeit as a civilian he provided martial arts instruction to elite units such as the Ranger Groups, SEAL Teams and Green Berets. Rather, during his period as an editor of the magazine, he was a CIA contract employee. According to the CBS television program 60 Minutes and other sources, he was involved in Edwin Wilson's ill-fated CIA mission in Libya before going to Nicaragua.

David Bufkin, a self-proclaimed mercenary recruiter who, while not an official member of the *Soldier of Fortune*/Omega Group circle, is a close friend of Brown, and who "handled" the Americans killed in Angola, claims to have been a CIA employee for a long time now.

Expanded Activities

Since the rebuff of Schroeder's inquiries by the Justice Department Brown and Omega Group have become increasingly brazen. For instance, the magazine has featured an article by former managing editor Bob Poos recounting how a team of *Soldier of Fortune* "journalists" ran a full combat patrol "to kill a last few terrorists" in Zimbabwe the very night before the election marking transition from white minority to black majority rule in that country.

There have also been a spate of "I was there" stories by U.S. nationals who served in the Rhodesian National Army, despite ongoing and "official" State Department denials that evidence has been obtained that American citizens were involved in the fighting in Zimbabwe. Several of these individuals—Major Mike Williams and Captain John Early, among others—have now been added to the *Soldier of Fortune* roster.

In 1980, the magazine began to sponsor a series of annual conventions, bringing together the faithful a thousand at a time. Staged in Columbia, Missouri, the first convention presented a "Bull Simons Freedom Award" to Vang Pao, former head of the CIA's clandestine Hmong guerrilla army in Laos during the late 1960s. The late Arthur D. "Bull" Simons headed the first CIA-sponsored Special Forces mission into that country, later worked as a SOG commander and led the unsuccessful Special Forces raid on North Vietnam's Son Tay POW camp in 1970. (Promoting the quest for the return of mythical "live POWs" by the Vietnamese is another activity *Soldier of Fortune* excels at.)

Omega Group retains an active interest and presence in southern Africa. Editor Jim Graves was in contact with the two American participants Charles William Dukes (formerly of the Rhodesian National Army's elite Special Air Service) and Barry Francis Briggon (formerly of the Rhodesian Light Infantry) in the abortive 1981 attempt by a mercenary force to stage a coup in the Seychelles Islands. (See *CAIB*, Number 16.) The strike force, led by Colonel Mike Hoare was launched from South Africa, where Graves just happened to be visiting at the time. He later acknowledged that he had been aware of the planned coup attempt a month before it materialized.

Central America and Grenada

The organization has also demonstrated a lively interest and involvement in Afghanistan, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, but its real nuts-and-bolts focus has clearly shifted to Central America over the past two years. In 1983, for example, Omega Group sent a team to El Salvador on two separate occasions. Ostensibly led by Brown, the composition of the group was as follows:

- Colonel Alexander McColl: former SOG member and CIA liaison officer.
- Captain John Early: former Special Forces A Team commander and self-described mercenary in Rhodesia and Eritrea.
- Ben Jones: former mercenary in the Rhodesian African Rifles.
- Captain Cliff Albright: former Republic Airlines DC-9 pilot and also a former DC-3 and C-47 pilot for the CIA's Air America Company. Albright was also part of the Civilian Military Assistance mission to Honduras when two of its members were killed in Nicaragua.
- John Donovan: former SOG member, SWAT team trainer (by contract) and owner of Donovan's Demolitions, a company in southern Illinois specializing in blowing buildings and clearing logjams.
- Peter G. Kokalis: former member of U.S. Army Intelligence, now believed to be employed by the CIA.

The purpose of the visits was to assess the potential for an American "private sector" deployment of troops in El Salvador, and to provide training for the rabble of that country's exceptionally brutal Atlacatl Regiment. Instruction included the tactics of ambush and patrol, proper utilization of the U.S. light weapons issued to Salvadoran troops as standard gear, and principles of airmobile operations.

Considering these efforts a success, Brown has now publicly offered to replace the hotly contested advisory presence of U.S. Army personnel in El Salvador with professional cadres of his own choosing. Salvadoran fascist leader Roberto d'Aubuisson has accepted the offer in an equally public fashion.

Conclusion

All in all given the whole context of circumstances surrounding them, it seems evident that the supposedly "private sector" activities of Robert K. Brown and Omega Group are something else altogether. To the contrary, it is a near certainty that the whole operation is an integral, if little considered, aspect of the covert means through which the United States government and its transnational corporate allies plan to continue to assert their hegemony over much of the globe.

The fundamental reality of Omega Group is perhaps best summed up by a poster hanging on the wall of Boulder's *Soldier of Fortune* office complex: featuring a picture of a vulture availing its chance to descend upon its prey, the poster reads, "Killing is our business, and business is good." There is nothing abstract in that statement as it relates to SOF. The number of corpses in Asia, Africa, and Latin America due to SOF activities can attest to the accuracy of its meaning. ●

The Ordeal of Leonard Peltier

by William M. Kunstler*

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 24, Summer 1985. Leonard Peltier remains in jail; his cause as a political prisoner, representative of many others in the U.S., is one which continues to gain widespread world support.

On June 26, 1975, FBI Special Agents Jack R. Coler and Ronald A. Williams were shot to death during a fire fight with members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) on South Dakota's Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Joseph Stuntz Kills-right, a young Native American, was also killed. The four oldest Indian males said by the Bureau to have been at the scene—Robert E. Robideau, Darelle Dean Butler, James T. Eagle, and Leonard Peltier—were indicted for the murder of the agents. No one was ever charged with Stuntz's death.

In July of 1976, after a lengthy trial, Robideau and Butler were acquitted by a jury in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where their case, and that of Peltier, had been transferred because of local anti-Indian prejudice in South Dakota. The Justice Department then decided to dismiss charges against Eagle, the youngest of the four, who had not been present at the shootout, "so that the full prosecutive weight of the Federal Government could be directed against Leonard Peltier," who was extradited from Canada on the basis of affidavits obtained by the FBI from one Myrtle Poor Bear who swore that she had seen him shooting the agents. The Government was later forced to admit that all these documents were false, a concession that led one federal appellate court to characterize their use as "a clear abuse of the investigative process by the FBI."

On April 18, 1977, Peltier was convicted of the murders of the agents by a jury in Fargo, North Dakota, where, much to the surprise of the Cedar Rapids judge, his case had been mysteriously shifted. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Upon appeal, his convictions were affirmed with the finding that, although "the evidence against [him] was primarily circumstantial," the "critical evidence" was the testimony of one Evan Hodge, a Washington-based FBI firearms identification specialist. Hodge told the jury that Government Exhibit 34-B, a .223 caliber shell casing found in the open trunk of Coler's car, just a few feet from his body, was extracted from 34-A, an AR-15 rifle attributable to Peltier, but that he could reach no conclusion as to whether the gun had actually fired the bullet from that casing because of damage to its firing pin and breech face surfaces. Since the pathologists had opined that the agents had each been killed by a high velocity, small caliber weapon, such as an AR-15, fired at close range, Hodge's testimony was extremely damag-

ing to Peltier and was characterized by the prosecutor in his summation as "the most important piece of evidence in this case."

The Discrepancies Come to Light

Long years after the trial, Peltier obtained, through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a number of documents relating to the FBI's ballistics examination. One, a teletype from Hodge to the FBI resident agency at Rapid City, South Dakota, stated that a comparison between the .223 casings found at the shootout scene, referred to in FBIese as RESMURS, and Peltier's AR-15 had revealed that the weapon in question contained "a different firing pin than that in [the] rifle used at [the] RESMURS scene." On the strength of this, an appellate court ordered Judge Paul Benson, who had presided at the Fargo trial, to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to "the meaning of the...teletype and its relation to the ballistics evidence introduced at Peltier's trial."

The hearing took place in Bismarck, North Dakota, on October 1-3, 1984. Hodge, the only government witness, testified that he had been able to examine only seven of the 136 or so casings submitted to him for comparison. In fact, he had not got around to looking at 34-B until more than a half-year after the Pine Ridge confrontation. However, he freely admitted that he was constantly being importuned by Rapid City to test every casing forwarded to him, and that any such casings found near the bodies should have been examined on a priority basis. His failure to do so promptly, he explained, was due to a number of factors: the large volume of work associated with the RESMURS investigation, his necessary absences from Washington in connection with other FBI business, and the fact that only he and one assistant were available for firearms identification purposes.

While Hodge was on the stand, Peltier's attorneys were given an opportunity, for the first time, to look at the handwritten notes of his RESMURS work. They noticed that his key report—the one stating that the extractor marks on 34-B matched Peltier's AR-15—contained what looked like handwriting different from that of either Hodge or his assistant. He was asked whether a third person had worked on the RESMURS ballistics, and replied he was "sure" that none had.

The defense then asked Judge Benson for permission to have all of Hodge's notes examined by a handwriting expert. The court, with obvious reluctance, granted Peltier's motion. The judge then closed the hearing. An hour later, all counsel were suddenly asked to return to the courtroom. The government, claiming that it had "stubbed its toe," recalled Agent Hodge who testified that, after leaving the stand, he had shown the report in question to his assistant and had been informed

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by him that the handwriting was not his. Hodge said he did not know the identity of the person who had written the document. Judge Benson ordered the government to turn over to defense counsel copies of all of the RESMURS ballistics notes and to attempt to determine just who had written the report.

The Bureau later named one William Albrecht, Jr., as the laboratory trainee who wrote the key report about the matching of the crucial .223 casing and the AR-15 attributed to Pel-



Leonard Peltier.

tier. Albrecht's deposition was taken in Washington. Now an FBI special agent, he said that Hodge, his unit chief, had told him, shortly after returning from the Bismarck hearing, that "it was important to determine who had prepared" the note in question. Hodge had been "ecstatic" and "even hugged me" when Albrecht said he had written it.

RESMURS had been the first case he had worked on after being assigned to the laboratory as "an agent examiner trainee." He recalled that he had worked on this case with Hodge and "Mr. Hodge's technician." He admitted that the deaths of two FBI agents would have had "a high priority" in the firearms unit and would have been "of personal interest since it is a fellow agent." Such a case would have created "a very strong interest on the part of the office of origin" as well. However, a decision was made on the part of the laboratory not to compare ejector marks on the .223 RESMURS casings and the test firings from the Wichita AR-15, even though they could have had "some value...in the lab."

In February 1985, a motion for a new trial was submitted to Judge Benson. On May 24 the Judge decided that the new evidence would not have influenced a jury in any way and denied Peltier's motion for a new trial. [Editors' note: This decision was appealed and the appeal was denied; the Supreme Court then denied a petition for review.]

The Frameup

From the moment Hodge testified at his trial, Peltier has strenuously contended that the ballistics evidence against him was fabricated to ensure a conviction. Knowing that the extradition affidavits had been falsified and that the 1979 nine-month federal prosecution of Dennis Banks and Russell Means, co-leaders of the AIM occupation of Wounded Knee

a year earlier, had been dismissed because of massive FBI misconduct, he was understandably suspicious of Hodge's damning testimony.

The intensity of the FBI's determination to hold someone accountable for the loss of its two agents can best be seen in the Bureau's agonized frustration after the acquittals of Butler and Robideau. On July 19, 1976, three days after the end of the Butler-Robideau trial, Director Clarence M. Kelley called Rapid City and requested the field office's analysis "as to possible reasons why the jury found defendants...not guilty." The reply broadly hinted that the Iowa trial judge had, in a number of his significant rulings, been partial to the defense.

Three weeks later, the first of a spate of top- and middle-level conferences took place at Bureau headquarters "to... discuss what can be done by the FBI to assist the government in [the] presentation of [the Peltier] case at trial." Between August 6, 1976, and the beginning of the defendant's trial in Fargo in late March of 1977, at least six similar conferences were held.

While it is patently impossible, given the small percentage of existent documentation reluctantly released by the FBI in response to Peltier's FOIA suit, to know everything discussed or decided at these meetings, it is not difficult to make some reasoned guesses. For example, one of the reasons advanced by Rapid City for the Butler-Robideau acquittals was the statement of the jury's foreperson, as reported in the *Cedar Rapids Gazette* the day following the verdicts, that "the Government did not produce sufficient evidence of guilt...[it] did not show that either of the defendants did it." Based on this interview, the Bureau came to the conclusion that "[T]he jury apparently wanted the Government to show that Robideau and Butler actually pulled the trigger at close range."

What better way to supply the missing link in Peltier's case than to connect his weapon with a shell casing found near Coler's body, the bullet from which could have been responsible for his death? In this case, a little fabrication could go a long way to obtain the conviction the FBI so desperately sought, and an agency that had stooped to the withholding and doctoring of its files as well as the subornation of perjury in the Means-Banks prosecution was certainly not above suspicion in this respect. In fact, in ordering the Bismarck evidentiary hearing, the appellate court emphasized that what it referred to as the "discrepancy" in the teletype, particularly as it related to "a different firing pin," raised questions about "the truth and accuracy of Hodge's testimony regarding his inability to reach a 'conclusion' on the firing pin analysis and his positive conclusion regarding the extractor markings."

On June 25, 1984, three months before the Bismarck hearing, four Soviet Nobel Prize winners signed an appeal to President Reagan on Peltier's behalf. They cited his case as "a typical example of politically motivated persecution of Americans who are fighting for human rights...." Putting aside their rhetoric, the laureates, on the face of the record in Peltier's prosecution, shared the appellate court's concern with "the truth and accuracy of Hodge's testimony." If anything, the hearing, with its startling conclusion, raised the spectre of another tragic miscarriage of American justice. ●

The CIA's Blueprint For Nicaragua

by Philip Agee

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 6, October 1979 and it foreshadowed the rise of the CIA's contra army. The CIA has used all of the tactics which Agee describes here, resulting in the loss of thousands of Nicaraguan lives. However, the Nicaraguan revolution remains triumphant.

Months ago, when the Sandinistas showed that they could sustain their final offensive against Somoza's National Guard, an inter-agency working group was established within the National Security Council to monitor and evaluate developments in Nicaragua. Officers from the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and NSA, and perhaps others from other agencies formed the working group. In the CIA, a Nicaragua task force was no doubt formed within the Directorate of Operations. These people had to predict the likely developments, the political consequences of a Sandinista victory, and the chances of success of various possible American diplomatic and military initiatives.

Since the Sandinista triumph in July, the work of these "Nicaragua-watchers" has surely increased in volume and importance, but now with the additional task of preparing for clandestine intervention to influence the course of the Nicaraguan revolution. One can easily anticipate probable secret U.S. operations in Nicaragua.

The overall U.S. goals surely are to prevent establishment of socialist institutions inside Nicaragua, radicalization of the revolution, and an anti-U.S. foreign stance with attendant military and geo-political problems, including any Nicaraguan support to revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

For American policy to succeed, and to be prepared sufficiently for clandestine intervention, the CIA and other agencies need intimate knowledge of what is happening in Nicaragua. To supplement information from open sources and diplomatic contacts, intelligence must be collected through spies and other clandestine means.

The CIA's Need To Know

The CIA needs to know the precise power structure within and between the elements of the Sandinista political organization, the Government of National Reconstruction, the military and security services, the revolutionary defense committees, and the mass organizations of workers, peasants, women, youth and students. The CIA and other agencies must seek to identify potential friends and foes within this power structure.

What exactly are foreign governments, particularly Cuba, doing to assist in the formation of new police, military and security services? What are the continuing developments in Nicaragua's relations with governments and political move-

ments that backed them against Somoza, including Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela, and what are the potential problems in these relations? Who are the leaders of the other countries who could be enlisted secretly to denounce radical programs in Nicaragua? The list of requirements could go on and on, but without this kind of very detailed information the CIA will find clandestine intervention exceedingly difficult.

The CIA's programs for covert collection of information on Nicaragua continue, of course, from the period before the Sandinista victory. Besides the CIA Station in the U.S. Embassy in Managua, officers in many other Stations such as those in the Andean Pact countries, San Jose, Panama City, Mexico City, New York, Washington and Miami have special assignments for intelligence collection on Nicaragua. An active program to recruit spies within the revolutionary movement and government continues. The CIA could have installed bugs in key government offices in Managua during the final days of Somoza as well as in Nicaraguan Embassies in key countries—no problem, given the CIA's intimate relations with the Somocistas. (The CIA officer who replaced me in Montevideo in 1966 came on transfer from Managua where he had spent several years training the presidential bodyguards.)

Encoded Nicaraguan diplomatic communications will continue to be decrypted and read until new, secure systems are established. Diplomats from third countries collaborating with the CIA in Nicaragua and elsewhere can be assigned to collect data on the new Nicaraguan diplomatic service as its officials take over the Foreign Ministry and embassies around the world. All Nicaraguan government radio communications can be monitored from satellites and stations in the U.S. Embassy in Managua and in the United States.

Information on Nicaragua can also be collected through the CIA's long-running efforts to penetrate international political movements and national parties. The CIA can send its spies in these movements to Nicaragua for intelligence collection, or they can try to monitor what legitimate visitors say on their return. The reports of all important foreign visitors to Nicaragua, and of the Nicaraguans with whom they meet, are a continuing CIA need. And not least, military and police training programs in the U.S. and other countries allow for close evaluation and possible recruitment of visiting trainees. The CIA can also enlist the cooperation of "friendly" security services of other countries for this purpose if necessary, or its spies within those services can assist extra-officially.

Destabilization Revisited

During the months ahead the CIA will have to prepare contingency plans for clandestine intervention for consideration

by the National Security Council. If the revolutionary leadership in Nicaragua embarks on radical programs deemed inconsistent with perceived U.S. interests, the options are likely to include elements of the destabilization programs already applied in the 1970s in Chile, Angola, Portugal and Jamaica.

The immediate political goal would be to split the Sandinista leadership, create an emotive international "cause," and isolate leading radicals, falsely painting them as allied with Cuba and Soviet interests while against traditional Western, liberal values. Money and propaganda support for "moderates" and others responsive to American wishes would serve to enhance the local and international stature of leaders opposed to radical policies. Propaganda through local and international media, falsified documents and other provocations, and exploitation of historical differences within the Sandinista movement can contribute to splitting the political leadership.

Strikes in key unions promoted through CIA-backed local and international unions can impede reconstruction and create a climate of tension. Tensions and disagreements can also be fostered between the Nicaraguan government and those that supported the revolution against Somoza.

As the "cause" is established, mainly through propaganda promoting simplistic, black-and-white impressions efforts can be made to foment popular disillusion with the revolution and radical policies. One obvious lever is restriction of relief and reconstruction aid.

Possible key issues in the "cause" would be an international clamoring for "free" elections and opposition political organizing. The neighborhood defense committees would be denounced as a political apparatus. In any election campaign, the CIA could make huge sums of money available to its favored candidates and parties.

Acts of violence such as bombings and assassinations would also contribute to the desired psychological climate. Perhaps the military forces of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala—probably the CIA's closest allies in the region—could be strengthened in order to provoke border incidents and additional tension.

Eventually, if the scenario continued, the CIA could seek to provoke "moderates" in the political and military leadership to oust radicals from positions of power. If this were unrealistic, impossible or failed, U.S. diplomatic efforts could seek joint intervention through reviving the Inter-American Peace Force proposal rejected by the Organization of American States on the eve of the Sandinista victory in July.

A Team Effort

The CIA would not be the only U.S. government agency involved in intervention in Nicaragua, and participation by non-governmental organizations would be needed. U.S. representatives on international and commercial lending institutions, as well as the Export-Import Bank, would have instructions to impede credits. U.S. diplomats and military officers, in addition to the CIA, would try to influence leaders of other countries. U.S. businessmen engaged in Nicaragua could delay investments and other job-producing operations.

Special Forces Camps

After news reports appeared describing numerous secret military commando units, *CAIB* asked a military training expert to investigate. His observations confirm the growing Pentagon participation in covert paramilitary planning and operations—a field which was previously considered the province of the CIA and its agents and secret armies.

As the *New York Times* explained (June 8, 1984), "Some of the units were created to fight terrorism but have acquired broadened mandates and training for missions against insurgencies in developing countries in Central America, Africa, and Asia....In a few instances, including operations in Central America, these new units have worked in conjunction with CIA covert activities...." While the degree of Pentagon-CIA cooperation varies from case to case, what emerges is a picture of deep U.S. military involvement in what have been thought to be purely mercenary or "indigenous" operations. At all three major Special Forces bases, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Ft. Benning, Georgia; and Ft. Lewis, Washington, civilian mercenaries and foreign forces are being trained to fight like soldiers, but, more remarkably, U.S. military personnel are also being trained to fight like mercenaries—and to look like them and act like them, too.

It is now clear that "private" mercenaries, like the team from Civilian-Military Assistance, are receiving some Ranger training. In addition, although it is well known that Salvadoran troops are being trained at Ft. Bragg, *CAIB* has learned from a high ranking soldier stationed at Ft. Bragg that the trainees include "death squad" members.

The implications of these developments are clear. Even if an open U.S. invasion is not "convenient" in the near future, an invasion is already taking place. Not only is the U.S. training, financing, and leading the *contras* and, it seems, the death squads, it is also infiltrating active duty troops into the mercenary battle field in unknown numbers. U.S. soldiers, *CAIB* has learned, are being killed and wounded. The bodies are being taken back to Honduras and families are told of "fatal traffic accidents" in Honduras. How long can the pretense be kept up that there is no direct U.S. troop involvement? ●

And American media organizations would be important participants in propaganda campaigns.

From a distance, one cannot know whether the CIA could find or create the "moderate" opposition that will serve the U.S. government's interests. But the CIA surely knows that in its pursuit of American policy goals, it has many potential allies in Nicaragua besides supporters of the old regime. As traditional, non-Somoza interests are effected by revolutionary programs, the CIA may discover a fertile field in which to plant the seeds of counter-revolution. ●

Reagan Administration Links:

Guatemala's Terrorist Government

by Allan Nairn*

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 12, April 1981. Even with the election of civilian president Vinicio Cerezo, the military repression continues unabated in Guatemala. To date, tens of thousands of people have been killed in the revolutionary struggle and U.S. military aid is once again arming a murderous government.

Local businessmen and government officials involved with Guatemala's notorious death squads say they have struck a deal with Ronald Reagan which provides for restoration of U.S. weapons sales and training facilities to the Guatemalan military and police, curtailment of State Department criticism of the Guatemalan regime's massive human rights violations, and the ultimate prospect of U.S. military intervention to shore up that beleaguered Central American government.

Before his election, Reagan met personally with two leading spokesmen of the Guatemalan right and also through a series of visits to the country by aides and associates conveyed the details of what one U.S. businessman calls his promised "180-degree turn" in U.S. policy toward Guatemala. These visits include one at the time of the Republican Convention to offer Reagan's "salute" to Guatemalan president General Romero Lucas Garcia and inform him that "things were going to be changing."

High-level Guatemalan officials say that Reagan's assurances may already have led to an increase in the number of death squad assassinations and a senior leader of Guatemala's moderate Christian Democratic Party — already decimated by more than 34 assassinations of its top leadership in the last year — fears for his life.

The Campaign Connections

An ominous bargain has been struck by means of an extensive network of connections between the Reagan team and the Guatemalan extreme right, which include:

- Junkets to Guatemala by a "who's-who" of the American New Right, sponsored by Guatemalan speculator and right-wing activist Roberto Alejos Arzu, who made his plantation available as a training site for participants in the CIA's Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

Those along on one trip in April 1980 included top executives of Young Americans for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation, Moral Majority, Young Republicans' National Federation, the American Conservative Union, *Conservative Digest*, and such right-wing activists as Howard Phillips of the

Conservative Caucus and John Laxalt, president of Reagan's campaign organization Citizens for the Republic, and brother of the Reagan campaign chairperson, Senator Paul Laxalt.

- A Spring 1980 meeting in California between Reagan and Guatemalan hotel magnate Eduardo Carrette — the man whom General Lucas [Garcia] has asked to be his new ambassador to the U.S. and a leading figure in Amigos del Pais, a pressure group comprised of businessmen and landowners which Guatemala's recently-resigned Vice President Dr. Francisco Villagran has compared to the John Birch Society.

The now extremely active Amigos paid a hefty \$11,000 per month in retainer fees to Deaver and Hannaford, a Los Angeles-Washington, D.C. public relations firm headed by Reagan confidante Michael Deaver, which handled advertising for the Republican presidential campaign. Deaver is now White House Deputy Chief of Staff.

- Pressure on Congress by Reagan associates to "lend a sympathetic ear" to the Amigos current lobbying campaign for the restoration of military aid and training for the Guatemalan military.

Several other Reagan advisors have visited Guatemala in the past year, including Roger Fontaine, National Security Council assistant for Latin American affairs and retired Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, of his defense advisory committee, who also visited El Salvador for President Reagan.

Fontaine, who is an established hard-liner in regional matters, is the former director of Latin American Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, perhaps the nation's most conservative academic-activists center for Latin American affairs. He bolstered Guatemalan hopes in an interview published in the *Miami Herald* where he was quoted as saying, "It's pretty clear that Guatemalans will be given what aid they need in order to defend themselves against an armed minority which is aided and abetted by Cubans."

The Death Squads

Guatemala's death squads with such names as "Secret Anti-Communist Army" and "Eye for an Eye" specialize in "disappearances" of their political opponents, routine torture, and high-noon machine-gun executions in downtown Guatemala City as well as the country's outlying provinces.

Sources close to the Lucas Garcia regime report that the death squads are staffed and directed by the Guatemalan Army and Police under the command of President Lucas, Interior Minister Donald Alvarez Ruiz, and a group of top-ranking generals, with the assistance of Lucas's right-hand man, Colonel Hector Montalban, and national Chief of Police, Colonel German Chupina. Private businessmen provide the

*When this article first appeared in *CAIB*, Allan Nairn was a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Nairn is a renowned free-lance journalist who specializes in right wing activities in Latin America.

payrolls for the squads, and often assist in "compiling" the lists of troublesome labor, professional and political leaders as well as other suggested victims.

Cotton grower Raul Garcia Granados—a leader of the Guatemalan right who is the brother of Lucas's Chief of Staff and co-owner with Lucas of an estate in the northern Franja Transversal region—traces the lineage of the current deathsquads back four administrations to the late 1960s.

"Of course when they were organized, they were organized under the patronage and the approval of the government and the army," he said in a transcribed interview. "They have lists of people that are suspected to be communists of whatever kind, and they kill them. It's a war, you see, a war between the communists and the anti-communists. They [the deathsquads] have the sympathy of most of the Guatemalan people."

Elias Barahona, former press secretary to Interior Minister Alvarez Ruiz, who controls the national police, fled the country, declared he had become a member of the EGP (Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo) an anti-government guerrilla group, and in a Panama City press conference issued a 15-page statement detailing how Lucas and the generals run the deathsquads from the fourth floor of the National Palace Annex. He listed the address of houses used by the government for detention and torture of its kidnap victims.

Despite such mounting evidence, and the near-universal recognition that Guatemala is one of the worst human rights violators in the entire world, both Arano Osorio, known as "the butcher of Zacape," and former Guatemalan vice-president Mario Sandoval Alarcon, generally considered high commander of the deathsquads, were invited to the Reagan inauguration.

Guatemala and the Carter Administration

To the Lucas regime and the businessmen who support it, President Carter's human rights policy was an anathema. Lucas called Carter "Jimmy Castro." Feeling increasingly isolated and betrayed by Carter State Department policy in Guatemala, officials there chose to ignore Washington's urging that human rights violations be corrected.

Businessman Roberto Alejos complained: "Most of the elements in the State Department are probably pro-communist—they're using human rights as an argument to promote the socialization of these areas. We've gotten to the point now where we fear the State Department more than we fear communist infiltration. Either Mr. Carter is a totally incapable president or he is definitely a pro-communist element."


Milton Molina is a wealthy plantation owner who is reputed within Guatemala to have funded and ordered deathsquad attacks on dozens of peasants and workers. When asked about the squads in a transcribed interview, Molina replied, "Well, we have to do something, don't you think so?" Molina says he and his friends back Reagan "one hundred percent."

The deathsquads' defenders base their faith in Reagan on direct conversations with him and his top military and foreign policy advisors. According to a Reagan fundraiser, Reagan told ambassador-to-be Carrette, "Hang in 'til we get there.

We'll get in and then we'll give you help. Don't give up. Stay there and fight. I'll help you as soon as I get in."

The Guatemalan Lobby

The Reagan camp's courtship of the Guatemalan right began in earnest with the December 1979 visit to Guatemala of a delegation from the American Security Council, a private, ultra-hawk U.S. military lobby. One of the consultants on Guatemalan affairs for the ASC film "Attack on the Americas" was John C. Trotter, the notorious manager of Guatemala City's Coca-Cola bottling plant franchise. Trotter has been implicated in the deathsquad murders of a number of workers and union leaders at the bottling plant and was removed from management by Coca-Cola headquarters after an international union and church-led boycott of Coke protesting the situation at the plant in Guatemala.



Death Squad founder Mario Sandoval Alarcon with friends.

Trotter is also a director of the Guatemala Freedom Foundation, a pro-Lucas international lobby group founded by Roberto Alejos, which is more extreme than the Amigos del Pais organization.

Alejos hosted the ASC delegation and helped set up an itinerary which included visits with President Lucas and the Guatemalan military high command, helicopter tours to inspect rural counter-insurgency activities, and a cocktail party with Guatemalan businessmen at Alejos's estate.

The delegation was headed by two Reagan associates—retired General John K. Singlaub who has served as ASC's Director of Education, and retired Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, the former Defense Intelligence Agency head, who maintains an office at ASC's Washington, D.C. headquarters.

As an advisor to Reagan, Graham retains his position as co-chairperson for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, a Washington lobby composed of retired military personnel pushing for a larger defense budget. The Missouri branch of the Coalition met with Guatemalan and Salvadoran business and political leaders in St. Louis last May. Among the Guatemalan visitors were Manuel Ayau and Roberto Alejos. Ayau is a member of his nation's most ultra-conservative party, the National Liberation Movement, which is allegedly directly linked to paramilitary deathsquads freely operating in the country. He is considered to be the ideologue of the more extremist sector of the business community, and is also

on the board of GFF.

Alejos and Ayau are now well-known figures in Washington. With extensive help from their PR people, they have met with Congressional staff and State Department officials in the hopes of enlisting support for their political position.

Public Relations

Their publicity is handled primarily by MacKenzie, McCheyne, Inc. of Washington, D.C. In the past, this firm received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Somoza government of Nicaragua. It also promotes the El Salvador Freedom Foundation, which purports to be to the right of the Salvadoran junta, and it openly arranged the April 1980 Washington press conference given by Roberto D'Aubuisson. In the past two years, MacKenzie, McCheyne has received over \$250,000 from the GFF.

The Guatemalan emissaries are known to have been heartened to hear Gen. Graham's statement made during a trip to Argentina last year, that "Carter's human rights policy has had disastrous effects on America's relations with Latin America...and if Reagan is elected, the U.S. would abandon the policy of throwing old friends to the wolves."

Singlaub, the former commander of U.S. forces in South Korea dismissed by President Carter for insubordination, has good contacts with the informal network of radical right-wing mercenaries who aid dictatorships around the globe.

In a tape-recorded interview last August, Singlaub said that he was "terribly impressed" at how the Lucas regime was "desperately trying to promote human rights" and lamented the fact that "as the [Guatemalan] government loses support from the United States, it gives the impression to the people that there's something wrong with their government."

As for Graham, he acknowledged during a Washington telephone interview last year that he told President Lucas Garcia that on his return to the United States, he would urge the Reagan campaign team to provide for the resumption of military training and aid to Guatemala as soon as a victorious Reagan would be installed in office.

The Reagan aides' advice and supportive comments were the talk of official Guatemala for days after their visit. Within weeks, death squad assassinations increased dramatically and there was talk in government circles of even harsher measures.

The parade of visiting advisors continued. Roger Fontaine made at least two trips to Guatemala. Fontaine is on a first-name basis with right-wing figures and keeps in constant touch with them by telephone.

Through the Amigos del Pais and Alejos's and Trotter's Guatemala Freedom Foundation, a number of Guatemalans also came to the U.S. to meet Reagan and his staff. Both Amigos del Pais director Maegli, and Manuel Ayau, chief ideologue and theorist of the Guatemalan right, have met with Richard Allen, head of the National Security Council, and early last year, Alejos met with Reagan in California.

The Deal With Reagan

As described by Guatemalan and U.S. businessmen and

Guatemalan government officials, the bargain with the Reagan forces has four key elements. First, there is an agreement, as Maegli puts it, "to take our Army off the blacklist" — to restore weapons and ammunition sales, supply badly needed spare parts for the U.S.-built helicopters, and make available fighter and cargo planes to the Guatemalan air force as well as crowd control and counterinsurgency gear to the army and police.

Second, a commitment has been made to resume Pentagon training of the army and police, particularly in surveillance, intelligence and interrogation techniques. According to Robert Merrick, an American-born plantation owner who was in close touch with Reagan advisors, Fontaine promised him and a group of Guatemalan businessmen that Reagan "would do everything he could within the law to help train the Guatemalan police."

Third and perhaps most importantly, the Reagan supporters have agreed to cut back U.S. criticism of the death squads which the Guatemalan regime feels has so tarnished its international political and financial standing.

Finally, although the signals have been less explicit, there is also the expectation in government and business councils that President Reagan would intervene militarily in the event that a popular uprising threatened the Lucas government.

In anticipation of such support, businessmen who back the death squads gave their all for the Reagan campaign. In addition to the more than \$120,000 which Amigos del Pais paid to the Deaver and Hannaford firm, other public relations efforts by rightwing Guatemalan groups attempted to sway U.S. opinion concerning Central America, in Reagan's favor.

According to Merrick and others, American businessmen based in Guatemala gave heavily to the Reagan campaign. Yet a check of the names of more than 200 such individuals — including several who said specifically that they had contributed — against the list of Reagan donors disclosed to the Federal Election Commission, showed no public trace of any such contributions. (The sole exception was John Trotter, who through his wife, had given \$750 to the Reagan primary campaign.) One businessman who was solicited by the Reagan campaign said explicit instructions were given repeatedly: "Do not give to Mr. Reagan's campaign directly." Monies went instead to an undisclosed committee in California.

Last spring — when the Amigos del Pais were making the rounds of Congress asking for restoration of Guatemalan military training appropriation — Nancy Reynolds, Nancy Reagan's former press secretary and the current Vice President for public relations of the Bendix Corporation, called the office of Congressman Don Pease (Dem.-Ohio) and asked that he "lend a sympathetic ear" to Amigos del Pais members' plea for aid. "It's the first time we ever got a phone call like that," said the congressman's aide." It was Nancy Reynolds who recommended Deaver and Hannaford to Amigos del Pais. [Editors' Note: It's no small wonder that Michael Deaver was later indicted for influence peddling. The support the Reagan administration gave to the far Right in Guatemala is an indictment of Reagan's entire Central American foreign policy.]

Massive Destabilization in Jamaica

by Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

Editors' Note: This article is from CAIB Number 10, the August-September 1980 issue. The CIA's campaign in Jamaica in 1980 led to the provocation which in turn provided the impetus in Congress for the passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act.

In many other countries, somebody with a disciplined force of men behind him would have long ago taken the Government away from them.... In most Third World countries, our Ministers, Ministers of State, Party commanders, heads of statutory boards, among others, would now be in forced exile or buried in common graves.

This is from one of the many CIA-inspired provocateurs writing for the Jamaica *Daily Gleaner* urging the elimination of the constitutionally-elected government of Prime Minister Michael Manley and his Peoples National Party. Ominously, this column appeared only three weeks before an attempted coup against the government, involving several dozen members of the Jamaica Defence Force and a few civilian members of a small rightist party. On June 22, 1980, loyal security forces moved on the plotters, who had been under suspicion for several weeks, when it was learned that they planned to take action that night.

That the coup attempt had little chance of success should not have detracted from its seriousness. Edward Seaga, who was—as he often is when unexpected violence erupts in Jamaica—visiting Washington, derided the episode as a “comic opera.” But the JLP issued a statement deploring the incident and disassociating themselves from any knowledge of the plot.

The Focus of Destabilization

Before the last election in Jamaica the approach was different. The violence preceding the December 1976 vote was indiscriminate; arson, food poisonings, shootings—sheer terrorism. A large and active CIA station in Kingston was evident. Following Henry Kissinger's threats to Manley over his support for the MPLA in Angola, violence escalated dramatically. But the campaign was unsuccessful, and after Manley's landslide victory, economic penetration and destabilization were given a chance. Yet, by early 1980, as negotiations with the International Monetary Fund—the major instrument of economic interference—came to a standstill and were finally severed completely by the Jamaican government, a highly sophisticated campaign with a new focus emerged.

Indications of Outside Influence

Seaga's frequent trips to the United States and an unusually affluent Jamaica Labour Party are not the only signs of outside help. The JLP somehow obtained through its Miami

affiliate, the Jamaica Freedom League, about 90 surplus U.S. Post Office jeeps, implicated in several incidents of violence. Where they came from and how they were paid for is unclear.

Several “support groups” in the United States channel funds and materiel to the JLP. Most well-known are the Friends of Free Jamaica, in New York, and the Jamaica Freedom League, a coalition of Jamaican and Cuban exiles in Miami, which prints brightly-colored anti-government propaganda that quickly works its way to the island.

Seaga's Recent Ploys

One of the most potent disinformation weapons, standard procedure in past CIA destabilization operations, is for one side to accuse the other of precisely what it is doing. This muddies the waters and confuses the people. The *Gleaner* has thus accused the government, in no uncertain terms, of being liars. “It is one thing to have incompetents for leaders, another thing entirely to have liars.... The Government and its Party...are untrustworthy. Nothing they say is to be believed.”

One day after the attempted coup, Seaga went further in a speech in Washington, suggesting that the government would use the “comic opera” coup scenario as an excuse to declare a State of Emergency. “If such a State of Emergency were declared,” he said, “we would defy it.” He went on to predict that violence would spread from the Kingston area to the countryside, a prediction which began to come true in July when the JLP went on the rampage.

Although there is considerable evidence that forces around the JLP may be deeply involved in plans for a coup, it is Seaga who has constantly accused the government of planning what he refers to as a “military solution,” a phrase he introduced, typically, at a Washington press conference. On June 18, four days before the coup attempt, at a JLP fund-raising dinner, Seaga referred to “the military solution planned by the government to regain power in the next general election.”

Making the Economy Scream

The economy of Jamaica has suffered greatly in the past several years. But it is no coincidence that the real suffering began after Kissinger's vow to get Jamaica. As Richard Nixon told CIA Director Helms when Allende was elected in Chile, “Make the economy scream.” The major instrument used by the United States was the IMF. Its requirements for helping Jamaica out of its foreign debt problems can be boiled down to a few words: lower wages for workers and higher profits for the multinationals. Manley believed, wrongly, in 1977, that he had to turn to the IMF. By January 1980 when Jamaica broke off all further dealings with the IMF, he had learned a hard lesson. The IMF was neither impartial nor concerned with the interests of the Jamaican people. A June 1980 *Multinational*

Monitor article, based upon confidential IMF documents, demonstrates that IMF personnel in Jamaica "have been guided primarily by political considerations in their dealings with the island government." Indeed, the PNP's decision to break with the IMF has heightened U.S. antagonism and efforts to destabilize the Manley government. For the first time a significant Third World nation has taken a step to show the rest of the world that one can live without the IMF.

The CIA Presence

The staff of *CAIB*, visiting Jamaica, determined that it was obvious there was a large CIA station present, and a busy one at that. We discovered at least 15 CIA personnel operating out of the U.S. Embassy, making it the largest station in the Caribbean. The Deputy Chief of Station is known to have special training and expertise in liaison operations with right-wing and paramilitary groups. During his posting in Haiti between 1973-75, his assignment was coordination with the Ton-Ton Macoute, "Baby Doc" Duvalier's private death squad.

Other suspicious U.S. personnel also abound. At the time of the coup attempt, the senior military attaché at the U.S. Embassy was meeting outside the Embassy with numerous Army officers, even on the grounds of the headquarters of the Jamaica Defence Force, wholly out of keeping with normal diplomatic protocol. Other non-CIA State Department personnel were cooperating closely with the CIA people. Some clear indications of deep cover agents appeared.

One interesting discovery was the opening of a new route to Jamaica by Evergreen International Airlines in the middle of the summer when there were few tourists. Evergreen flew the deposed Shah of Iran from Panama to Egypt, at the behest of the United States. Evergreen also worked at Walvis Bay, a portion of Namibia claimed by South Africa. It initiated airborne crew transfers there for the *Glomar Challenger*, the sister ship of the *Glomar Explorer*, the CIA vessel used in an attempt to raise a sunken Soviet submarine. Evergreen, which owns the largest fleet of civilian-owned helicopters in the world, purchased from the Pentagon after the Vietnam War, has been reputed for some time to be either a CIA proprietary or a major contractor for the CIA.

Also, the bank used by the Jamaica Freedom League is the Bank of Perrine. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, it was the principal U.S. correspondent bank for Castle Bank of the Bahamas, the CIA's major financial institution in Latin America. Moreover, the Bank of Perrine was owned by Paul Helliwell, according to the *Journal*, a major CIA operative who coordinated 10 years of Nationalist Chinese attacks on the mainland during the 1950s, and was the "paymaster for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961." Helliwell was active in CIA operations in Latin America till his death in 1976.

In light of these discoveries, and at the urging of several Jamaican groups, *CAIB* described the CIA presence in detail at a press conference in Kingston. A subsequent phoney attack on the home of the Chief of Station led to the campaign against *CAIB* in Washington (see sidebar). But the message for Jamaica is clear. It was spelled out in a *Daily News* column:

Knowing a coup is going to be tried, sighting all the signs and publishing them, pinpointing even the month and week — does not prevent it from being tried. Neither does knowing about CIA involvement head it off. Neither does calling attention to the open wooing of the military by the right-wing press. Neither do rallies.... they are insufficient for the task. Against the species of determined brute in question, what is needed is a set of really tough measures in all sectors — economic, security, political and political education.... It is hardly enough simply to be on the look-out for a set of people pre-classified as simply "traitors." More far-reaching political measures are required. ●

From Our Editorial

Our on-the-scene investigation culminated in a press conference at which we divulged the names of 15 CIA people in the U.S. Embassy in Kingston. As we have "named names" for several years, we were not prepared for the incredible scenario which followed.

Two days after the press conference, after we had all left the island, reports appeared that there had been a shooting and a bombing at the home of the man we had named as the Chief of Station, N. Richard Kinsman. Initial reports were replete with inaccuracies, and as we discovered, the "attack" was questionable, to say the least.

The first inaccuracy was that the individual had just been exposed. He was, in fact, exposed in *CAIB* in October 1979, an act well-covered in the Jamaican media at the time. Reports of the incident also expressed relief that the bullets had missed him, his wife, and daughter. But his family was not home that night, and subsequent investigators expressed some doubt whether he was home either. Reports also circulated that bullets had whistled through a bedroom. But the bullet holes shown to the press were in a wall by the house's garage.

Then there was the alleged grenade. Initial reports mentioned a hole "the size of a basketball" in the front lawn. Others said it was "the size of a grapefruit." Whatever it was, it was a small hole in the ground dozens of yards from the house. And *no* grenade fragments were found. A maid sleeping in the house said she heard nothing. The CIA official did not call the police the following morning; he called the *Gleaner*.

We are convinced that the incident was a phoney. It may never be proved that the CIA staged the incident, but it was the most helpful thing for them that has happened in years. Just as the Welch assassination in Athens in 1975 brought the Church Committee investigations to a complete standstill, this incident has instantly created a wave of sympathy for the CIA, a barrage of attacks against *CAIB*, and renewed efforts in Congress to ban this magazine. ●

U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel

by Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 20, Winter 1984 and was one of the few analyses of the overthrow of the Bishop government to concentrate on the role of U.S. intelligence. The U.S. invasion of Grenada remains the most severe application of the "Reagan Doctrine," intervention of whatever sort necessary to reverse progressive victories around the world.

A curious aspect of the coverage of the coup against Maurice Bishop and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Grenada is the near absence in the press of any mention of the CIA or speculation about a CIA hand in the events. One would think William Casey was not present at George Bush's National Security Council meetings deciding to divert the fleet after the death of Bishop, advancing the incursion plans at a frenzied pace after the Beirut bombing—plotting each step of the invasion. One would think there were no CIA agents on Grenada after four and a half years of urgent and persistent endeavors to place them there, that there were no intelligence officers on the island, directing the Marines and Rangers, or aboard the U.S.S. *Guam* directing part of the invasion itself.

And yet we know that from the moment of the March 13, 1979, revolution in Grenada the CIA has relentlessly tried to destroy that tiny island's government and to eliminate that great threat to the U.S.—a charismatic black leader loved by his own people and respected by all who knew him.

It is now clear that for more than two years the U.S. government had been moving inexorably toward the military overthrow of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada. Early on, President Reagan's advisers recognized that a simple continuation of the Carter administration's destabilization campaign would not suffice.

Reagan's Changing Plans

In 1980, President Carter created the Caribbean Rapid Deployment Force, which staged exercises at Guantanamo Naval Base on Cuba—military posturing which Bishop denounced at the U.N. as a return to gunboat diplomacy and a revival of the Monroe Doctrine. Shortly thereafter, when Reagan took over, he embarked on a game plan which would lead to the actual use of those forces.

Promising to shore up the CIA and to stop the "Marxists" in Grenada from threatening their democratic neighbors, Reagan sent Jeane Kirkpatrick to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to urge them to develop a joint security treaty. This preoccupation with organizing unity among rightwing countries eventually culminated in the formation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the revival of the Central American Defense Council (Condeca).

Some of the steps leading up to the invasion include:

- On April 27, 1981, a rather motley collection of ten Ku

Klux Klansmen and Nazis were arrested in New Orleans about to depart with a plan to invade Dominica. They were quietly tried and convicted. Eugenia Charles's Freedom Party had been elected in Dominica with considerable support from the U.S. Embassy in Barbados. After the arrest of the would-be invaders, she clamored for a regional security treaty to protect against mercenaries, and at her urging the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States was inaugurated on June 18, 1981. The only reason for this organization seems to have been to provide an entity to be told by the U.S. to ask for a U.S. invasion.

- In the summer of 1981, Casey proposed a covert action plan against both Grenada and Suriname which was, in the words of one Senator, so "off the wall" that it was dropped. According to the *Washington Post* (February 27, 1983), members of the Senate Intelligence Committee objected. However, it was clear that the plan for Grenada was never dropped, but just sent back to the drawing board.


- Over a six-week period in the fall of 1981, according to Grenadian security forces, there were seven incidents of sabotage, suspected to have been of CIA origin, which could have been connected to an invasion plan.

- In October 1981, a massive U.S. naval exercise, Ocean Venture '81, was conducted in the Caribbean, including a mock invasion of "Amber and the Amberdines," an open reference to Grenada and the Grenadines. It involved a rescue of Americans being held hostage by the Amber government, and its mission was "to install a regime favorable to the way of life we espouse," according to Pentagon literature.

- Reagan visited Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams in April 1982 to discuss the "spread of the virus of communism" from Grenada. According to Karen DeYoung of the *Washington Post* (October 26, 1983), Adams said at the time he did not feel that either Grenada or Cuba posed a military threat to his island, but another participant at the meeting, Jamaica Prime Minister Edward Seaga, who owed his own election victory over Michael Manley to considerable U.S. intelligence collaboration, was interested. Shortly thereafter, Seaga was awarded a medal by Reagan at the White House.

- By the spring of 1983 the invasion plan was in high gear. In March, Reagan fulminated over Cuban help for the international airport construction. Although no one knowledgeable on the subject ever bought the President's argument that the airport was "too big" for mere tourism, or that it was a secret military installation, the media continued to play up the charge, and the American public was told that tiny Grenada was a threat to U.S. security. At the same time, authoritative military journals were decrying the threat to the chokepoints of U.S. oil tanker lanes, another myth, since Grenada had no navy.

- In April, Barbados Foreign Minister Louis Tull told



Credit: Prensa Latina

Maurice Bishop.

Edward Cody of the *Washington Post* (April 24, 1983), "I don't expect the government of Grenada to back off. They've gone too far. You have to live with them." Tull spoke highly of the Regional Defense System agreement (from which Grenada was excluded) to share intelligence and promote military cooperation.

- Shortly thereafter the Barbados Defense Forces, according to *Caribbean Contact*, began to receive training in the United States under the direction of the CIA.

- Then, a few months before Bishop's assassination and the invasion, U.S. diplomats traveled to Jamaica and Barbados to finalize military intervention plans. According to officials there, "unidentified U.S. officials had been seeking for several months to...isolate Grenada and had urged the regional governments to consider military action against Grenada." (*Washington Post*, October 28, 1983.) And, two weeks before the house arrest of Bishop, U.S. Army Rangers in Seattle were practicing parachute landings and the takeover of an airfield. Tom Adams almost gave the plan away when he tried to convince Grenadian Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman not to return to Grenada while Bishop was under house arrest. Later Adams claimed that the U.S. had approached him with a vague plan to rescue Bishop.

It is clear that there were U.S. intelligence agents active on Grenada; a military invasion of that size would never have been undertaken otherwise. The *New York Times* confirmed that CIA agents were brought out in the airlift of the medical students, and *Newsweek* (November 7) described one of them, "an older student named Jim Pfister" who assured the students that "help was on the way." Pfister "claimed to be a...former Foreign Service officer, a U.S. consul in Laos during the Vietnam War, who had quit the State Department to go to medical school. Once the invasion started, he was in constant shortwave radio contact with the advancing troops

and seemed to know their moves in advance."

The "Internal" Struggles

What happened in Grenada affected the entire socialist world. That there was a deep split within the leadership of the New Jewel Movement—and clearly there was—was not as well known to insiders, friends of Grenada, and even some of its ambassadors, as it was to the recipients of intelligence "leaks." For example, a front-page story by Barbara Crossette in the August 7, 1983 Sunday *New York Times* sought to play on racist fears of conservatives as well as anticommunist liberals, while pointing out, for the first time, rumors of a split. Crossette said that "Public support for the Government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop is diminishing rapidly as Cuban and Soviet influence here grows, according to many Grenadians." And, she noted, "Mr. Coard, Deputy Prime Minister, and Mrs. Coard, head of the National Women's Organization, are considered by many Grenadians to be among the most radical members of the Government, and there are rumors of a rift between the Coards and Mr. Bishop."

She was totally wrong in her account of Bishop's lack of popularity; indeed events have proved that Bishop was far more interested in their welfare than the Coards. The graffiti on a truck, shown in many U.S. newspapers after the invasion, told it all: "No Bishop, No Work, No Revo."

The hypocrisy of the U.S. government and its official media after the coup against Bishop was beyond belief. The day after Bishop was placed under house arrest, the Voice of America broadcast to Latin America and the Caribbean profiles of Bishop and Coard, portraying Bishop as a world-renowned, moderate, civil rights hero—the same Bishop it had excoriated relentlessly for four years—and portraying Coard as a brutal Stalinist. And, the reports said, there was "mounting evidence" that Cuba was behind the downfall of Bishop. The networks followed suit; both NBC and ABC referred to a "leftist" regime being overthrown by a "Marxist" regime.

The Imminent Invasion

Pressures from the U.S. intensified to the point that Caribbean leaders who were opposed to the invasion, such as Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister George Chambers and Guyana Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, were excluded from meetings and kept misinformed. State Department spokesmen, such as Deputy Assistant Secretary James H. Michel at an October 28 briefing, insisted that the decision to invade was made by the OECS, who "came to us," a fatuous suggestion.

The urgency was underscored when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Gillespie (now "Ambassador" to Grenada) surfaced in Barbados at meetings between OECS leaders and Prime Ministers Seaga of Jamaica and Adams of Barbados—meetings at which those countries allegedly decided to ask for U.S. aid. The *Washington Post* noted that Gillespie was in Barbados "on a previously scheduled visit" when the regional talks turned to the discussion of invasion. The visit, according to *Newsday*, was "a trip to the region with Vice President George Bush on the weekend of October 15," just after Bishop was placed under house arrest, and the same

time that Adams said "a U.S. official" approached him with the idea of a "rescue" mission.

Censorship and Lies

The almost unbelievably strict press censorship imposed by the U.S. for the first several days of the invasion was clever on two counts. As could be expected, it prevented anyone from confirming or refuting whatever official statements issued forth, many of which, it later transpired, were outright lies. But it also deflected media scrutiny by making the censorship as big a story for the media as the invasion. Half the precious minutes on the nightly TV news programs were devoted to the adventures of small bands of correspondents trying by air and water to break the blockade.

Of course the censorship was not imposed by the administration and the military merely to suppress information. It was also used to peddle lies and half-truths which no one on Grenada could reach the media to expose. Even before the invasion had begun and censorship been imposed, when the fleet bound for Lebanon was diverted after the murder of Bishop, it was described as a "precautionary move." As late as the night before the invasion reporters were told by press secretary Larry Speakes that the fleet was to "monitor" the situation, that there were "no plans for U.S. military action in Grenada," that rumors of an invasion were "preposterous."

Official lies about the composition of the attacking force abounded. Both President Reagan and Eugenia Charles referred to a "multinational force." But every single soldier involved in the invasion was American. After the island was occupied, the other members of the "multinational" force were flown in and comfortably ensconced in police jobs.

The Cubans on Grenada

Some of the most outrageous lies concerned the Cubans on Grenada. The first was the notion that the Rangers parachuted into heavy Cuban fire. In fact, the Cubans did not fire upon the descending Rangers. They had orders not to fire unless attacked. Even before the invasion, they had made it clear to the world in general and the U.S. Interests Section in particular that they were appalled by the actions of the Revolutionary Military Council, and that they did not intend to get involved in internal Grenadian affairs. They wished to cooperate in ensuring the safety of U.S. residents on Grenada and, later, in the return of their own people. The Cuban government had refused to supply arms or reinforcements to the RMC, but had determined that it would be dishonorable to evacuate its citizens just as an invasion was imminent.

The Cubans did not obstruct the Ranger landings, but remained in their barracks at the far end of the site. The Rangers did meet some hostile fire as 350 of them parachuted onto the field, but that was Grenadian anti-aircraft fire. Yet, shortly after landing and clearing the runway for additional troop landings, the Rangers attacked the Cubans, commencing a day's fierce fighting.

That night the Cubans and the Americans exchanged diplomatic notes again and the Cubans were assured that they were "not a target" and that their ultimate evacuation would

not be considered a "surrender." The following morning, the reassured Cubans remaining in defensive positions were directly attacked by helicopter gunships.

The Intelligence Failure

A further lie was the so-called intelligence failure, discussed in the early aftermath of the invasion. Originally officials expressed chagrin that the military did not know there were nearly twice as many Cubans on Grenada as had been reported by intelligence sources, or that most of them were trained soldiers, not construction workers. However, since this information turned out to be false, and the original estimates correct, it is unclear how this was an intelligence "failure." What actually irked the Pentagon most was how tenaciously the Grenadians and the Cubans fought.

An interesting reason for the "confusion" emerged in Canadian media, suggesting that an inflated Cuban presence was a CIA media disinformation operation planned well before the invasion, which may have misled some Pentagon analysts not in on the scam. An "authoritative" article on Cubans in Grenada was written for the November issue of *Naval Institute Proceedings* by Timothy Ashby, described in the *Toronto Globe and Mail* (October 29, 1983) as "a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institute [sic] at Stanford University who lived in Grenada on and off for 13 years." An advance copy, described in Reuters dispatches, insisted that there were more than 1,000 Cubans on Grenada, with more than 300 of them trained, full-time military, and faulted anyone who did not know this for not keeping their eyes open.

The article was touted in the media to demonstrate that there should not have been the intelligence failure which at the time was thought to have occurred. The irony is that the invasion provided positive proof that the so-called facts of the authoritative article were themselves untrue, deliberate disinformation intended to be part of the ongoing propaganda war against Grenada. The unfortunate author had no idea that his lies were going to be exposed so quickly. The "failure" was nothing more than a smokescreen to hide the fact that a few hundred Cubans and several hundred Grenadians were fiercely resisting some 6,000 to 8,000 elite U.S. troops on the island and 10,000 more on ships off the coast.

The Implications

There has been a dangerous flexing of U.S. military muscle in the region. New Caribbean naval maneuvers were ordered within days of the invasion and reports of the military's heightened role in U.S. foreign policy were rife.

Directly threatened by such saber-rattling are Nicaragua, Cuba, and El Salvador. Any talk of the "impossibility" of a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua has been mooted by the fate of Grenada. Nicaragua is creating a nation-wide militia to prevent a repeat of Grenada and Cuba has been bolstering its militia. One can only hope the U.S. will study the mathematics of the situation before acting. If it took 8,000 or more trained troops to vanquish several hundred Cubans and Grenadians, it would take many more combat soldiers than the U.S. has in the world to defeat the Cubans or the Nicaraguans. ●

New Spate of Terrorism

By William Schaap

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 11, December 1980. It describes how, despite an alleged campaign in the U.S. against terrorism, rightwing terrorists were on the rampage.

For years, the rhetoric of the western press has confused the public's image of terrorism. Progressive revolutionaries are referred to as "terrorists," and rightwing reactionaries are called "freedom fighters" or "rebels." But historically, when terrorism has applied to liberation struggles—notably the Irish Revolution of 1916-1921 and the Algerian Revolution of 1957-1961—it has been in the context of a colonized people fighting the colonial settlers and occupiers.

In recent times, however, nearly all the terrorism in the world has come from the right, from some of the most reactionary forces in existence. Yet the effect of decades of linguistic manipulation has been to create the impression that terrorism is a weapon of the left, and to obscure the real role that terrorism plays in rightist political movements. This confusion is serious, because of a massive increase in the use of terrorism by reactionaries, coupled with the inability of the western powers to stem this tide, at best—or outright complicity with it, at worst.

Recent Events

Several recent events, both in the United States and elsewhere, demonstrate that terrorism of the right is on the rise, and that some of the most notorious and dangerous terrorists of recent years are being set free by western nations, despite the lip service given to efforts to convict and jail these wanton murderers.

In the past few months, there has been an anti-Semitic bombing in Paris, France; a neo-fascist bombing in Bologna, Italy; and a neo-Nazi bombing in Munich, Germany. Even the Peoples Republic of China has acknowledged a terrorism problem after the bombing of Peking's main railroad station October 29. A repressive military government seized power in Turkey; extreme rightwing terrorist elements are on the rampage in El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Argentina.

These are just some examples of the trend in the world. In the United States the situation is also disturbing. According to several recent reports, the Ku Klux Klan is engaged in paramilitary training in at least seven states, and Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles are openly training for combat in southern Florida. But three events in September underscore the dangers which may be expected. On September 11, [1980] Felix Garcia Rodriguez, a protocol officer at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York was assassinated, the first time that a U.N. delegate has ever been killed. On September 15, the convictions of three assassins who killed former

Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier and his associate Ronni Karpen Moffitt were overturned by the District of Columbia federal Court of Appeals. And, on September 26, the Venezuelan War Council, a military court, threw out murder charges against the infamous Orlando Bosch and three others, who had repeatedly confessed to the 1976 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in which all 73 passengers and crew perished.

In March 1978, the newly-appointed Director of the FBI, William Webster, announced with considerable fanfare the intensification of the FBI's anti-terrorist training programs. His concern, though, was not so much for innocent people as for political and commercial leaders, given the kidnappings which were occurring in Europe at the time. But, in fact, such efforts as were mounted dealt almost exclusively with potential leftwing terrorism, indeed almost only with events such as kidnapping and takeovers of buildings. Rightwing murders and bombings were not even mentioned.

The Cuban Exiles

Yet, the most visible, the most vocal, the most active terrorists in the United States have been a small group of Cuban exiles, based primarily in southern Florida and in New Jersey, operating under several names, and generally *well-known* to local authorities. They were all involved in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They were all trained, supplied and encouraged by the CIA. The group, centered around Bosch, is implicated in the killing of exiled Chilean Gen. Carlos Prats and his wife in 1974; the attempted assassination of exiled Chilean politician Bernardo Leighton and his wife in 1975; the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in 1976; and the murder of South African economist Robert Smit and his wife in 1977.

They have also been linked to 85 bombings, one bazooka attack (for which Bosch served four years in prison in the U.S.), several shootings, four unsuccessful murder attempts, and two other murders in 1979, those of Carlos Muniz Barela, a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade in Puerto Rico, and of Eulalio J. Negrin, a Cuban living in New Jersey, who supported the dialogue between the Cuban exile community and the Cuban government.

U.S. Inaction

The United States authorities, local, state, and federal, have done virtually nothing to stop this avalanche of terrorism. These terrorists—sometimes known as CORU (the Commandos of United Revolutionary Organization), sometimes CNM (Cuban Nationalist Movement), sometimes Omega 7, sometimes Alpha 66, but always virtually the same group of people—must be taken seriously.

How the members of these groups, who regularly phone

newspapers and claim credit for dozens of bombings, shootings and killings, can not only walk the street, but appear at press conferences and thumb their noses at the authorities, remains a mystery.

Perfidy in Venezuela

The government of Venezuela has thrown out murder charges against Orlando Bosch and three accomplices who had repeatedly confessed to the Cubana airliner sabotage. The scenario was not complicated. In September 1976, Orlando Bosch, in Caracas, Venezuela, under a false passport, conspired with three Venezuelan terrorists—Freddy Lugo, Hernan Ricardo, and Luis Posada—to bomb a Cubana plane. [Posada was to figure prominently in the Iran/contras hearings.] On October 5, 1976, Lugo and Ricardo went to Port of Spain, Trinidad, while Posada remained in Caracas with Bosch. The next morning, Lugo and Ricardo took the first leg of the Cubana flight, from Trinidad to Barbados, under assumed names, and planted two bombs on the plane. When the plane landed in Barbados, Lugo and Ricardo disembarked and took a plane to Trinidad. Shortly thereafter, the Cubana plane took off, on its final leg to Havana. On board were 57 Cubans, 11 Guyanese, and 5 North Koreans. Minutes after takeoff, the bombs exploded. Everyone aboard was killed.

The next morning, Lugo and Ricardo were arrested in Trinidad. Ricardo confessed to the Trinidadian authorities, implicating Lugo, Posada, and Bosch. They were returned to Venezuela, and, along with Bosch and Posada, held for trial. The Venezuelan President at the time, Carlos Andres Perez, determined, based on the information made available to him, that there was sufficient information to charge and detain the four. A Venezuelan magistrate agreed. For four years various pretrial maneuvers were attempted by the defendants. President Andres Perez was replaced by Luis Herrera Campins and a Social Christian administration. On September 26, 1980, as the trial was to commence, the prosecutor announced that the government had determined there was insufficient evidence to proceed with the mass murder charges, and asked that they be dropped to which the court agreed.

Protests were sent to the Venezuelan government from many countries and scores of organizations. The Cuban government, whose relations with the Herrera Campins government were not good to begin with, recalled all of its diplomats from Caracas, and Fidel Castro denounced the action in a speech distributed at the U.N.

The magistrate who had been involved at the initial stages, Judge Estaba Moreno, broke her silence. She said, "When I ordered the arrest of those persons—there were well-founded indications of guilt. When the dossier left this court it contained sufficient evidence, and the arrest orders were confirmed by the military court. However, I have no idea what happened to the dossier after it left my hands."

The Letelier-Moffitt Assassins

Bosch and his cellmates are not the only terrorists being let out. On September 15, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo, his brother

Ignacio Novo, and Alvin Ross. Guillermo Novo and Ross had been found guilty of the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, and Ignacio Novo had been convicted of lying to a grand jury about the killings and failing to report certain information to authorities. They were convicted primarily on the testimony of Michael Townley, who had planned and helped execute the bombing, and who had been returned from Chile, pleaded guilty, and testified against the others in exchange for leniency.

The legal reasons for the reversals of the convictions were not entirely unexpected, and appeared to be the result of prosecutorial overzealousness. The government, unable to force the Chilean government to extradite to the U.S. the real mastermind of the Letelier killing, former DINA head Juan Contreras Sepulveda, and having already given Michael Townley the deal of a lifetime, decided to go all out against the three "footsoldiers" at the bottom of the totem pole.

In addition to Townley's testimony, the government secured further confessions by planting informers as cellmates of the defendants while they were awaiting trial. In between the trial and the appeal decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled that such tactics violated a prisoner's constitutional rights and that such testimony was inadmissible. In fact, there was probably no need for the use of the testimony of the cellmates, although of course, they had no reason to know that the Supreme Court was going to denounce such a practice.

The Killing of Felix Garcia

Felix Garcia Rodriguez, the protocol officer at the Cuban Mission to the United States, was described by a colleague to the *New York Times* as the "most widely known and most widely liked" person at the Mission. On September 11, 1980, he became the first diplomat in the history of the United States to be murdered on the streets of New York City. Omega 7 claimed credit for the murder and said that Raul Roa, the Ambassador, would be "next." The group had bombed the Cuban Mission last December and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Roa in March. To date, not a single person has been charged with any involvement in several attacks on Cuban offices and personnel. Nor does any action seem likely.

Conclusion

When the U.S. talks about anti-terrorism measures, it refers almost exclusively to protection from kidnapping attempts of corporate executives, embassy personnel, and other government officials. It creates the impression that all terrorism comes from the left. Yet the evidence is mounting that there are several wide-spread terrorist networks active in the United States, all from the extreme right. Paramilitary groups like the Klan are openly training and drilling. The Omega 7 gang openly boasts of its accomplishments and sends its representatives to Florida political meetings. Brigade 2506 is actually a potent factor in Florida politics. Not only is no one being apprehended, but those who were are getting out. The U.S. government admits that it knows who most of these people are. That they cannot obtain an arrest, much less a conviction, is incredible. ●

The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic

By Bill Schaap

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 17, Summer 1982. It was cited as an example of chemical/biological warfare when similar epidemics later broke out in Nicaragua.

For more than 20 years Cuba has been the victim of unrelenting American attacks, including chemical and biological warfare — some of which has been proved, some of which has not. We believe the dengue fever epidemic of 1981 was only the latest outrageous and illegal CBW attack against Cuba.

Why Dengue?

Dengue fever is an arbovirus, transmitted by the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito. There are several types, which all begin with the symptoms of a severe cold or flu, followed by incapacitating bone pain and tell-tale pain at the back of the eyes. All types can give rise to the hemorrhagic form, that is, accompanied by internal bleeding and shock. This is most dangerous, especially to children, for whom it is often fatal.

Arboviruses are ideal biological warfare weapons. Dengue, especially hemorrhagic dengue, is highly incapacitating; it can be transmitted easily through the introduction of infected mosquitoes; it spreads rapidly, especially in highly populated and damp areas. In favorable winds, *Aedes* mosquitoes can travel hundreds of miles before landing. And since dengue fever is found in nature in many parts of the world, a human role in its spread is hard to detect.

The 1981 Epidemic

Although dengue fever is much more common in the Far East, there have been many outbreaks in the Caribbean and Central America during the past century. But except for a mild, non-hemorrhagic epidemic in 1977, the hemorrhagic dengue epidemic which hit Cuba in May 1981 was the first major dengue outbreak in Cuba since 1944, and, most importantly, the first in the Caribbean since the turn of the century to involve hemorrhagic shock on a massive scale.

From May to October 1981 there were over 300,000 cases, with 158 deaths, 101 involving children under 15. At the peak there were more than 10,000 cases a day; more than a third required hospitalization. By mid-October, after a massive campaign to eradicate *Aedes aegypti*, the epidemic was over.

The history of the war against Cuba and the virulence of this epidemic raise serious suspicion of a U.S. hand in it. But there is more support for those suspicions than a healthy distrust of American intentions regarding Cuba.

The Clues

The epidemic began with the simultaneous discovery in May 1981 of three cases in three widely separated parts of Cuba. It is very unusual that an epidemic commences in three

different localities at once. None of the initial victims had traveled out of the country; none had recently been away from home. None had had recent contact with international travelers. A study of persons arriving in Cuba in May from known dengue areas found only a dozen such passengers (from Vietnam and Laos), all of whom were checked and found free of the disease. Somehow, infected mosquitoes had appeared in three places at the same time. Somehow, the fever spread at a rapid rate. There is no likely explanation but the artificial introduction of infected mosquitoes. Significantly, there were no epidemics taking place elsewhere in the Caribbean.

Another peculiarity is the unprecedented rainfall throughout much of Cuba during the preceding winter and spring. This led to an unusual accumulation of mosquito breeding areas. Statistics for the provinces in which the epidemic began show that rainfall was double the average.

Whether this was the result of artificial weather modification coordinated with the release of infected *Aedes* mosquitoes or merely a fortuitous coincidence taken advantage of by the planners of this action is not provable at this time. It is clear though that the increase in precipitation was dramatic, and it is well known that the U.S. has been involved in weather modification for many years, and has used it against Cuba.

Most important, perhaps, is U.S. familiarity with arbovirus transmission, with years of CBW research involving *Aedes* and other mosquitoes and dengue and other fevers. The U.S. military and its academic collaborators have been experimenting with dengue fever since at least 1959, primarily at Fort Detrick in Maryland and at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in Washington. Dozens of projects, costing millions of dollars, have been funded by Defense Department.

Conclusions

That the dengue epidemic *could* have been a covert U.S. operation is clear. It is a plausible hypothesis, consistent with past actions. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the U.S. has been investigating the biological warfare possibilities of dengue fever for many years. And it is U.S. experimentation which has shown that *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes (infected with dengue) could travel hundreds of miles, along the path of the prevailing winds, from the place of release to the place of landing. A boat off Florida with the right winds could infest Cuba with no fear of infecting the mainland. Or a ship or plane based at Guantanamo could have been used.

That the epidemic *was* an American covert action is not easily demonstrated, but, as shown here, there are many indications that this is true, and that the Cuban accusation is valid. And for those who have studied the recent history of the U.S., for those who know of what it is capable, there is no reason to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. ●

Israeli Arms in Central America

by Clarence Lusane *

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 20, Winter 1984. Israel has remained an important conduit for military training and arms on behalf of the U.S. Israel was a crucial supplier of weapons to the Nicaraguan contras after Congress prohibited Reagan from sending military aid. They continue to supply the Guatemalan military as it wages a brutal counterinsurgency war against the Guatemalan people.

The war drums are beating in Central America and Israel is an important player. The State of Israel has emerged as a major, and in some cases, principal, supplier of arms, advisers and training to the repressive forces in the region. Long denounced for its military ties to South Africa, Chile, and the Philippines, the Zionist regime has extended its role as surrogate for the U.S. to the front line of Central America. Although much of what is happening is held in strict secrecy, the vast extent of Israeli aid has begun to fray the cover under which Reagan administration policy objectives circumvent Congressional obstacles.

As this article will show, stopping U.S. military aid to Central America also requires stopping U.S. military aid to Israel. The information presented only scratches the surface of what is probably the key link in U.S. foreign policy under the Reagan administration. By the end of the 1960s Israel had emerged as an arms exporter, but only since the Reagan administration has it been able to reach its potential as a full junior partner to U.S. imperialism.

The Israeli Arms Industry

Fourteen percent of Israel's industrial labor force is employed in its arms industry. If the armed forces are included, the number rises to 25%.

According to the latest CIA estimates, Israel is the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world. This is up from its seventh place ranking in 1980. Israel remains the largest supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

In 1977, Israel's arms exports were valued at \$285 million. Despite the loss of two reliable customers, Iran and Nicaragua, by 1981, military exports had risen to \$1.3 billion. Since 1970, Israel's military budget has consumed more than 30% of its national budget. Limited domestic use has made the export of arms essential to its economic survival. Latin American money has become indispensable to the Israeli arms industry.

It must be pointed out that Israel's goals are political as well as economic. Stability of the current and international politi-

cal order is a chief objective of Israeli foreign and military policy. In country after country, we can observe how Israeli arms sales meet these twin aims.

Honduras

In 1982 Israel's then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon arrived in Honduras for a 38-hour visit. Sharon and the Hondurans agreed that Israel would send Honduras 12 Kfir planes, radar equipment, light weapons and spare parts and 50 advisers. Military training was also proposed. Incidentally, upon leaving Honduras, Sharon flew to the U.S. AFP, the French News Agency, observed the deal "could intensify the danger of unleashing an arms race in the region."

Less than six months later, the *New York Times* reported on its front page that Israel was sending weapons to Honduras. Much, if not all, of these arms were to go to U.S.-backed counterrevolutionaries seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government from bases in Honduras.

It was also reported that the Honduran Armed Forces Commander, Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, visited a CIA training facility in Virginia earlier this year to examine captured PLO weapons. Israel has stated that it would provide captured weapons to any Central American military government for only the cost of transporting them.

The estimated \$25 million in weapons promised to Honduras by Sharon is a continuation of past practice. However Honduras is now playing a new role in Central America, similar to the one Israel plays in the Middle East. It has become strategically important to U.S. interests and goals in the region. As a rear base for the *contras* attacking Nicaragua, and as a training ground for Guatemalan and Salvadoran fascists, Honduras must be armed. Determined not to be inhibited by congressional or public opinion, the Reagan administration has given the Israelis the go-ahead in Honduras. In addition to aid from the U.S. and Israel, Honduras has received military aid from Argentina and Chile, allowing it to increase its armed forces six-fold since 1970 (from 5,000 to over 30,000). The Honduran Air Force is the most powerful in Central America.

U.S. officials have admitted that Israeli assistance is important in achieving Reagan administration military and political goals. Worried about potential congressional locks on aid to the Nicaraguan *contras*, the administration wants to be sure supply lines are not disturbed. U.S. military aid to Honduras will go toward buying weapons from Israel which have themselves been produced with U.S. military aid.

It is the goal of the U.S., with the critical assistance of Israel, to make Honduras the chief gendarme of Central

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America. The second poorest nation in the region (behind Haiti) will continue to buy arms from Israel at the expense of its own people. Like its neighbors in El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras increasingly violates the human rights of its citizens with the helping hand of Israel. There is one central objective in the U.S.-Honduras-Israel connection. If the conditions ripen to where U.S. policy makers launch an all-out invasion of Nicaragua, it will duplicate the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, except that it will be launched from Honduran soil.

El Salvador

From his first days in office, Ronald Reagan pledged to draw the line against communism in El Salvador. The murderous and corrupt Salvadoran junta, a politically split U.S. Congress, and the superior fighting capacities of the FMLN guerrillas have turned out to be difficult obstacles.

In 1981 when the Administration was scrambling to find more aid to send El Salvador, Israel agreed to "lend" the U \$21 million to give El Salvador. Money which came from previous U.S. aid to Israel. In other words, the U.S. cynically took out a loan on its original funds, thereby violating the expressed will of Congress.

The U.S. has only recently become a major supplier of military aid to El Salvador. Through all of the 1970s, Israel was the biggest seller of weapons and aircraft to the country. This arsenal made up more than 80% of El Salvador's military imports during the period. It has been supplemented by an estimated 100 Israeli advisers (almost twice the official number the U.S. claims to have). These advisers, like their U.S. counterparts, are training the Salvadoran military in counterinsurgency strategy and tactics at a secret base near Tegucigalpa.

In addition, Israeli pilots are believed to be flying Israeli made aircraft against the guerrillas. El Salvador has the infamous distinction of being the first Latin country to receive these advanced combat fighters.

Israel has also set up advanced computer systems to gather and analyze intelligence about the citizenry. Similar to the Israeli-installed computers in Guatemala, the network in El Salvador also monitors changes in water and electricity consumption.

All Israeli aid to El Salvador comes from American military and economic aid to Israel. It has been noted that some of the most vocal congressional critics of Reagan policy objectives in El Salvador are also unquestioning supporters of aid to Israel.

Somoza's Nicaragua

Until the very end, Israeli arms poured into Somoza's Nicaragua. After the cold-blooded killing of journalists by Somoza's National Guard in 1978, President Carter cut off all U.S. aid to Nicaragua. Israel, bolstered by U.S. aid to it, picked up the slack and until July 2, 1979, just two weeks before the Sandinistas won the final battle, provided 98% of Somoza's arms.

When questioned about selling arms to Somoza, Israeli

Prime Minister Menachem Begin responded, "We have a debt of gratitude with Somoza." In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. The new State of Israel needed weapons and had almost nowhere to turn. Israel struck a deal with Somoza. Somoza appointed Yehuda Arazi as a Nicaraguan Ambassador to Europe where he could purchase weapons in the name of Nicaragua. Eventually, all the weapons ended up in Israel. All of this was accomplished for a mere \$200,000. Arazi, it turned out, was a member of the Jewish underground's clandestine army organization, Haganah.

Guatemala

The U.S. is not the primary supplier of arms to Guatemala. Since 1976, Israel has been the main provider of weapons, aircraft, and training to Guatemala. Between 1977 and 1981, after the U.S. cut off aid due to gross human rights violations, Israel was the only nation giving military aid to the regime.



Israel supplied Somoza's National Guard with military equipment and training.

Training of Guatemalan military strongmen by Israel has included education in the use of terror and interrogation techniques, modern intelligence methods and psychological warfare. Israeli advisers are the key link in Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations. From national planning to civilian rural cooperative programs to military maneuvers, Israel is centrally involved.

Israel's connection to the repressive forces of Guatemala are hardly secret. Israeli advisers have trained many of the officers of Guatemala's police intelligence (G-2). In reference to the guerrillas fighting the ever-changing military juntas which have come to power, the right wing openly calls for the "Palestinianization" of the rebelling Mayan Indians.

As with Somoza, Guatemala's relationship to the Zionist state goes back to 1948 when Israel was created. One of the three U.N. Commissioners overseeing the establishment of Israel was from Guatemala. Despite the numerous changes in power in Guatemala over the years, it has remained a consistent and staunch supporter of Israel.

Today, Guatemala-Israel relations are better than ever. Extensive trade and economic agreements have been signed recently. First and foremost, however, Israel's relations with

Guatemala are military. Some of Israel's most advanced electronic and computer technologies have been installed in Guatemala. Hit lists used by the death squads have been computerized. Technologically sophisticated murder is coordinated by a Regional Telecommunications Center (RTC) built and managed by Israeli Army experts. The RTC is also linked to the U.S. Army's Southern Command at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The RTC is run by the generals from the fourth floor of the National Palace Annex.

The U.S. Agency for International Development has said that the RTC is Guatemala's principal presidential level security agency and works with a high level security network. AID claims that it links the key officials of the National Police, Treasury Police, Detective Corps, Ministry of Government, the Presidential Palace, and the Military Communications Center.

The Tel Aviv newspaper *Haolam Hazeh* and the London *Guardian* revealed in December 1982 that Israeli advisers work closely with Guatemala's G-2 police units in the use of interrogation and torture. In this activity, they work closely with Argentina and Chile.

Computerized death lists are a mainstay of government terror and inspired a "spy-on-thy-neighbor" campaign. By 1980, computers already listed 80% of the Guatemalan population.

In November 1981, the Israeli-sponsored Army Electronics and Transmission School was opened in Guatemala. Its purpose is to teach computer and electronic monitoring of the Guatemalan people. Equipment at the school is capable of doing everything from checks on potential apartment renters to detecting changes in electricity consumption that supposedly might indicate that an illegal printing press is in operation.

Israel has also been helpful in developing Guatemala's major military-civilian programs. The Guatemalan military has attempted to create Vietnam-style strategic hamlets. The means of implementing these counterinsurgency plans were couched in terms of establishing peasant cooperatives similar to the kibbutzim in Israel. Guatemalan and Israeli agricultural and military officials were exchanged and it soon became apparent that the goals of the program were to crush peasant support and participation in the armed struggle.

The U.S., becoming involved through AID, sent "experts" and provided credits and grants. These civic programs were to take place in the Ixcán area. This is the major base of support for the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), one of the major rebel forces fighting to overthrow a succession of repressive governments.

Under the recently overthrown Rios Montt regime, the Israeli model was put into full operation. In August 1982, a "Plan of Assistance to Conflict Areas" (PAAC) program was begun. The PAAC program reproduced many of the tactics applied by the Israelis on the West Bank, such as finding mayors willing to accommodate to the status quo.

Some of Israel's most advanced electronic and computer technologies have been installed in Guatemala. Hit lists used by the death squads have been computerized.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica's northern border has become an operational base for attacks by *contras* on Nicaragua. Former Sandinista, Eden Pastora, leads a small army estimated at 5,000 from this

border area.

At one point, Pastora claimed that he had to shut down his activities because he had run out of funds. He stated that because of his "anti-U.S." stance, he would not accept funds from the CIA. Within days he was fighting again, reportedly with an infusion of funds from Israel, as well as other countries. In fact, much of this was a propaganda charade, as Pastora has been receiving CIA aid all the time.

Although Costa Rica has no army, Israeli military trainers and arms are beginning to pour into the country. In 1982, President Luis Alberto Monge met with Menachem Begin in Washington. They discussed the possibility of Israeli military aid in building up Costa Rican security forces. The funds would come from Washington.

Israel has been chosen by AID to build a \$10 million settlement project along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border. The military squeeze that the *contras* are currently operating from Honduras and Costa Rica would obviously be enhanced should the U.S. Congress fund this proposal.

The U.S. Role

Has exposure of illegal arms transfers by Israel forced the U.S. to cut back on aid? Or has the fact that Israel has sent arms to countries which the U.S. Congress and others have designated as flagrant violators of basic human rights made the Reagan administration voice any criticism of Israel? The answer to both questions is no.

Relative to its size and needs, the immense scale of continued U.S. military and economic aid to Israel is obscene. Even after last summer's internationally condemned invasion of Lebanon, Israel remains the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. It receives about one-third of all U.S. foreign aid, which in the last 10 years has amounted to about \$25 billion.

Even more shocking, since 1976 Israel has not spent a penny of its own for military imports. The average U.S. subsidy to Israel for military imports has been 129% of the actual cost of those imports.

In the current fiscal year, Israel will receive \$785 million in economic assistance and \$1.7 billion in military aid. It will receive the same amounts in the fiscal year which began October 1, 1983. Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, was in Washington in late July to discuss more military aid and the right to use U.S. aid to develop weapon systems that are currently only available in the U.S.

The above figures shed light on the important and central role that Israel plays in U.S. foreign policy goals. No amount of struggle against U.S. aid to repressive dictatorships and juntas will be complete, or even marginally successful, unless Israel is also taken to task. ●

Libya in U.S. Demonology

by Noam Chomsky *

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 26, Summer 1986. It is interesting to note that several years after the La Belle disco bombing and the Athens and Rome airport attacks, all attributed in some form to Libya, the U.S. has never produced a shred of evidence to support these charges.

The term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the 18th century, primarily to designate violent acts of governments intended to ensure popular submission. That concept, plainly, is of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned, and the term "terrorism" has come to be applied mainly to "retail terrorism" by individuals or groups.¹

Extricating ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends).

In the true sense of the term, Libya is a terrorist state: the latest Amnesty International Report lists the killings, through 1985, of 14 Libyan citizens by this terrorist state, four abroad, as the major acts of terrorism plausibly attributed to Libya.

Amnesty International reports that Libya's terrorist killings began in early 1980, at the time when Jimmy Carter launched the terrorist war in El Salvador with José Napoleon Duarte serving as a cover to ensure that arms would flow to the killers. While Libya was killing 14 of its own citizens, along with a handful of others, the U.S. client regime of El Salvador killed some 50,000 of its citizens in the course of what Bishop Rivera y Damas, who succeeded the assassinated Archbishop Romero, described in October 1980 as "a war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population."

U. S. international terrorism in El Salvador is hailed as a magnificent achievement across the mainstream political spectrum in the United States because it laid the basis for what is called "democracy" in western parlance: namely, the rule of elite groups serving the needs of the Global Enforcer with the public occasionally mobilized to ratify elite decisions. In El Salvador, the United States organized what Herman and Brodhead call "demonstration elections" to pacify the home front, carried out in an atmosphere of "terror and despair, macabre rumor and grisly reality," in the words of the observers of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.²

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1. "Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism," U.N. Secretariat, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975).

2. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

Guatemala is also considered a success, for similar reasons. When half the population was marched to the polls after it had been properly traumatized by U.S.-backed violence, enlightened American humanists were overjoyed at this renewed demonstration of our love for democracy. They were, of course, untroubled by the rise in death squad killings after the elections (including at least 94 deaths and 35 disappearances in the weeks following President Vinicio Cerezo's January inauguration), the admission by Cerezo that he can do nothing because the actual power is in the military and the oligarchy, and that the reaction in the United States helps convene the elections into a means for the U.S. to participate more fully in state terror and repression, as in El Salvador.

In short, Libya is indeed a terrorist state, but in the world of international terrorism, it is hardly even a bit player.

"Their Side" Is Terrorist

An act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is committed by "their side," not ours. Consider, for example, the public relations campaign about "international terrorism" launched in early 1981 by the Reagan administration. The major text was Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network* which offered an ingenious proof that international terrorism is a "Soviet-inspired" instrument "aimed at the destabilization of western democratic society." The proof is that the major terrorist actions are confined to the western democratic states, and are not "directed against the Soviet Union or any of its satellites or client states."

Since only acts committed by "their side" count as terrorism, it follows that Sterling is necessarily correct, whatever the facts. In the real world, the story is quite different. The majority of the victims of international terrorism in the several decades prior to the Sterling pronouncements were Cuban and Palestinian, but none of this counts, by definition.³ When Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps killing many civilians — often without even a pretense of reprisal — or sends its troops into Lebanese villages in "counterterror" operations where they murder and destroy, or hijacks ships and places thousands of hostages in prison camps under horrifying conditions, this is not "terrorism."

Similarly, it is not terrorism when paramilitary forces operating from U.S. bases and trained by the CIA bombard Cuban hotels, sink fishing boats and attack Russian ships in Cuban harbors, poison crops and livestock, attempt to assassinate Castro, and so on, in missions that were running almost weekly at their peak.⁴

3. I exclude here outright aggression, as in the case of the U.S. attack against South Vietnam, then all of Indochina.

4. See Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish is Red* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).

Not only is "terrorism" defined for ideological serviceability, but standards of evidence are also conveniently minimal. To demonstrate Libya's role as a state terrorist, the flimsiest evidence, or none at all, will suffice. The headline of a *New York Times* editorial justifying the terrorist attack that killed some 100 people in Libya reads "To Save the Next Natasha Simpson," referring to the 11-year-old American girl who was one of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna air terminals on December 27, 1985. These victims entitle us to bomb Libyan cities "to discourage state-supported terrorism," the editors solemnly inform us.

It is only a minor defect that no evidence has been presented to implicate Libya in these actions. The Italian and Austrian governments stated that the terrorists [who committed the bombings] were trained in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and had come via Damascus, a conclusion reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin. Four months later, in response to U.S. claims about Libyan involvement in the Vienna attack, the Austrian Minister of Interior stated that "there is not the slightest evidence to implicate Libya," again citing Syria as the connection and adding that Washington had never presented the evidence of Libyan complicity it had promised to provide to the Austrian authorities.

He also added the correct but—in the U.S.—inexpressible comment that the problem of Lebanese-based terrorism lies largely in the failure to solve the Palestine problem, which has caused desperate people to turn to violence, exactly the result intended by U.S.-Israeli terrorism.

The Reagan Agenda

What the President calls "the evil scourge of terrorism" (in the specific western sense) was placed in the central focus of attention by the Reagan administration as it came into office in 1981. The reasons were transparent, though inexpressible within the doctrinal system. The administration was committed to three related policies, all achieved with some success: (1) transfer of resources from the poor to the rich; (2) a massive increase in the state sector of the economy in the traditional American way, through the Pentagon system—a device to force the public to invest in high technology industry by means the state-guaranteed market for the production of high technology waste (armaments), and thus to contribute to the general program of public subsidy, private profit, called "free enterprise"; and (3) a substantial increase in the U.S. role in intervention, subversion, and international terrorism (in the true sense of the expression).

Such policies cannot be presented to the public in the terms in which they are intended. They can be implemented only if the general population is properly frightened by monsters against whom we must defend ourselves. The standard device is an appeal to the threat of Reagan's "Evil Empire," what President Kennedy called "the monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" bent on world conquest, as he launched a rather similar program. But confrontation with the Evil Empire can be a dangerous affair, so it is preferable to do battle with safer enemies designated as the Evil Empire's proxies, a choice that conforms well to the third plank in the Reagan agenda, pur-

sued for quite independent reasons: to ensure "stability" and "order" in our global domains.

Qaddafi as Scapegoat

Libya fits the need perfectly. Qaddafi is easy to hate and Libya is weak and defenseless, so that martial flourishes and, when needed, murder of Libyans can be conducted with impunity. In August 1981, the anti-Qaddafi message "was reinforced by the trap laid for Libya in the Gulf of Sidra," a trap "elaborately planned on the U.S. side" with the intent of a confrontation in which Libyan jets could be shot down, as they were, Edward Haley observes in his bitterly anti-Qaddafi study of U.S. relations with Libya. One specific purpose, Haley plausibly argues, was to "exploit the 'Libyan menace' in



The La Belle Disco bombing: Who was responsible?

order to win support for steps [the administration] wished to take in pursuit of Secretary Haig's 'strategic consensus' against the Soviet Union, and as an element in the arrangements necessary for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force," targeted primarily at the Middle East.

The events of March-April 1986 fit the familiar pattern to perfection. The Gulf of Sidra operation in March was plainly timed to stir up jingoist hysteria just prior to the crucial Senate vote on *contra* aid, coinciding with a fabricated Nicaraguan "invasion" of Honduras as Nicaragua exercised its legal right of hot pursuit to expel from its territory U.S. proxy forces dispatched by their master from their Honduras bases to sow terror in Nicaragua prior to the Senate vote. The public relations campaign succeeded brilliantly as demonstrated by the enraged reaction of congressional doves, the media, and the Senate vote. The Libyan provocation too was a success, enabling U.S. forces to sink several Libyan boats, killing more than 50 Libyans, and, it was hoped, to incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans, as was subsequently claimed.

The extent of the provocation in the Gulf of Sidra was made clear by Pentagon spokesman Robert Sims, who "said that U.S. policy is to shoot at any Libyan boat that enters interna-

tional waters in the Gulf of Sidra for as long as the U.S. naval exercise in that region continues — no matter how far away the boat might be from U.S. ships.” In short, the U.S. maintains the right of “self-defense” against any Libyan

vessel that approaches its naval armada off the Libyan coast, but Libya does not have a right of self-defense in airspace comparable to that claimed by the U.S.

There is more to the story. David Blundy interviewed British engineers in Tripoli who were repairing the Soviet-installed radar system. One, who says he was monitoring the incident throughout on the radar screens (which, contrary to Pentagon claims, were not rendered inoperative), reports that “he saw American warplanes cross not only into the 12 miles of Libyan territorial waters, but over Libyan land as well.” “I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan airspace,” he said. “I don’t think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back. In my opinion they were reluctant to do so.” The engineer added that “American warplanes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and followed in the wake of a Libyan airliner, so that its radar blip would mask them on the Libyan radar screen.”⁵

One likely consequence of the Gulf of Sidra operation was to elicit acts of Libyan terrorism in retaliation. These would then have the effect of inducing a state of terror in the United States and, with some luck, in Europe as well, setting the stage for the next escalation. The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, with one American and one Turk killed, was immediately blamed on Libya, and was then used as the pretext for the April 14 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, with about 100 Libyans killed, neatly timed the day before the expected House vote on *contra* aid. In case the audience missed the point, Reagan’s speech writers made it explicit. Addressing the American Business Conference on April 15, he said, “And I would remind the House voting this week that this arch-terrorist has sent \$400 million and an arsenal of weapons and advisers into Nicaragua to bring his war home to the United States. He has bragged that he is helping the Nicaraguans because they fight America on its own ground.”⁶

The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television. As the subsequently published record shows, the bombing raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7 pm Eastern Standard Time; that is, precisely at the moment when all three national television channels broadcast their national news, which was of course preempted as agitated anchor men switched to Tripoli for direct eyewitness reports of the exciting events. As soon as the raids ended, the White House had Larry Speakes address a press conference, followed by other dignitaries, ensuring total domination of the propaganda system during the crucial early hours.

5. London *Sunday Times*, April 6, 1986.

6. New York *Times*, April 16, 1986.

The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television...the raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7 pm Eastern Standard Time...

Foreign Reactions

Beyond the borders, discipline does not reign. In Germany, a week after Washington had stated its certain knowledge ten days earlier of Libyan responsibility for the [La Belle] disco bombing, *Der*

Spiegel reported that the famed telephone intercepts apparently do not exist and that West Berlin intelligence has only suspicions about Libyan involvement, also suspecting “rival groups of drug dealers” among other possibilities, including neo-Nazi groups.

In an interview on April 28 with a reporter for the U.S. Army journal *Stars and Stripes*, Manfred Ganschow, chief of the Berlin *Staatschutz* and head of the 100-man team investigating the disco bombing, stated that “I have no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bombing than I had when you first called me two days after the act. Which is none.” He agreed that it was “a highly political case” and hinted at considerable skepticism about what “the politicians” were saying and would say about it.

The reaction to the bombing of Libya at home and abroad was sharply different. Expecting the worst, the 12-member European Economic Community called upon the U.S. to avoid “further escalation of military tension in the region with all the inherent dangers.” A few hours later, U. S. warplanes struck, as West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was on his way to Washington to explain the EEC position. His spokesman stated that “We want to do everything we can to avoid a military escalation.”

The bombing aroused extensive protest throughout most of Europe, including large-scale demonstrations, and evoked editorial condemnation in most of the world. Spain’s major journal, the independent *El Pais*, condemned the raid, writing that “The military action of the United States is not only an offense against international law and a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean, but a mockery of its European allies, who did not find motives for economic sanctions against Libya in a meeting Monday despite being previously and without success pressured to adopt sanctions.” The conservative *South China Morning Post* in Hong Kong wrote that “President Reagan’s cure for ‘the mad dog of the Middle East’ may prove more lethal than the disease,” and his action “may also have lit the fuse to a wider conflagration” in the Middle East. In Mexico City, *El Universal* wrote that the U.S. “has no right to set itself up as the defender of world freedom,” urging recourse to legal means through the United Nations. There were many similar reactions.

The U.S. press, in contrast, was overwhelmingly favorable. The *New York Times* wrote that “even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attacks on Libya,” describing this as a just sentence: “the United States has prosecuted [Qaddafi] carefully, proportionately — and justly.” The evidence for Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing has been “now laid out clearly to the public”; “Then came the jury, the European governments to which the

United States went out of its way to send emissaries to share evidence and urge concerted action against the Libyan leader." It is irrelevant, apparently, that the jury was hardly convinced by the evidence, and issued a "judgment" calling on the executioner to refrain from any action.

The U.S. bombing of Libya had nothing to do with "terrorism," even in the hypocritical western sense of the word. In fact, it was clear enough that the Gulf of Sidra operation and the bombing of Libyan cities would if anything incite such retail terrorism, one major reason why the likely targets in Europe pleaded with the U.S. to refrain from such action. This is hardly the first time that violent actions have been executed with the expectation that they would incite retail terrorism. Consider the U.S.-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, undertaken against the background of persistent U.S.-Israeli refusal to permit a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

After the Israeli-initiated exchange across the Israel-Lebanon border in June 1981 with some 450 Arabs and six Jews killed, the border was "quiet" in the racist terms of American discourse, meaning that there was no PLO response to the many Israeli provocations (including bombing of civilian areas with many killed) undertaken in an effort to elicit a "terrorist act" that could be exploited to justify the planned invasion. Finally, Israel invaded on a pretext in June 1982, destroyed the civilian base of the PLO in Lebanon and demolished much of what remained of Lebanese society.

U.S. Escalation Strategy

The real reasons for the U.S. attack on Libya have nothing to do with self-defense against "terrorist attacks" or "self-defense against future attack" in accord with the astonishing doctrine proclaimed by the Reagan administration to much domestic acclaim. Libya's terrorism is a minor irritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the way of U.S. plans in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere: supporting Polisario and anti-U.S. groups in the Sudan, forging a union with Morocco, intervening in Chad, and in general interfering with U.S. efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" in the region, and to impose its will elsewhere. These are real crimes, which must be punished. Furthermore, the Libyan attack had the purpose, and the effect, of preparing opinion at home and abroad for further acts of U.S. violence. The immediate response might be negative, but once absorbed, the level of expectation is heightened and the U.S. can proceed to further escalation.

There are two major areas where such escalation is likely. The first is Central America. While the U.S. proxy army has succeeded in its major task of "forcing [the Sandinistas] to divert scarce resources to the war and away from social programs," as explained in a rare moment of candor by administration officials,⁷ it is unlikely that it can "cut out the cancer"; hence the threat of successful independent development in terms that might be meaningful to the suffering population of U.S. client states will remain.

The obvious means are threats to Soviet and Cuban shipping. Nicaragua would not be able to respond, but the

U.S.S.R. and Cuba might. If they do, the U.S. propaganda system can be counted on to react with outrage over this new proof of Communist aggression, allowing the administration to construct an international crisis in which, it may be assumed, the U.S.S.R. will back down, so that Nicaragua will be effectively blockaded. If they do not respond, the same result will be achieved. Of course, the world may go up in smoke, but that is a minor consideration in comparison with the need to



Credit: Department of Defense

Libyan ship burns in the Gulf of Sidra after U.S. attack.

excise the cancer. U.S. and European opinion must be prepared for these eventualities. The bombing of Libya turns the ratchet another notch.

The second area where world opinion must be prepared for eventual escalation is the Middle East. The U.S. has blocked political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at least since 1971, when President Sadat of Egypt made his first proposal for a full peace treaty (offering nothing to the Palestinians, and in almost precise accord with official U.S. policy as well as the international consensus).

Meanwhile, the U.S. government surely wants to leave its options open. It would make sense for an Israeli strike against Syria to be accompanied by U.S. bombing, the former presented as a "pre-emptive strike" in "self-defense against future attack," the latter packaged for western consumption as "self-defense" against Syrian-inspired terrorism. The purpose of direct U.S. participation would be to warn the Soviet Union that a global war will result from any attempt on their part to support their Syrian ally. European and U.S. opinion must be prepared for such possible moves. The attack on Libya, and the subsequent propaganda campaigns, help set the stage, leaving the U.S. more free to consider these options if they are later deemed necessary. Again, the likelihood of a nuclear war is not small, but the U.S. has shown repeatedly that it is prepared to face this danger to achieve its ends in the Middle East, as elsewhere. ●

7. Julia Preston, *Boston Globe*, February 9, 1986.

Vernon Walters:

Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist

by Ellen Ray and William Schaap

Editors' Note: This article first ran in CAIB Number 26, Summer 1986. Vernon Walters, who over the years has been involved in one covert action after another, was also a member of the "Murder Board," the Reagan administration's core Central American policy group. (Other members of this group include, Robert McFarlane, Alexander Haig, Lawrence Eagleburger, and William Casey.) Walters brandished this issue of CAIB, which had his picture on the cover, at a UN press conference expressing shock that he was labeled a terrorist.

The Military Background

Vernon Walters enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army shortly before Pearl Harbor.¹ After the U.S. entered the war, he attended infantry school and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, and attended the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Richie, Maryland. In October 1942 he "took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco." (This appears to be the extent of Walters's combat experience.) He then taught "Prisoner of War Interrogation" at Camp Richie. Although not mentioned in his official biography, Walters later trained Brazilian troops at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he became close friends with a young officer, Humberto Castelo Branco, who, more than 20 years later, was to take power in the coup which overthrew President João Goulart. Walters was aide de camp to General Mark W. Clark in Italy and then, until the end of the War, combat liaison officer with the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division in Italy. All the above mentioned countries are ones with which Walters was later to have significant ties.

Walters spent more than 25 years in a succession of military assignments, usually as military attaché or interpreter, and generally under the aegis of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was in Brazil in 1945 with Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman, and attended the 1947 Pan American Conference in Bogotá, Colombia. This was his first brush with revolution and counterrevolution; the massive protests against the Conference were met with bloody retaliation which left more than 2,000 dead. Curiously, Walters received a medal for his service during this incident, leading to speculation about his role in the events.²

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Walters was all over the globe, most significantly, as we will see below, in Iran, Italy, Brazil, France, and Vietnam. He spent three years in secret negotiations with the Chinese, and, in the words of his official

biography, "smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct such negotiations."

His military promotions were unprecedented, considering his beginnings as a private. His Brazilian escapades in 1964 earned the Colonel a promotion to Brigadier General; his one month in Vietnam three years later got him his second star, as Major General; and when, in April 1972, he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, he became a Lieutenant General. He retired in July 1976 and spent the Carter years in an action-packed civilian career. Then, shortly after President Reagan entered office, Walters returned through the revolving door and began four years' State Department service as Ambassador-at-Large, before becoming U.N. Ambassador.

Prior to examining his post-military career, it is enlightening to review Walters's far-flung operations in the coup-filled years from 1953 to 1973.

Walters admits, and associates confirm, that he was involved in the 1953 putsch which overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstalled the young Shah.³ In the early 1960s he was military attaché in Rome, actively blocking the Kennedy administration's "opening" towards the Italian left.⁴

Brazil

In 1962 Walters was posted to Brazil as military attaché. Although Walters insists he was nothing more than a "well-informed observer" of the events that followed,⁵ it is obvious that he was up to his neck in the plotting which culminated in the bloody coup of 1964. He was, according to Jan Knippers Black, the "linchpin, the one person all the officers would talk to while they were still afraid to talk with one another."⁶ Indeed, he was such a good "observer" that he told Washington one week in advance the exact day the coup was to take place.⁷

In fact, various government documents suggest that Walters played an extremely crucial role both in fomenting and in accomplishing the coup. In the year preceding the March 31, 1964 start of the coup, a series of CIA documents describe a meticulous investigation into the attitude of the Brazilian military regarding the Goulart government. During this period, the person best situated to sway the hesitant rightist military leaders was Colonel Vernon Walters, who, as it hap-

3. Claudia Wright, "Brass Knuckles for America," in *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, p. 22.

6. Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

7. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 22.


1. The underlying data are from the State Department biography of August 1981.

2. Ramón Jimeno and Marcela Caldas, "Vernon Anthony Walters: El Agente Secreto de la Diplomacia Silenciosa," in *Zona* (Bogotá, Colombia), April 23, 1986, p. 46.

pens, was promoted to Brigadier General within a year of the coup.⁸

Walters's friendship with Nixon, led to his appointment, in April 1972, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a post he filled under four Directors, Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush. John Dean testified during the Watergate trials that he had been told Walters "was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency."⁹ Walters served from 1972 to 1976.

Credit: © 1985, Brian Alpert, Keystone Press Agency



Vernon Walters: Diplo-spook.

The Great Watergate Myth

Part of the Walters mythology is his allegedly firm, moral, and indignant refusal to be a part of any cover-up of what came to be known as the Watergate scandal. The fact is that when Walters was first asked, by Nixon aide Bob Haldeman, to warn the FBI (falsely) that a strenuous investigation of Watergate would jeopardize ongoing CIA operations, he did just that. Within minutes of receiving those orders, he was on his way to FBI Director Patrick Gray.¹⁰ Several days later Walters was still stonewalling, advising John Dean that the then Director, Richard Helms, wanted to distance himself and the Agency from the growing scandal.

Two weeks after his first, eager involvement, Walters realized he could not stall the investigation much further. When Gray, also anxious to protect himself, asked Walters if he could put the CIA's request in writing, Walters said he could not write such a "spurious" letter. The relieved Gray then understood that he could let the investigation, already with a momentum of its own, go on; Walters did not want to be in the position of wittingly covering up crimes, especially as so many

8. *Ibid.*, p. 22; *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, p. A6; Jeff Stein, "Mystery Man of American Diplomacy," *Boston Globe Magazine*, August 29, 1982, p. 29; *Washington Post*, December 29, 1976.

9. David Wise, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 245.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 243-44.

people would know about it. Still, it was almost a year later that he first informed the Department of Justice of his knowledge of the White House's efforts to have the CIA stop the FBI, and during that year he received the Agency's Distinguished Intelligence Medal.¹¹

Chile, Allende, and Letelier

One of the most controversial series of charges against Walters involve his connections with the fascist opposition to the administration of Chilean President Salvador Allende, to the overthrow of Allende, and to the assassination of former Chilean Defense Minister Orlando Letelier.

While DDCI, Walters was in charge of the close liaison between the CIA and the Chilean intelligence services, which cooperated closely in the efforts to overthrow the Allende government. They also reportedly received considerable help from Walters's friends in the Brazilian service.¹² But the most controversial allegation against Walters is that he was complicit in the assassination of Letelier.¹³

It is almost impossible to believe, from all of the studies which have been published, and from the testimony of several trials and congressional hearings, that Vernon Walters did not have advance knowledge of a major Chilean secret police operation in the U.S. being planned in July and August of 1976, but no directly incriminating evidence has been found. Walters vigorously denies any connection with, or foreknowledge of, the Letelier assassination.

Walters's "Private Life," 1976-1981

Whatever his reasons for leaving the Ford administration well before the elections, Walters spent the Carter years close to the friends he had made over the past three decades. And playing upon those friendships proved no fiscal hardship. In 1980, for example, Walters made nearly half a million dollars, \$300,000 of which was a fee from what may be one of the most misleadingly named companies in the United States, Environmental Energy Systems, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia, which is, curiously, a major arms merchant. The money was a consultant's fee for assisting them in their efforts (apparently unsuccessful) to sell tanks to the King of Morocco.

Walters's work with Morocco during this time period has even more ominous overtones. He was (and possibly still is) a general partner in a Vienna, Virginia organization called Morocco Travel Advisers. In a letter to the Senate submitted with his April 1, 1981 Disclosure Statement he said the company "provides tours of Morocco for and at the expense of U.S. travel agents." But he also noted that it was involved in

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 529.

12. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 8, p. 36; Thomas F. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 231.

13. Jeff Stein, "Vernon Walters and the Death of Orlando Letelier," *Boston Globe*, August 29, 1982, p. 50; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 1-14; John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 382-89; Donald Freed with Fred Landis, *Death in Washington* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 184-86.

"the development of tourism in the far south of Morocco and in the contested area."¹⁴

Walters's Ties to Guatemala

Vernon Walters was perhaps President Reagan's most prominent apologist for the brutal military dictatorship of General Romeo Lucas García of Guatemala. In a May 1981 press conference in Guatemala City, Walters said the U.S. wanted to help Lucas García defend "peace and liberty."¹⁵ When asked about Guatemalan human rights violations, Walters said, "There will be human rights problems in the year 3000 with the governments of Mars and the moon. There are some problems that are never resolved."¹⁶ A month later, U.S. aid for Guatemala resumed at a significant level.

Walters had ties to Guatemala and its murderous leaders from his "civilian" interlude in the late 1970s. One of the clients he listed in his Senate disclosure statement was Basic Research International, S.A.. They paid him \$1,000 a day to try to influence the Guatemalan government to lift oil production quotas. It has been charged that in this project, Basic Research issued exaggerated estimates of Guatemalan oil reserves which the State Department then used to justify continued U.S. support for the brutal regime.

Walters continues to flak for Guatemala. In 1985 he told an interviewer that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" really worked; the Guatemalan military is "not killing as many people as they did before."¹⁷ This faint praise was not even true; virtually all reports indicated that the Guatemalan government at the time continued to have the worst human rights record in the area.

Joining the Reagan Administration

Walters was appointed a senior adviser to then Secretary of State Alexander Haig on April 1, 1981, just two months after Reagan took office. On July 22, 1981, after Senate confirmation, he was sworn in as Ambassador-at-Large. Among his earliest duties was a deep involvement in the administration's war against Nicaragua. In 1981 and 1982 he made numerous trips to Argentina to arrange for that government's training of contras and for their handling of various secret payments to contra leaders, particularly prior to the final approval of the CIA's original plans.

Walters had a special role in the building up of the contra forces waging their brutal war against Nicaragua. According to the testimony of former contra leader Edgar Chamorro,¹⁸ Walters was instrumental in consolidating the forces of the former members of Somoza's National Guard:

14. *New York Times*, December 6, 1981.

15. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 24.

16. *Ibid.* Walters was accompanied on his May 1981 trip to Guatemala by Frank Ortiz, who had been removed by President Carter from his post as Ambassador to that country because he was considered "too conciliatory" to the regime. *Washington Post*, May 13, 1981.

17. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 25.

18. Transcript, sworn testimony of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in *Nicaragua v. United States of America: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*.

"At the time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border...General Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorporated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers...the new organization was called the National Democratic Force, or by its Spanish acronym, FDN."

One of Walters's most significant achievements in his personal war against Nicaragua was a secret agreement he negotiated with the then President of Colombia, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala aimed at setting up a top secret U.S. military base on the Colombian island of San Andrés, only 125 miles off the east coast of Nicaragua. Some \$50 million worth of sophisticated tracking radar and anti-aircraft batteries have reportedly been installed on the island and nearby keys.¹⁹

Walters in for Kirkpatrick

In February 1985, Walters was nominated by President Reagan to succeed Jeane Kirkpatrick as United Nations Ambassador. Although most reportage continued to praise Walters, reiterating all the old war stories, some of the journals were less than flattering. As Claudia Wright noted in the *New Statesman*, "Walters's candidacy for the U.N. post carries an unusual cachet: Directly or indirectly, he has been involved in overthrowing more governments than any other official still serving in the U.S. government."²⁰

Indeed, the downplaying of the role of the United Nations is a pillar of Reagan's foreign policy. And Walters is a staunch adherent of the Reagan Doctrine. He has called the U.N. a "measured disappointment," because it has "drifted away from resolution of conflicts." Walters has promised to be "very tough," to "work very hard to change these voting patterns unfavorable to the U.S."²¹ His professed love for conflict resolution belies the administration's—and Walters's—contempt for the World Court, as evidenced by their refusal to participate in the case brought, successfully, by Nicaragua to challenge the *contra* war.

Recent press reports note that Walters has been absent from his U.N. post nearly continually the past few months, traveling around the world on more secret missions. As usual, his trips go undocumented while incidents of U.S.-sponsored terrorism continue unabated.

If all else fails, Walters is not above simple blackmail. *U.S. News & World Report* has described how he fended off a potentially hostile Senator during the Watergate hearings by discreetly threatening to bring up at the hearings the time the Senator had asked Walters, then military attaché in Paris, to ship some luxury items illegally through military channels for a group of junketing Senators.²² ●

19. Jimeno and Caldas, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 47.

20. *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

21. *U.S. News & World Report*, September 3, 1985, p. 29.

22. *U.S. News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13.

Savimbi Seeks "Understanding"

By Louis Wolf

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 7, December 1979. It describes the first visit of Jonas Savimbi to the U.S. in many years, visits which became more frequent under the Reagan administration.

The failure of the joint CIA-South African military operation (1971-74) that attempted to thwart the Angolan liberation struggle was amply documented in John Stockwell's "In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story." The CIA and South Africa pinned their hopes on two so-called "liberation movements," UNITA (led by Jonas Savimbi) and FNLA (led by Holden Roberto), to destroy the people's genuine liberation organization that had fought the Portuguese uninterruptedly since 1960, the MPLA.

In this context Jonas Savimbi arrived in New York for a week-long visit, his first to this country since 1961. The decision to come here was, according to *Newsweek*, not even made by Savimbi. He was expecting to begin his annual junket to drop in on the few African heads of state still friendly to UNITA. He was joined by *Newsweek*'s star reporter Arnaud de Borchgrave, and informed that he was going to the United States instead.

The trip was sponsored by *Freedom House*, on whose board White House national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sits (he is now listed "on leave"), and which trumpets itself as "a non-partisan, national organization devoted to the strengthening of free societies." Savimbi spoke at Freedom House, to an audience packed with Cuban exiles. The co-sponsor was *Social Democrats, U.S.A.*, whose executive director called Savimbi "one of the most impressive political figures I have ever met."

Although Savimbi said he had not come to the U.S. seeking military or economic aid, but simply wanting "understanding," *Newsweek*'s headline "Savimbi Asks For Help" was more candid, as was his statement to De Borchgrave: "You should help your friends help themselves." Savimbi was not an official state visitor, but while in Washington, he and his party were provided with two long, sleek black Cadillac limousines from the White House fleet.

Kissinger's Role

One person, above all others, has lobbied most for Savimbi's cause. At the time of the huge CIA-South African thrust into Angola in 1974-76 and since the death of MPLA President Agostinho Neto, he has had the ardent backing of Henry Kissinger. Their meeting in New York was "very fruitful" and the former Secretary of State was "extremely sympathetic and brotherly to our leader," a Savimbi aide told *CAIB*.

Savimbi was slated to meet with ex-energy czar and former CIA chief James Schlesinger, Senators Sam Nunn (Dem.-Ga.)

and Henry Jackson (Dem.-Wash.), and House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill (Dem.-Mass.), all reportedly anxious to facilitate help for Savimbi and UNITA.

Savimbi was feted as a dinner guest at the home of AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, and also met at their headquarters with Kirkland and a select group from their International Affairs Department—the CIA's well-worn channel for its global labor operations—including head of the African-American Labor Center, ex-Marine Patrick O'Farrell.

Talking Turkey

For a guerrilla who has solicited and received aid from countries as disparate as the U.S., Portugal, France, North Korea, the Peoples Republic of China, Zaire, and South Africa, it was intriguing to see the flattery which awaited him as he addressed a crowded conference room at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where Kissinger has an office and where James Schlesinger and other "retirees" from the national security establishment sit as board and staff members or as advisors. After giving his presentation, entitled "The Strategic Role of Angola in the Subcontinent," it became apparent that he really was talking about *the strategic role of UNITA*. He spoke rhetorically about "the interests" and the "best interests" of the U.S., suggesting that UNITA should be seen by his audience in the latter category.

Savimbi's justification for his war is the Cuban presence in Angola, but not everybody in the audience was prepared to accept him as the "liberation fighter" he described himself as. Some of those listening asked difficult questions.

One identifying himself as a South African said: "In the Kunene region of southern Angola, you are supported by South Africa. South Africa is bombing Angolans every day." To the surprise of many, Savimbi admitted this and even bragged about selling diamonds to South Africa for money to buy arms in various countries.

CIA Pawn

Another questioner asked bluntly: "Are you in the CIA's pocket?" Savimbi chuckled and, after a thoughtful pause, said: "In 1975, I addressed myself to the American administration, then I asked for help. If they give it to me through which channel, that's a domestic problem...."

It is obvious that Savimbi will measure the "understanding" he generated in the United States very literally—in dollars and cents, in tanks, in guns, and in bullets the U.S. sends him. He has addressed himself to the Carter Administration in full view of everyone this time. Will the Administration wade in once more, and "through which channel?" ●

Mozambique Smashes Spy Network

by Ellen Ray

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 12, April 1981. Since then, the South African government has dramatically increased its funding of and control over the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), a brutal terrorist organization which has killed thousands of Mozambicans in recent years. It is also important to note that this article describes an attempt by the CIA to secure the travel plans, including flight schedules, of Mozambican President Samora Machel. Machel died in a mysterious plane crash in 1987 which was thought by many to have been caused by sabotage.

With the complicity of a U.S. media blackout, the CIA has once again managed to deflect attention from its criminal operations — in this case the exposure in Mozambique in early March of one of the largest and most sinister spy rings ever uncovered.

The joint operations of the CIA and South African intelligence, the Department of National Security (DONS, formerly BOSS) were directed against progressive African governments for a period of more than six years, according to a March 4 communique from the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities extended throughout southern Africa, and from Pretoria to Washington. "The CIA had initiated espionage activities and recruitment of agents during the colonial era," the communique states. After Mozambican independence in 1975, the spy ring was directed from the U.S. Embassy in Maputo, the Mozambican capital, by the successive CIA Chiefs of Station posing as second secretaries.

Involvement in Mass Murder

Announcing the expulsion of six American CIA officers and agents, Mozambique's Ministry of Security produced a double agent, a young Air Force officer, who had infiltrated the network since 1978. According to his testimony and that of other Mozambican officials who confessed to involvement, the ring did not serve merely to gather intelligence information, but was actively engaged in subversion and interference in Mozambique's internal affairs.

The most blatant current example given was the direct involvement of the CIA with South Africa in the January 30 raid in which twelve members of the African National Congress were murdered and three others kidnapped and taken to South Africa. Evidence indicates that the CIA provided the addresses of the three homes in the Maputo suburb of Matola where the South African exiles were living. With this information, South African commandos crossed the border near Swaziland, drove to Matola, and attacked the homes.

Prior to the liberation of Zimbabwe, it was learned, the CIA network had also collected information on the location of Robert Mugabe's ZANU refugee camps in Mozambique, and transmitted this information to the Ian Smith regime in

Rhodesia, leading to repeated raids against Mozambican territory.

The Expulsions

In retaliation for the latest and most vicious raid, the government of Mozambique expelled six Americans and arrested at least twenty other persons, both foreigners and Mozambicans, including Jose Massinga, a former director of research and personnel in the Foreign Ministry. Massinga confessed to having been recruited by the CIA while attending university in the United States. He was activated to work against his government in 1975, and continued until his arrest on March 2.

Another CIA agent arrested in connection with the smashing of this ring was Alcide Chivite, a veteran FRELIMO guerrilla leader, who has publicly detailed his work with the spy ring since 1978. Additionally, a number of Mozambican military officers have been arrested. President Samora Machel has, in several addresses to the people of Mozambique, urged far greater vigilance on the part of everyone, and criticized the relaxation of security which came with the victory of the progressive forces in Zimbabwe.

Other CIA Recruits

At a recent press conference in Maputo, attended by more than 100 foreign reporters and diplomats, Flight Captain Joao Carneiro Goncalves described how he duped the CIA for more than three years by passing on false information provided to him by the Ministry of Security. The CIA was apparently interested in obtaining information on the Mozambican armed forces, on liberation movements which had representatives in that country, and, ominously, on the movements of President Samora Machel.

A pilot, Jose Gomes Neto, whom the CIA tried to recruit, described the methods used. A CIA agent, who was a trained pilot and parachutist, had joined the Mozambique Aero-Club and took part in various competitions. The agent made use of such occasions to take photographs of sensitive areas. He also used the excuse of flying from Maputo to Inhambane in the north for a parachute competition to make an aerial survey of areas near both cities. Determined to recruit Gomes Neto, the CIA agent tried to pass himself off as a representative of the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, and invited Gomes Neto sailing on his yacht, playing squash at his club, and the like.

The information the CIA was trying to obtain included the identity of the flight staff which travelled with President Machel; the flights scheduled for the President and other civilian and military leaders; the security systems at Mozambican airports, particularly the stationing of security forces at Maputo airport; the quantity of spare aircraft parts in stock; the structure of Mozambican Airways workshops; and the

identities of the main aircraft mechanics. The Maputo daily, *Noticias* commented that the case of Jose Gomes Neto illustrates how the CIA uses social contacts to try to recruit agents, to lead them into illegal and subversive activities.

U.S. Response

Responding immediately to the expulsions, the U.S. State Department charged that the orders for the U.S. personnel to leave came after a Cuban intelligence team with Mozambican support had tried to recruit one of the CIA officers and failed. The State Department also alleged that three *CAIB* co-editors who had visited Mozambique were involved. The State Department stated it was "not coincidental" that the *CAIB* people were there "at the time," and that the incident was viewed "with the most serious concern."

Mozambican authorities criticized U.S. attempts to present Mozambique as subservient to any outside forces. The claim of "Cuban and private American involvement was intended to convey that Mozambicans were incapable of exposing the spy ring. That's racist," a Mozambican official said.

A number of related events followed in the wake of the Maputo CIA scandal. At the very time the press conferences were being called in Maputo, senior South African intelligence and military officers were visiting Washington, despite long-standing diplomatic policies forbidding such direct contacts. These officials, one of whom had actually been previously expelled from the United States, received visas, travelled to Washington, met with officials of the NSC and the Defense Intelligence Agency, all, according to the State Department, without their knowing of the South African's identities.

It turned out that the South African officials were invited by the American Security Council, which has long supported close relations with South Africa, and, according to John Fisher, ASC president, he had notified the State Department in advance of the invitations, but had not received any reply. The State Department professed surprise and embarrassment and the South Africans cut short their visit; presumably, not before certain deals were struck.

Most recently, it was learned that U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick also met on March 15 with one of the South Africans, Lt. Gen. P.W. Van Der Westerhuizen, head of military intelligence, despite State Department assertions to the contrary. She also met privately with Dirk Mudge, the white puppet "leader" of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia.

The United States retaliated for the expulsions in Mozambique by abruptly cutting off all food shipments to Mozambique, indicating the level to which humanitarian considerations have sunk in the Reagan administration. Several high officials, including the President, have made public statements in the past few weeks indicating strong support for the South African government, much to the dismay of virtually all other African states.

South Africa, elated by these expressions of solidarity, has launched more outrageous raids against both Angola and Mozambique. These have included a massive bombing March



Credit: Associated Press

U.S. Embassy personnel departing Mozambique after being expelled for spying.

17 of the Lubango airfield in southern Angola, more than 190 miles north of the Namibian border, and a bizarre incident March 18 on Mozambique's southern border with South Africa.

According to South Africa, some fifty of its soldiers were simply strolling along the unmarked beach and "unsuspectingly and probably innocently" strayed across the line, whereupon they were attacked by Mozambican troops, suffering two deaths before reinforcements arrived to cover the retreat back to South African soil. The South African government had the audacity to refer to the Mozambican action as an "ambush," and said that such deeds "will without a doubt heighten tension on the border." This from the country which had just staged the murderous Matola raid.

The signals from Washington are more ominous than would have been thought possible a few months ago. The administration has announced its intention to press for the immediate repeal of the Clark Amendment, which purports to prohibit covert CIA operations in Angola—though it has been more honored in the breach during its five years on the books.

In a major international shock, the administration has announced that it is considering inviting the Prime Minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, for an official visit to the United States. The United States has never before invited a South African Prime Minister to visit, and the proposal has African leaders deeply concerned. The President of Nigeria noted his fear that Mr. Reagan has no comprehension of the repercussions such a move would have.

It is nevertheless clear that the present U.S. administration is filled with boosters of South Africa intent on engineering a complete turnabout in U.S. foreign policy in the area. Open support for the apartheid regime is now the rule, not the exception. This support only encourages South Africa to resist any accommodation or negotiation with its neighbors, and to resist any change in its apartheid policy. If anything, such policies will only hasten the final military conflict in southern Africa. In this war it appears that the United States may be South Africa's only ally in the entire world. ●

U.S. and South Africa Foment Terrorist Wars

by Sean Gervasi *

Editors' Note: This article was first published in CAIB Number 22, Fall 1984. To date, South Africa continues to supply counterrevolutionary armies in Angola and Mozambique even though it has formally agreed not to.

South Africa has been conducting an undeclared terrorist war on the Front-line States, and in particular on Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, for more than three years. This war has been waged across an entire subcontinent, using every means of modern warfare from armored divisions and squadrons of bombers to economic sabotage, subversion and assassination.

Moreover, the Reagan Administration is a willing partner in the secret war in southern Africa. It has thrown the weight and power of the United States behind South Africa's campaign to destabilize the Front-line States. South Africa and the U.S. are now full partners in an almost invisible war to change the political balance in the region and to preserve and reinforce the principal institutions of the apartheid system.

Indeed, from its inception, it was clear that the Reagan Administration would seek to preserve the status quo in South Africa as part of an anti-Socialist crusade, just as it announced it would do in El Salvador. It has therefore pursued a "two-track" policy, revealing its commitment to South Africa and its antagonism to radical change, but concealing many of its actions in support of South Africa's war.

The war against the Front-line States has been much more complex than many observers have suspected. And the Central Intelligence Agency has inevitably played an important role in it, carrying out a second, secret "track" of U. S. policy, coordinating various programs of covert warfare and undertaking important operations.

The 1981 Southern Africa Policy Review

When the Reagan Administration took office, the new President's foreign policy advisors shared the view that the U.S. had to become actively engaged in southern Africa. The Administration, however, needed a coherent position and a consistent set of policies for the region.

In the region as a whole, to seek to end "the dangerous cycle of violence in the region" and to direct "the impetus toward change into peaceful channels"; privately to encourage South Africa "to preempt any armed threat—guerrilla or conventional—from its neighbors" and "to use its military superiority for that end"; to apply strong pressure, with others, against

Angola and Mozambique and eventually to seek radical changes in the internal political balance in those countries; to apply pressure against the governments of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and gradually to draw them closer to the West; to cooperate closely with South Africa in mounting pressures against the Front-line States; to use U.S. diplomacy "to help establish the rules of the game that will limit and discourage the application of outside force" in the region.

And publicly, to maintain strict secrecy about active collaboration in support of South Africa; to maintain strict secrecy about certain actions taken against the Front-line States; to mount an extensive campaign of political action and propaganda in Africa, Western Europe, and the United States to ensure that actions of the U.S. government remain invisible or are accepted by public opinion.

Coercive Diplomacy

The strategy chosen was essentially an extension of the military doctrine of coercive diplomacy, according to which a nation can sometimes achieve certain limited political objectives by combining carefully measured doses of military force with diplomacy. Selective force can be used against an adversary who resists one's demands, while "negotiations" with him are continued. In some cases, inducements of aid or other incentives may be offered. The idea is that an adversary may be "persuaded" to accept one's demands after military pressure has been applied, and when inducements are offered.

But this strategy did not produce the results which were expected of it. The U.S. and South Africa were demanding much more of the Front-line States than they were prepared to give, even under pressure. What began as coercive diplomacy, therefore, broke down and became a full-scale terrorist war. When the Reagan Administration and South Africa met resistance, they had to choose between giving up their aims or escalating the war. They chose the latter course.

The War is Launched

In March 1981, South African commandos raided Maputo, the Mozambican capital, only a few hours after Secretary of State Haig had declared the "war against international terrorism" a priority for United States foreign policy. Pretoria stepped up its military actions against Angola, initiating a continuous low intensity war in the southern part of the country. Its agents carried out sabotage and assassinations in Zimbabwe. It made an attempt to mount a coup against Zambia's President Kaunda. South Africa also began a major effort to build, arm and deploy special military units in Mozambique to attack roads, railways, bridges, and other economic targets,

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Credit: Noticias

The result of a South African commando raid into Mozambique which left 12 dead.

as well as to sow terror in rural areas.

At the same time, South Africa began preparations for full-scale economic warfare against several of the Front-line States, notably Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. During the latter part of 1981, the pressure against the Front-line States was increased, creating severe economic and political difficulties.

Sabotage increased in Zimbabwe, causing many millions of dollars in losses. At the end of 1981, a bomb blast nearly destroyed ZANU headquarters in the middle of Salisbury-Harare, killing six people and wounding many others.

However, in 1981 the brunt of the attack was falling on Angola. In August, South Africa mounted a major invasion of the southern part of the country, deploying 11,000 men and several battalions of tanks and armored cars. There was fierce fighting in the center of Cunene province, and by September 80,000 Angolans from the area had been forced to flee. South Africa established a permanent military presence in southern Angola, substantially increased its support for UNITA and began to extend its own raids further and further to the north.

In Mozambique, South Africa started a veritable war. It reorganized the Mozambique National Resistance, which had been started by Rhodesian Military Intelligence to attack ZANU inside Mozambique during the liberation struggle. MNR units, assisted by South African commandos, were sent again into Mozambique, where they repeatedly attacked transport links and power lines in the central provinces. Key road and rail bridges to Zimbabwe were blown up by South African forces, cutting the movement of goods to and from that country, including oil. While the Mozambique Army began to react with some effect in 1981, the scale of the South African operations was very large and difficult to cope with. Mozambique gradually came under siege.

The Role of the U.S. Since 1981

Considerable evidence can be pieced together from public sources and from interviews, to give some idea of the extent

of U.S. actions aimed at destabilizing the Front-line States.

From 1981, the CIA, acting through third parties, began to provide substantial aid to the UNITA group in Angola, which has been heavily supported by South Africa for a decade. This aid has included money, arms, and equipment.

From 1981, the U.S. has orchestrated a campaign of economic pressure against Tanzania, demanding persistently behind the scenes that Tanzania abandon socialist economic policies. This campaign has succeeded in depriving Tanzania of needed investment, credit, and aid, thus contributing to the "economic failure" which the Reagan Administration decries.

In 1981, Zambian security forces thwarted a plot by dissidents and "South African commandos" to assassinate President Kaunda and seize power. It was reported in *Africa News*, July 13, 1981 that agents of the CIA had recruited Zambians in an effort to examine "the possibility of an alternative leadership in the country." CIA Director William Casey flew secretly to Lusaka and threatened sanctions against Zambia if the role of the CIA was exposed.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration blocked the implementation of the U.N. plan for a Namibian settlement by linking it for the first time to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. While the U.S. continued to state its support for the U.N. plan, Secretary of State Haig wrote the South African Foreign Minister late in the year "that the United States would not press South Africa to settle the Namibian question unless Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola." (*TransAfrica Forum*, Spring 1983, p. 12.)

While the U.S. and South Africa were applying various pressures against Angola, including substantial overt military pressure, General Vernon Walters, a former deputy director of the CIA and now a U.S. special envoy, made numerous trips to Luanda to persuade the Angolan Government to agree to the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

In 1983, when large numbers of people in Mozambique faced starvation and when tens of thousands had already died from lack of food, the Reagan Administration deliberately held back food aid to that country, while it was seeking to "persuade" it to sign a non-aggression agreement with South Africa. Mozambique has repeatedly refused to agree to South Africa's demand that the African National Congress be expelled from its territory. Mozambique began 1984 facing the most serious food shortages it had known and with a food deficit of well over 100,000 tons of cereals.

Rebuilding the *Cordon Sanitaire*

The Reagan Administration had concentrated its efforts on what it considered Cuba's intervention in Angola. The focus was on the issue of "linkage." Despite considerable military and economic pressure, against all the Front-line States, and especially against Angola, these efforts failed.

The response to this resistance was to escalate the war and to try to force through a "regional security settlement." In practice, this meant forcing the Front-line States to reduce their support for the liberation movements. The objective was to rebuild the *cordon sanitaire* of buffer states around South Africa which had been destroyed by revolutions in Angola,

Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

In September 1982, shortly after the Frontline States had rebuffed President Reagan's approach on "linkage," William Casey flew to southern Africa. He visited a number of countries, including South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zaire. CIA sources have stated that this was a "familiarization" trip, with no particular political purpose. This is not true. Casey went to southern Africa, and particularly to South Africa, to begin implementing a grand design for rebuilding the *cordon sanitaire* around South Africa. Press reports at the time made it clear that South Africa and the U.S. would demand that the Front-line States cease or reduce their support for SWAPO and the ANC or face an escalation of military, economic and other pressures.

Casey's discussions with South African officials apparently resulted in an agreement on implementing the next phase of coercive diplomacy in southern Africa. Pressures on all the Front-line States would be increased.

The Road to "Settlements"

By the end of 1982, the situation in southern Africa was becoming very difficult, especially in Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. The region was suffering from the effects of two years of drought. The world recession had hurt exports badly, and foreign exchange was generally very scarce. Parts of the region had already suffered serious damage as a result of South African military and terrorist operations.

The attacks on most of the Front-line States were intensified. South Africa resumed a low-level guerrilla war against Lesotho, using a surrogate Lesotho "liberation army." In Mozambique, the MNR attacked transport routes and terrorized the countryside, mining roads, burning stores, schools and health posts, poisoning wells, and deliberately mutilating peasants. In some cases, actions supposedly carried out by the MNR were actually carried out by regular South African commando units. South Africa had also begun to infiltrate former Rhodesian commandos into the southern part of Zimbabwe in an effort to precipitate a "civil war."

In December of 1982, South African commandos attacked and destroyed the oil depot in the Mozambican city of Beira. The raid caused millions of dollars in damage and cut supplies of petroleum to Zimbabwe. On the same day, South African commandos flew by helicopter to Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, and carried out a raid against houses inhabited by South African refugees. Forty-two persons were killed, and many more were wounded.

By the beginning of 1983, South Africa was carrying out military and paramilitary attacks against the Front-line States almost openly. During 1983, economic warfare, most of which was covert, continued, and several countries found themselves facing unprecedented difficulties. They could not export their goods. They could not attract foreign capital or purchase essential commodities, particularly adequate supplies of food. They lacked the means to substitute domestic production of needed goods and foreign aid projects had to be shut down, often for security reasons.

By mid-1983, drought, war, and a variety of external pressures had begun to make a difficult situation desperate. U.S. analysts predicted that the Front-line States would soon be "on their knees."

The situation which existed by the end of the year in most parts of the region is hard to describe. In Zimbabwe, millions of people were receiving emergency food aid. South Africa was again intensifying its efforts to produce chaos in the province of Matabeleland. It had mounted a further large-scale invasion of Angola, sending its troops nearly two hundred miles into the country. While Angola offered strong resistance, this third invasion was a harsh blow to a country already suffering from drought, a partial economic blockade and the dislocation and damage caused by previous attacks. South Africa's UNITA surrogates, furthermore, were extending their military actions into the center of the country.

Mozambique faced the gravest economic situation it had known. The drought had continued, further reducing food production. More than 100,000 Mozambicans had fled to Zimbabwe in search of food. In Inhambane province, where the war was especially intense, the lack of food had caused the death of tens of thousands of people, and possibly as many as 100,000 people in 1983 alone.

As the war escalated in late 1983, and as the situation of several of the front-line States grew increasingly difficult, U.S. diplomats pressed hard for a series of "non-aggression" agreements. A South African official quoted in the *New York Times* (January 25, 1983) made it clear what kind of "peace" they were offering: "We want to show that we want peace in the region, we want to contribute and we can help a lot. But we also want to show that if we are refused we can destroy the whole of southern Africa."

U. S. officials were for the most part more circumspect about expressing such views. The Reagan Administration could not openly link its proposals to the Front-line States to such crude threats. But the link was there nonetheless, and the Front-line States understood this. In late 1983, in an interview with the *Johannesburg Financial Mail* (November 18, 1983), Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, said that "destabilization will remain in force until Angola and Mozambique do not permit their territory to be used by terrorists to attack South Africa."

Conclusion

This account should help to explain why Angola and Mozambique eventually submitted to some U.S. and South African demands at Lusaka and at Nkomati some time ago. Something near all-out war, no less menacing for being unseen, was waged against them to force them to do so.

However, the story is not ended. The Lusaka agreement has already broken down. South Africa has not withdrawn from Angola. And both South Africa and the U.S. are now seeking to by-pass the United Nations plan for decolonizing Namibia. Moreover, Angola has made it quite clear that it will not accept "linkage." The political situation in southern Africa has not changed. ●

Profile of U.S. Intelligence in Southeast Asia

by David Truong D.H.*

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 5, July 1979. In January 1979, the Vietnamese army entered Kampuchea and overthrew the Pol Pot regime. Military forces opposing the Vietnamese-backed government, including a force led by Pol Pot, formed on the Kampuchean-Thai border and the CIA dutifully proceeded to arm them. The war continues today.

In the aftermath of the US debacle in Indochina in April 1975, little has been written in the Western media about that part of Asia which affected the US for more than two decades. Brief visits by a few Westerners to Vietnam and Laos have produced sketches of life there, but most stories about Indochina deal with refugees, their plight, and at times, their dubious accounts of the internal situation. Official US statements in early 1976 gave the impression that the US was actually "leaving" Southeast Asia.

The Situation Since the US Defeat

Has this been the reality since April 1975? Actually, except for the unravelling of the client Thieu regime and the chaotic evacuation of US interests from Saigon, events and trends both within and without Indochina indicate that the US presence is much entrenched in Southeast Asia, especially with regard to its clandestine operations.

In April 1975, much of the CIA apparatus in South Vietnam was disrupted. Parts of it were moved to Thailand and to US bases in the Philippines. Under the shock of the Vietnamese spring offensive, the Thieu regime's gigantic police and intelligence machine — which the US took years to build — crumbled. According to Frank Snepp's *Decent Interval*, up to thirty thousand Vietnamese special police, CIA, and Operation Phoenix employees were left behind (p. 567). The Saigon CIA station — the largest in Asia — managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese (p. 566), including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the Agency over the years.

The CIA's other bases throughout South Vietnam, which operated under the cover of US consulates at the time, succeeded in taking out most of their Vietnamese, totalling several thousand.

Clearly the most immediate problem in 1975-76 for the Ford administration lay in resettling all these suddenly unemployed CIA operatives — hundreds of them — as well as all the pre-1975 Vietnamese employees. A few high-level Agency officers stayed in Bangkok after the debacle to assist the

station there in its intelligence-gathering activities. But they eventually joined the rest of the operatives in retirement in 1977. Although Stansfield Turner's Halloween purge removed most of these Indochina operatives from the Clandestine Division, the Agency was nevertheless left with a trim, and no less effective, "black operations" and paramilitary capability. With advances made in electronic technology, and the increasing practice of sharing resources with other services, Turner's move signaled the end of the Agency's era of large-scale para-military operations in Southeast Asia.

Most of the CIA's Vietnamese employees fared well. Following resettlement in the US, a few hundred refugees have been working as translators, monitors of events in Indochina, and consultants to the Agency and to the Pentagon on Indochina. Most low-level CIA-related refugees have been attached since 1976 to the HEW's Indochina refugee program, working throughout the US under the command of Americans who are either former Agency personnel or CORDS officers. (CORDS was predominantly a cover for the Agency's Operation Phoenix program to eliminate the NLF infrastructure.) This background indicates that the US has already set up in this country a similar network of Vietnamese agents designed to neutralize or eliminate Vietnamese suspected of pro-Hanoi views, and to build anti-Vietnam organizations of refugees. Nguyen Van Be, the former head of Saigon's Rural Development cadre program, now works for the HEW program, reporting on activities of various refugee organizations.

Working with the intelligence and counterinsurgency agencies of Southeast Asian governments are a small number of former Vietnamese officers of the Thieu regime's General Department of Political Warfare (GDPW). Established in the late 1950's under the guidance of CIA and counterinsurgency experts like Sir Robert Thompson, the GDPW borrowed its methods from all sources: from Agency experience in the Philippines with the Hukbalahap movement, from British counterinsurgency in Malaysia, from Goebbels' Nazi propaganda and psychological warfare techniques, and from tactics used by Chiang Kai-shek's command against the Chinese (*Etudes Vietnamiennes*, No. 42, p.82). These Vietnamese assist the Thai government in suppressing the liberation movement in Northern Thailand, and aid the Malaysian government as counterinsurgency advisors.

Singapore and the CIA

A look at Singapore reveals some interesting facts. Singapore lies at the strategically important Straits of Malacca, a region where for many years there has been a convergence of US and British interests, and a strong coordination of intelligence activities vis-a-vis the rest of Southeast Asia.

The Agency's Singapore station has a long history of ac-

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tivities against Vietnam. In the mid-1950's and during the period of the CIA's efforts to prop up the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam, Singapore was the center for all "black propaganda" operations directed against Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh movement. When the French colonialists negotiated in Geneva with the Vietnamese, the Singapore station put on an all-out drive of activities including "black operations," to bolster the French position (Joseph B. Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, p. 169). At the same time the Philippines station in Manila was the jumping-off base for the Agency's sabotage and other clandestine activities in North Vietnam, according to the *Pentagon Papers*. In 1954, the establishment of the Diem regime by Edward Lansdale of the CIA was backed by propaganda and clandestine operations out of Singapore (Smith, p. 178). It is common knowledge among intelligence observers of Southeast Asia that Singapore, the main business center of the area, is routinely used by Agency operatives with business covers on their way to their missions elsewhere in Asia.

With the withdrawal of the British military presence East of Suez several years ago, the Agency expanded its activities in Singapore, especially with a heightened US interest in Singapore following the closure of US bases in Thailand, and the establishment of US military and intelligence "transit" facilities there in the spring of 1978. At the present time, the Singapore station has developed a close working relationship with Singapore's intelligence service, monitoring and analyzing events in Indochina, and of course cooperating in "black propaganda" operations.

Manila and the CIA

A post-1975 tour d'horizon of the CIA in Southeast Asia would not be complete without mention of the main station, and regional headquarters, Manila. The Agency's assets there are significant: it operates jointly with the Defense Intelligence Agency major electronic listening posts into Indochina and southern China, which provided most of the intelligence on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. This joint CIA/DIA structure, called the Strategic Warning Staff, is headquartered in the Pentagon and operates a number of similar posts all over the world. The Manila station includes also very sizeable logistics capabilities for a wide range of clandestine operations against the governments of Indochina.

In the mid-1950s, US bases in the Philippines were used as the headquarters for "Operation Brotherhood" in northern Vietnam, under the direction of Edward Lansdale and Lucien Conien, and involving CIA-trained Filipinos.

Aside from the CIA's huge telecommunications installation—the Regional Relay Station—at Clark Air Force Base (the largest American military installation outside the continental US), there is at least one other vital installation in the Philippines. Located in Manila at the Seafront Compound about a mile from the US Embassy is the so-called "Regional Service Center." Though ostensibly under the auspices of the International Communications Agency, this ultra-modern printing facility functions as a secret CIA propaganda plant.

It had the ability to produce large quantities of high-quality color offset magazines, posters, leaflets and the like in at least 14 Asian languages.

One source in Manila has stated that the RSC was the source of counterfeit Vietnamese piasters which were airdropped in Vietnam. Officers from the CIA's Technical Services Division are known to maintain close liaison with the RSC, which still operates today in Manila.

In the post-Vietnam war period the regional headquarters



Henry Kissinger plans another covert action for South East Asia.

in Manila generally has increased in importance as a major listening post into the Indochinese peninsula.

US Policy and Intelligence Activities Since 1975

Since April 1975, US policies toward Vietnam have reflected a strong current of hostility toward the Vietnamese revolutionaries, with a brief interruption in the first few months of 1977.

In the last year of the Ford administration, the US sought to conduct a massive program of economic warfare and to mount a campaign to isolate Vietnam diplomatically. Aside from the official embargo against Vietnam and Kampuchea, the US applied pressure on Thailand's Thanin regime to economically blockade Laos, a landlocked country which had extensive trade with Thailand for years, thus forcing Vietnam to divert food resources to assist Laos. Two specific areas of economic warfare that the US has concentrated on deal with scientific and technological information, and development of oil resources. Under Kissinger's initiative, US missions around the world sought to prevent the cooperation and contracts made by Western countries and Japan—particularly the latter—in Vietnam's petroleum development.

The range of clandestine operations programmed to support US hostility toward Vietnam basically falls into two categories. The first one includes tactical, short-term operations that attempt to disrupt every aspect of life in revolutionary Vietnam. The second set of activities relates to the

strategic "Balkanization" of Indochina, and of preventing Vietnam's emergence as an economic power. The objectives were to agitate ethnic and religious groups which had a long association with the US presence in South Vietnam.

The Agency's clandestine operations were basically a hodge-podge of dead-end activities which already had been tried by the French colonialists following the loss of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. A French officer named Trinquier sought at that time to organize guerrilla units among the ethnic minorities in northern Tonkin against Ho Chi Minh's victorious Viet Minh forces, but the whole effort was eventually crushed.

Much more lethal were clandestine operations implemented in support of US strategic objectives of "Balkanization" of Indochina and of the economic containment of Vietnam. Under the leadership of Kissinger, these strategic operations dominated the covert side of US policies not only in Southeast Asia, but in areas considered vital to US interests, like Africa and the Middle East.

Relations With Chinese Intelligence

Following the Nixon administration's opening to China in 1971, the US government found a new partner in China to develop its strategic operations. While the policy of "Balkanization" of Indochina calls for a permanent state of war between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea based on ethnic and border differences (at one point for a permanently divided Vietnam) and may reflect some divergence in long-term US and Chinese objectives, US and Chinese interests for the time being have been and are, if not on a parallel course, then at least converging. The content of the Shanghai Communiqué, other Chinese and US policy statements, and moves by both parties since that time, provide the clearest record of these parallel interests.

According to reliable Agency sources, Kissinger laid the foundation in 1971, during his visit to Peking, for a basic strategic intelligence exchange agreement with the Chinese. At the time, what concerned China's leadership most was the Soviet Union's massing of troops at the border and their deployment. Kissinger's nagging problem was to find a solution to the war in Indochina. Sources who have had access to the content of these US-China "consultations," and to some high-level meetings during the Carter administration, have indicated that out of Kissinger's basic agreement with the Chinese grew a whole range of intelligence exchanges and working understandings, covering areas of the world where both parties have parallel interests.

Sino-US exchange agreements have linked US intelligence and clandestine operations in Africa to Chinese intelligence operations in Indochina. It was fairly common knowledge among intelligence people that following the US demise in Kampuchea in 1975, the two main sources of intelligence in Phnom Penh for the US came from the Chinese and Egyptian missions. Although sources were not able to confirm that an intelligence trade-off had been made between the parties involved, those sources familiar with such exchanges suspect the other side of the coin has been some type of intelligence on the Middle East developments from the US to them.

In Indochina, covert US operations in support of Balkanization include the long-term penetration into the Communist parties of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and their mass organizations; the fostering, directly and indirectly, of ethnic, regional and border problems which would lead to constant turmoil within Indochina.

In Kampuchea, the Agency's efforts at penetration were particularly unsuccessful due to the Pol Pot regime's drastic mass killings within the Kampuchean Communist party. The US did however succeed in planting the seeds for a border dispute between Vietnam and China in 1974 by manipulating the Thieu regime's moves in the clash with China over the Paracels Islands, and creating the conditions for China's takeover of those islands. The Paracels Islands today are a main point of contention in the Vietnam-China conflict, as exemplified by the naval build-up of forces on both sides since January 1979.

Overall, because of the strength of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement which has undergone for four decades brutal assaults by Japanese fascists, French colonialists, Chinese warlords and American imperialists, and has emerged strong and battle-tested, most US strategic covert operations have failed to advance the administration's Balkanization policy.

However, in the post-1975 period, the US government has found a new proxy policeman. Every significant covert operation which had been hatched by the French and later the US now appears to be the domain of the Chinese intelligence service. Jean Lacouture, a journalist long associated with French state interests and an Indochina veteran, recently made appropriate comments about the Chinese role in Indochina: "The visit to Peking of the principal traditional leader of the Meos, Vang Pao, who for a long time was manipulated by the Americans, has been one of the first successes of the Chinese intelligence service's policy of undermining Vietnam. This was soon followed by the reawakening of the Fulro, a creation of American agents, which in March 1975 partially defected to Hanoi's side and thus became one of the causes of the Thieu regime's crumbling. In this realm also, Peking has succeeded Washington" (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, March 5, 1979).

Other operations picked up by the proxy policeman of the East include the Pol Pot guerrilla forces in Kampuchea, backed up by hundreds of para-military Chinese advisors, and the recent Chinese creation of the Laotian Socialist Party in southern China to undermine the Laotian revolution.

Conclusion

Today, the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea face not only the continued hostile policies of the US government, but also the aggressive policy and activities of Chinese reactionaries who are willing defenders of US interests in the region. The aim of such Sino-US operations against the three revolutions of Indochina is the same as during the Vietnam war: an attempt to crush the Indochinese revolutionary movements. Despite enormous difficulties, the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have consolidated their revolutions. It is reasonable to conclude that this Sino-US partnership in aggression against Indochina will also fail. The only question is when. ●

The KCIA

by Carolyn Turbyfill

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 11, December 1980. The author was a Peace Corps volunteer in South Korea in the late 1970s where she witnessed, first hand, the massive brutality of the South Korean military regime.

Among the KCIA's more famous exploits are the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung from Japan in 1973 and the bribing of U.S. Congressmen in "Koreagate." But, what the KCIA does best is terrorize the Korean people. Its job is intimidation of the people to make them paranoid and distrustful of everyone, and therefore unable to organize and act. Those who defy this intimidation are arrested and tortured. Friends and family of dissidents are often harassed or arrested and tortured too. The ostensible reason for arresting family members and friends of dissidents is to get information, but the true purpose is to deter other brave persons who are willing even to die for their principles, but who will not risk the possibility that loved ones will be made to suffer for their actions. The KCIA, which in 1978 was referred to as a "friendly foreign intelligence service" by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is as insidious, brutal and despised as the SAVAK was in Iran, the DINA in Chile, or the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.

Tactics

These tactics are not restricted to the KCIA, and are also employed, to one degree or another, by the Korean National Police, the Korean Military Police, and the Defense Security Command (military intelligence).

● **Torture:** All of the standard techniques are employed: beating; electric shock; sleep deprivation; sexual assault; and water torture — one variation is hanging a person upside down, plugging the nose and then pouring alternately very hot or very cold water in the mouth and ears. Drugs and psychological torture are also used. After arrest and interrogation, detainees are forced to sign a statement saying that torture has not been used and agreeing not to discuss what happened while they were under arrest. Usually, they must also sign a statement pledging not to engage in any political activities, legal or not, and are subject to immediate arrest without a warrant should they violate any of these "agreements." People are frequently arrested and imprisoned for 15 days. This allows 3 to 5 days for interrogation and torture followed by 10 days for the evidence of torture to heal.

● **Terror:** The KCIA is not surreptitious when it engages in surveillance, the purpose being to intimidate, not to gain information. The KCIA is everywhere and strives to make people think that it is even where it isn't. A recent example occurred during and after the Kwangju uprising which lasted from May 17-27. In Seoul, taxi drivers were taking anyone who mentioned Kwangju, or who otherwise made politically unac-

ceptable remarks in a taxi, straight to the nearest police station. Taxi drivers weren't doing this out of loyalty. They were told that they would be tested by KCIA agents who would say illegal things in taxis. If the driver didn't turn the KCIA agent in, the driver would be arrested. So taxi drivers turned people in out of self-defense.

● **Disruption:** Creating tension among dissidents is another tactic. During the Kwangju uprising the student leaders were in the provincial office working with two other citizens groups and running the city. (Contrary to U.S. State Department comments characterizing Kwangju as "a breakdown in law and order," the city was well run and orderly while the citizens were in control of it.) In the provincial office, a KCIA agent stabbed one of the student leaders, but the students caught him. He was trying to make it appear as if there was conflict among the student leaders.

● **Discrediting:** The KCIA is always trying to make dissidents, whether they be students, intellectuals, Christians, workers or farmers, look like communists or rowdy hoodlums. Over the last two years, practically every time there have been large peaceful demonstrations, someone has thrown a few molotov cocktails. It has gotten to the point that the cocktails are expected, and everyone assumes that it is the KCIA up to its old tricks.

The Staff

The KCIA is 30,000 strong. This does not count informants; the Defense Security Command; the Korean National Police; the Korean Military Police; or U.S., Japanese and West German intelligence operatives, and all this for a country of 37 million people.

The lowest ranking KCIA officers make 80,000 won a month, \$133.00. This is supplemented by bribes, free meals, free taxi rides, etc. Income rises with rank. The highest ranking officials are millionaires, like Kim Jong Pil who founded the KCIA with U.S. assistance in 1961, and Lee Hu Rak who engineered the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping and masterminded Koreagate while he was Director of the KCIA.

In the spring of 1980, after Pak's death, while it was uncertain who would end up in charge, lower level KCIA officials and other government officials were fencesitting. They carried out their official duties but were fearful of offending anyone who could conceivably end up on the winning side of the struggle for control of the country. Chun Doo Hwan replaced 300 top KCIA officers with his own proteges; the number of lower ranking officers replaced has not been publicly disclosed. Probably few needed replacing. All that is required from lower ranking officers is obedience to authority, and for most of them, any authority would do. ●

God is Phasing Out Democracy

by Fred Clarkson*

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in our best-selling issue on the Religious Right, CAIB Number 27, Spring 1987. The Moon empire has holdings around the world including the Washington [DC] Times, the New York City Tribune, a fishing fleet in Gloucester, MA, and an arms factory in Korea. They also have numerous political fronts such as CAUSA, AULA, and the International Security Council.

Over the years, Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the founder, spiritual leader, and corporate head of the vast Unification Church conglomerate, has repeatedly declared that his goal is global theocracy. He has expressed his desire for political and economic control originating from centralized religious power. Equally important to understand is that the Moon organization¹ is an integral part of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), which in turn has played a pivotal role in the development and activities of the Unification Church.

Inside The League

The World Anti-Communist League (WACL) is an international coalition of fascist and conservative groups and political parties founded in 1966 by agents of the governments of Taiwan and South Korea.² One of the original groups was the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL). Its Japanese affiliate, *Shokyo Rengo*, became a WACL chapter in 1968. *Shokyo Rengo* (Victory over Communism) began after a 1967 meeting between Sun Myung Moon, Ryiochi Sasakawa, Yoshio Kodama, and two of his lieutenants. Kodama was the head of Japanese organized crime, the *Yakuza*. One of the lieutenants, Osami Kuboki, became head of the Unification Church in Japan, as well as a leader in WACL. Soon afterward, WACL began indoctrinating young *Yakuza* gang members in anticommunist ideology similar to what the Moon organization was already doing in Korea with government officials. Sasakawa, an important World War II Japanese fascist leader, became the head of *Shokyo Rengo*, and Kodama its chief advisor.

Meanwhile, the first Moon missionaries arrived in the U.S. in 1959. By the early 1960s, Moon fronts had been established

and were working in collaboration with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Indeed, shortly after the military coup which elevated Park Chung Hee to power in 1961, his KCIA director (and founder), Kim Jong Pil, stated that he intended to "organize and utilize" the Unification Church as a "political tool" according to the Fraser Report.³

The Fraser Report, a House of Representatives investigation into Korean covert operations in the U.S., chaired by Donald Fraser (Dem.-Minn.), reveals that one of the early KCIA/Moon projects was the Korean Cultural Freedom Foundation (KCFF). The ostensibly non-profit organization quickly turned from a "cultural" to a political operation under the influence of "Honorary Chairman" Kim Jong Pil, who wanted the "Freedom Center" in Seoul, South Korea to be its principal project. Thus, by the spring of 1964, KCFF was raising funds from private citizens in the U.S. for the Freedom Center, in fact an APACL project promoted and subsidized by the Korean government.⁴ The Freedom Center serves as the "secretariat" of WACL to this day.

Moon's principal political organization, the International Federation for Victory Over Communism (IFVC) was formed in 1968 in Seoul. The American affiliate was incorporated in Washington, D.C. in 1969 as the Freedom Leadership Foundation (FLF).

FLF President Allen Tate Wood attended [the 1970 WACL conference in Tokyo] as a "youth delegate" with several American Moonies. (Wood later broke with Moon, gave press conferences denouncing Moon, and testified before the Fraser Committee.) While visiting Korea on the same trip, Wood was instructed by Moon to "win the power centers" of the U.S. for him, beginning with academia.⁵ Moon also told him that "part of our strategy in the U.S. must be to make friends in the FBI, the CIA and police forces, the military and business community...as a means of entering the political arena, influencing foreign policy, and ultimately of establishing absolute dominion over the American people."⁶

Wood has said that "[u]nder the aegis of American Youth for a Just Peace (AYJP)...set up by myself and a man named Charles Stephens, the Unification Church carried out extensive lobbying in the spring of 1970. This lobbying was carried out by church members under orders from their superiors...to try to indicate to Congress...strong grassroots support for a

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1. The Moon organization is the term used by the congressional committees investigating the "Koreagate" scandal in the mid 1970s. It is used here with the caveat that the various Moon enterprises, including the church, operate with a high degree of central coordination and common purpose.

2. Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside The League* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1986) is the first book-length expose of the World Anti-Communist League. It details the role of the Moon organization, as well as the involvement of Nazi war criminals, fascist governments, American racists, Latin American death squad leaders, and other extremist and criminal elements that comprise much of the League's membership.

3. Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, October 31, 1978 (hereafter, the Fraser Report), p. 315.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 357-58.

5. Press Statement by Allen Tate Wood, November 15, 1979 (hereafter Wood Press Statement).

6. Ripon Forum, January 1983.

hard line in Vietnam." He also emphasized that because "the church's tax exempt status would be threatened if we carried out our political activities openly, we were careful to hide our real identity behind the guise of AYJP. During this time, AYJP received 'anonymous' donations from 'friends of the President' [Nixon] through connections with Charles Colson and Jeb Magruder. So the Unification Church in the 1970s was the recipient of money to carry out the programs of the government."

"Mr. Moon has said," continued Wood, "that 'God is phasing out democracy.' Well, whether or not God is doing it, it is clear that Sun Myung Moon wants to do this...so right now, the United States is acting as a seedbed for fascist religious cults whose objective is in the end to destroy the Constitution, and remake America in the image of an autocratic hierarchical fascist state."⁷

Significantly, the youth section of WACL, currently headed by David Finzer⁸ of the Washington-based Conservative Action Foundation, has reportedly received a grant from the South Korean WACL chapter.⁹ Finzer's group is providing seminars on "political technology" for WACL Youth, and originated the Chevron/Gulf boycott—a campaign which received support from the RAMBO Coalition—designed to highlight the efforts of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA to overthrow the government of Angola.

An Automatic Theocracy

While WACL generally promotes fascist political programs, when the Moon organization is involved, the messages released are more explicitly theocratic. Essentially, Moon's followers believe he is the new Messiah, the second coming, not of Jesus but of the Messiah. Moon says that God told him: "You are the son I have been seeking, the one who can begin my eternal history."¹⁰ He says that God has revealed his plan to him and that he has spoken with Jesus, Moses, and other great historical religious figures.

Moon intends to bend the U.S. to "God's will," which will lead to a final war with Soviet communism, and finally to the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. According to *The Divine Principle*, the basic theological work of Unificationism, World War III is "inevitable." This war may be fought with weapons, or with "ideology," in order to "subjugate and unify the Satanic world." The organization created to refine and promote this ideology appears to be CAUSA which the *Unification News* describes as an "ideological movement," which "unites all religious people as a God-accepting force against the God-denying forces such as communism."¹¹


The Moon organization has a long history of political activism. For example, after American Youth for a Just Peace was disbanded in 1971, its co-founder Charles Stephens moved to New York, and ran (unsuccessfully), first for the State legislature in 1972, and for Congress in 1974. In both

campaigns, FLF provided "volunteers."

The Moon organization's party of choice has always been the Republicans, and the New Right of the GOP in particular. This relationship is epitomized by Moon's VIP seat at the first Reagan inaugural.

Moon as Martyr

[In 1984, Moon went to Danbury prison to serve an eighteen month sentence for income tax evasion. His supporters immediately launched a campaign to win his freedom]. The Moon-as-martyr campaign was orchestrated by the Moon organization, public relations firms, and grantees. The most



Sun Myung Moon

prominent example is the Washington-based Coalition for Religious Freedom (CRF) which, according to CRF president Don Sills, has received at least \$500,000 from Moon supporters.¹² A prominent CRF spokesperson and executive committee member is Joseph Paige. As Executive Vice President of the Black Baptist Shaw Divinity School, Paige received \$60,000 from the Unification Church for his school, which in turn gave Moon a much publicized honorary doctorate. Paige is also active in CAUSA.¹³ The CRF executive committee has developed rapidly since 1984, to include most of the major televangelists, such as Tim LaHaye, Jerry Falwell, James Robison, Rex Humbard, D. James Kennedy, and Jimmy Swaggart.

Recently, the Moon organization opened an international front in its "religious freedom" campaign. Moonies founded the World Council on Religious Liberty (WCRL) in December 1986 at a conference in Geneva, Switzerland. The Chairman of WCRL is Joseph Paige, and its "Chairman of the North American Caucus" is Don Sills. They have recruited Dr. Robert G. Muller, assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, as chairman of the Council's International Advisory Committee. The Council's headquarters are in Raleigh, North

12. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, September 27, 1986.

13. Fred Clarkson, "The Manifest Sins of Sun Myung Moon," *Christianity and Crisis*, October 28, 1985. Back issues are available from: 537 West 121 Street, New York 10027.

7. Wood Press Statement.

8. See "Christian Voice," *CAIB*, Number 27, Spring 1987.

9. *Searchlight*, October 1986.

10. Robert Boettcher, *Gifts of Deceit*. (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 1980), p. 31.

11. *Church and State*, May 1986.

Carolina, which is also home to Paige's Shaw Divinity School.¹⁴

They also hired two public relations firms — Madison Fielding and Gray and Co. The latter was headed by Robert Keith Gray, a former Reagan campaign official. Gray, who co-chaired the 1981 Reagan Inaugural Committee, was also involved in the Koreagate scandal. He was the first President of the Georgetown Club, an elite social club financed by his friend, KCIA operative Tongsun Park. According to a former KCIA director, the Georgetown Club was a KCIA front used by Park to facilitate "lobbying activities" in the 1970s.¹⁵ For at least the past few years, Gray and Co. has been registered as a foreign agent for Japan and South Korea.

The pardon campaign failed even though Osami Kuboki claimed that Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and former Prime Minister Kishi had "interceded on Moon's behalf with President Reagan." According to the *Times* of London, Nakasone "telephoned the President because of Mr. Moon's status as an international leader, while Mr. Kishi, a supporter of the Unification Church in Japan, had written to the President three times."¹⁶

Kishi, who was a WACL leader in the late 1960s, is also involved with CAUSA's International Security Council (ISC). ISC's purpose includes organizing retired military officers of the Western Alliance, and holding anticommunist conferences. Kishi also co-chaired Moon's 1984 World Media Conference in Tokyo.

Kishi's involvement underscores the importance of Japan to the Moon organization. Despite its Korean roots and the historical animosity between Korea and Japan, the Unification Church has had a limited popular following in Korea and very large support in Japan. Indeed, its predominant source of funding has been Japan. The *Washington Post*, quoting a former ranking Japanese Moon official, reported that some \$800 million had flowed from Japan to the U.S. Unification Church over the preceding nine years (1975-1984).¹⁷

Inside the New Religious Right

Part of Moon's U.S. strategy has been to seek alliances with the religious Right. However, the relationship has been highly controversial within the movement. While Moon money is widely rumored to be a major financial underpinning of the New Right, it is often kept secret because so many conservatives find the Moon organization repugnant.

In a letter to Bo Hi Pak, taped onto a cassette by Rev. Tim LaHaye of the American Coalition for Traditional Values (ACTV is a political coalition of televangelists), LaHaye thanked Pak for providing "timely" and "generous help" in connection with an "extremely expensive" move of ACTV's headquarters from California to Washington, D.C.¹⁸ Like Falwell, LaHaye was one of the founders and executive committee members of CRF. LaHaye later denied receiving money

from the Moon organization.

The rightwing Christian Voice claims 350,000 members, including 40,000 ministers who become members by virtue of having responded to direct mail funding appeals. The organization, which employs 17 field organizers, stepped into the void left by the departure of the Moral Majority and ACTV from significant political activity. However, they may have overstepped their position.

The relationship between Christian Voice and the Moon organization has plagued them for some time. At the center of this controversy is lobbyist Gary Jarmin, a Moonie from 1967-1973 who was active in Moon's Freedom Leadership Foundation and who many suspect may be a Moon agent in the New Right. Jarmin, who was the legislative director of Christian Voice at the time, insisted, "I'm no longer affiliated with the [Moon] church; I'm not a member of it and I don't consult with their people."¹⁹ Nevertheless, by February 1982 Jarmin had helped organize the first CAUSA North America conference, held in Jamaica. Also in attendance were Christian Voice chairman Robert Grant and Advisory Board member W. Steuart McBirney.

The relationships go even deeper. The three-member board of Christian Voice's political action committee is chaired by Jarmin, and includes Rev. Don Sills of the Moon-funded Coalition for Religious Freedom. In August of 1985, Jarmin helped organize CRF's God and Freedom Banquet held in celebration of Moon's release from jail. He also led legislative workshops at secretive CAUSA indoctrination sessions for U.S. legislators during 1986. These events drew about 100 conservative legislators from both parties to all-expense-paid junkets, ostensibly to discuss the Constitution.

Although CRF declares its independence from the Moon organization (despite the Moon funding), the current executive director of CRF is Dan Holdgreiwe, a longtime Moon operative who worked for Moon's Freedom Leadership Foundation from the late 1970s to the early 1980s.²⁰

Conclusion: Moon's Law

The Moon organization is an ominous, anti-democratic element in American and world politics. Its history is synonymous with post-World War II fascism. In coalition with rightwing secular and religious groups the Moon organization is attempting to create a broad-based, mainstream fascist movement in the U.S.

The totalist Moon ideology tells new Moonies that everyone outside the "True Family," including their biological parents, may be agents of Satan. CAUSA's philosophy expresses a similar view. Doubt about Moon, even by loved ones, may be Satan at work. Moon's law is arbitrary and totalitarian. The activities of the Moon organization should be examined in this context, because despite the mendacity of the Moon organization, when it comes to their fascist politics, they mean what they say. ●

14. *New York Tribune*, December 10, 1986.

15. Jim Hougan, *Secret Agenda* (New York: Ballantine, 1984), p. 145.

16. *Times* [London], December 17, 1985.

17. *Washington Post*, September 16-17, 1984.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Mother Jones*, May 1981.

20. Louis Wolf and Fred Clarkson, "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship," *CAIB* Number 24 (Summer 1985), p. 34.

CIA Relations with Media — Official and Otherwise

Editors' Note: These articles first appeared in CAIB Number 7, December 1979. The media remains an important area where the CIA concentrates many of its vast resources. Recent examples of CIA manipulation of the media include NED funding of the rightwing Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa and a disinformation campaign which attempted to show that the Salvadoran FMLN was receiving arms from Eastern bloc countries.

It is clear that one of the most sensitive areas in government is the use by the CIA of media and of reporters as spies "in the national interest." As the CIA is supplying certain information to reporters in the U.S., even at their own request, it should not be forgotten that it is specifically forbidden from engaging in domestic propaganda activity by the 1947 National Security Act.

Nonetheless, the CIA has with impunity violated this part of its charter. It was exposed again and again during the Church Committee hearings which traced the pattern back many years; by Carl Bernstein in the October 1977 *Rolling Stone*, who asserted that about 400 American media people secretly collaborated with the Agency; and by the *New York Times* on December 27 and 28, 1977 which revealed operational assistance to the CIA rendered over the years by various editors and journalists whom it named.

The CIA has used major U.S. news organizations as cover for its officers. It has paid editors, reporters, columnists, commentators, and free-lancers for their intelligence favors. It has owned or funded over fifty news organizations. And it has sponsored, subsidized or produced more than 1,000 books (about one-fourth of them in English).

Getting Briefed by the CIA

One of the ways in which the CIA exploits media personnel is characterized in an internal Agency regulation dated November 30, 1977 which sanctions the maintenance of "regular liaison with representatives of the news media." How does this process work? Take the case of journalists whose beat is foreign or military affairs, and who periodically travel to CIA Headquarters in Langley. There they sit down with Herbert E. Hetu, the chief CIA spokesperson, or his representative, and receive a "substantive" briefing on some topic. Normally, the briefings are "on background," meaning the information they receive can only be described as deriving from "a government official" or some such label, but can not be attributed to the CIA.

These sessions are, by the admission of the journalists, entered into on their own initiative — a fact which is the CIA's automatic justification of the program. Many observers question the propriety of these liaison activities, both from the standpoint of the CIA and of the journalists who choose the

Agency as a news source, particularly when the source is not CIA-attributed, which it rarely is.

The "voluntary" nature of the journalist's relationship with the CIA under such circumstances does not preclude the possibility that it is the CIA which receives the briefing and the journalist who gives it. Some are proud to say they have briefed the Agency.

CAIB has learned that a few chosen journalists in the U.S. receive briefings from the CIA, in printed form, delivered to them by courier, and known to contain a mixture of classified and non-classified material. Our source informed us that in some instances, recipients of these printed briefings have simply put their own by-line on the stories, which are printed almost verbatim by their newspaper.

The best known case of this kind is that of C.L. Sulzberger, *New York Times* foreign affairs correspondent. According to an intelligence agency source quoted by Carl Bernstein, Sulzberger was provided with a "background paper" and then "gave it to the printers and put his name on it." Even though he acknowledged knowing every CIA director personally since Allen Dulles, Sulzberger denied the incident.

Sowing Seeds on Foreign Soil

Another sensitive area is the CIA's admitted liaison with foreign journalists. It is quite apparent this is a field where the Agency remains tenaciously unyielding to any proposed change or reform. In his 1978 reply to one journalist who challenged the practice, Admiral Stansfield Turner commented that because of "the knowledgeability of media people through their many contacts, foreign media people can be of great value to our intelligence activities." Another letter from Turner boldly claimed that to expand restrictions on the use of journalists "beyond U.S. media organizations is neither legally required nor otherwise appropriate."

Many journalists, U.S. and foreign, have expressed strong opposition to this practice. Gilbert Cranberg, editorial page editor of the *Des Moines Register-Tribune*, testified before the House Intelligence Committee in January 1978 that the CIA "should be required to quit planting false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to protect all readers from misinformation."

CIA case officers posted abroad under diplomatic cover at U.S. embassies often contact American and foreign journalists at cocktail parties, diplomatic receptions, or over a private lunch together, to discuss matters of common interest. In cases where the particular individual has been tested by the CIA for reliability over a period of time, he or she may be compensated in the form of an occasional tip which can then be converted into a news "scoop."

One of the primary methods the CIA employs is fabrica-

tion and orchestration of propaganda as a central part in any covert operation. The Church Committee Final Report (Book 1, page 200) cites a portion of a CIA cable dated September 25, 1970, which was used as part of the Agency's dedicated efforts to discredit Salvador Allende's election:

Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance.

Intelligence Community Pow-wows

As with the media, or in major corporations, much of the battle on the Washington intelligence front is fought in the ways the public relations machinery handles the public on a day-to-day basis. How does the Director of Central Intelligence superintend the "public relations" of the intelligence community? The DCI convenes periodic "working lunches" for the PR officers from throughout the "community."

The agenda is of course set by the CIA, and it varies from lunch to lunch. Essentially, the aim of these CIA-controlled gatherings is to make sure the various PR people are in line

and that all pull together.

At one of the recent sessions, there were representatives from the following agencies in attendance: White House—one person; Vice President's Office—one person; Departments of Justice, Defense, and State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation—two persons each; Drug Enforcement Agency and Department of Energy—one person each; Central Intelligence Agency—ten persons.

All participating agencies (plus the National Security Agency and the intelligence arms of the three military services—whose absence is somewhat surprising) handle large amounts of classified intelligence, and each is accessible to a greater or lesser degree to the various media. The DCI's "line" on the relations between the intelligence "community" and the media/public is handed down at the meeting.

The House Select Intelligence Committee held hearings on the CIA and the media between December 1977 and April 1978. Its final report described, according to Committee chief counsel Michael J. O'Neill, "what the relationships could be" between the Agency and the media. The wealth of information which has emerged about CIA media operations in all the Congressional hearings and from persons who have worked in exposing the intelligence network, add up to a picture very close indeed. ●

CIA Covert Propaganda Capability

by Sean Gervasi *

The series of articles on CIA media activities published in *The New York Times* at the end of 1977 gave some indication of the Agency's global reach. It revealed that an extensive network of assets had been established for carrying out covert propaganda around the world. Unfortunately, the *Times* articles were impressionistic rather than systematic. They contained much valuable information, but the wealth of detail was essentially unconnected and incoherent. The articles did not provide any clear account of covert propaganda operations as a whole.

The principal flaw of the series was that it left readers with almost no idea of the overall scale of CIA media activities. In this article, a rough estimate of CIA covert propaganda capability will be made. Such an estimate is essential if we are to begin to analyze the problems posed by covert propaganda within the present global information order.

The Central Intelligence Agency does not publish figures which would help to shed light on its capabilities in the sphere of propaganda. Nonetheless, information which has become available in the course of Congressional investigations and

private research can provide the basis for a tentative estimate of the amount of expenditure on covert propaganda and of the number of people engaged in that activity.

The starting point for any such estimate must be the size of the current overall CIA budget. The official figure for total CIA expenditure, of course, remains a secret, even to the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless, there is enough fragmentary evidence available to permit a reasonable estimate. In their book *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, Victor Marchetti and John Marks gave a figure of \$750 million for the CIA budget. That figure may be taken to refer to the year 1973, the year before the publication of the book.

Recent well-informed estimates place the current figure at approximately \$1 billion. *The National Journal*, for instance, a respected Washington weekly on politics and government, indicated at the end of 1977, that the CIA budget was "only slightly less than \$1 billion." This figure is within the range of the Marchetti and Marks estimate. Average annual increases of 5 percent added to their 1973 figure would give a 1978 budget total of some \$940 million.

It must be kept in mind, however, that these are all public estimates and that informed sources are, for a variety of reasons, likely to understate estimates given for publication or

* Sean Gervasi is a visiting professor of economics at the University of Paris, and former Assistant in the Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia.

attribution.

Sources within and near the intelligence community indicate that the actual current figures are substantially higher. One Washington source with extensive knowledge of the CIA's

operations recently indicated that \$1.5 billion should be considered a "reasonable" estimate for total expenditure. A second source close to the intelligence community stated that such a figure is too low and that \$2 billion is more appropriate. Thus the range of estimates for current total expenditure by the CIA is from \$1 billion to \$2 billion. This is the same range given by Philip Agee in his most recent book.

Expanding on a breakdown given by Marchetti and Marks for 1973; the overall budget figure is doubled, and the separate figures for each directorate and function are doubled. Thus the main assumption is that the *structure* of activities within the CIA remains what it was five years ago. Each activity is assumed to account for the same proportion of total expenditure today that it accounted for in 1973. This seems a valid assumption. Reductions in operations due to the withdrawal from Indochina have in all probability been compensated for by increases in activity and expenditure in other areas such as Central America and the Caribbean, The Persian Gulf and southern Africa.

Covert propaganda is one of the principal covert activities carried out by the CIA. The other two principal covert activities are political action and paramilitary. Thus a detailed breakdown of the overall budget estimate helps us to begin to isolate covert propaganda activities and to make a rough estimate of their dollar cost.

There are fairly clear indications of the relative importance of propaganda in the Agency's covert action programs. The Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 stated: "Some 29 percent of 40 committee-approved covert actions were for media and propaganda projects...This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects could be determined it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA."

The committee stated further that the expenditure on political action, or Election Support, was, for the period examined, 32 percent of the total expended for covert action.

Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that, when all covert action authorizations are taken into account, it is likely that covert propaganda accounts for one-third of the total for covert action. This means that, with a budget of some \$520 million for covert action, the CIA was probably spending some \$170 to \$175 million for covert propaganda within the Directorate for Operations in 1978.

These costs would be only the direct expenses, however. They would not include the support of indirect costs of covert

Covert propaganda is one of the principal covert activities carried out by the CIA....It uses far more resources in its propaganda operations than any single news agency.

propaganda activities. The indirect costs could be estimated by adding an appropriate proportion of the total costs incurred by the two supporting directorates of the CIA, those for Administration and Science and

Technology. These directorates provide support for all Agency operations. Adding indirect costs means no more than for support of covert propaganda.

The estimated total expenditure by the Directorates for Administration and for Science and Technology in 1978 was \$460 million. Some \$270 million, or 60 percent of the sum, is allocable to covert action support. One-third of that \$270 million, or \$90 million, could be considered the indirect cost of covert propaganda.

The reason behind the allocation of such a sum in support of covert propaganda is based upon a fundamental distinction between operations and those activities which support them. The purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency, in essence, are to gather intelligence and to carry out operations. Other activities support those efforts. Basically, the Directorate for National Intelligence supports intelligence-gathering activities in the Directorate for Operations. The two other Directorates support all Agency activities.

Thus, the total cost of covert propaganda in 1978 was probably in the range of \$265 million, that is, \$175 million in direct expenditure plus a further \$90 million in support costs.

Estimates of the number of personnel employed in covert propaganda activities are more difficult to make. In 1974 Marchetti and Marks estimated that the total number of CIA salaried employees was 16,500. Of that number they estimated that 6,000 were employed in the Directorate for Operations. Currently, the lowest estimate cited is 20,000. If it is assumed that personnel are allocated to different functions in the same proportions as expenditure, then this figure is reduced to 2,000 salaried employees in covert propaganda. In addition, of course, one would have to add some 1,000 contract employees, most of whom are employed overseas, who constitute the "media assets" of the covert propaganda program. Thus some 3,000 salaried and contract employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are likely to be engaged in clandestine media activities trying to influence world opinion.

It can be seen that the Central Intelligence Agency uses far more resources in its propaganda operations than any single news agency uses in gathering and disseminating news around the world. In fact, the CIA propaganda budget is as large as the combined budgets of Reuters, United Press International and the Associated Press. The Agency, furthermore, appears to employ as many, if not more, personnel than any single news agency.

It must be realized that these comparisons are very rough ones. For the estimates of the CIA's propaganda activities are approximate. Nonetheless, it is clear that the CIA's propaganda capability is formidable. The Agency, in fact, may be considered the largest "news" organization in the world. ●

The "Grocery Store Papers"

Editors' Note: This article first appeared in CAIB Number 12, April 1981. "The Grocery Store Papers" are a clear example of how the CIA and State Department cooperate to promote propaganda in the U.S. media. Jon Glassman, the author of the White Paper, rose to new heights as a propagandist in his recent post as chargé d'affaires in Afghanistan where he falsely predicted the imminent downfall of the Kabul government and led the departure en masse of Western diplomats.

The *Boston Globe* called him the "State Department code-breaker;" Karen De Young of the *Washington Post* said his role "is described as more that of one of Smiley's people than of James Bond." But Hodding Carter, III, former State Department spokesman, in the *Wall Street Journal*, said he was responsible for a report which was "swallowed whole and regurgitated in a fashion not equalled since the Johnson administration's white paper on Vietnam 15 years ago."

They all were writing about Jon Glassman, 37, political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, who researched and assembled the 178-page White Paper entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador." Although Glassman participated in the February 23 State Department briefing which unveiled the White Paper, nothing was said at the time of his personal detective role in the drama. Nearly a month later, after, as Hodding Carter pointed out, the U.S. press accepted the incredible report virtually without question, Glassman granted an interview in Mexico to attempt to answer the question which should have been asked before, but wasn't. Where had the documents come from?

Before assignment to Mexico, Glassman had served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, at the State Department's Soviet desk, and spent two years at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. From Mexico he had attended the 1979 Sixth Summit of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana, where, as noted in CAIB Number 6, he continually briefed U.S. media representatives on the significance of speeches he had not listened to, and, on several occasions, got himself thrown out of guests-only hotel lobbies where he was accosting delegates.

Glassman's interview with the progressive Mexico City daily, *Uno Mas Uno*, was quickly picked up by the U.S. press, though the source was never mentioned. His tale, apparently designed to give the White Paper the human face journalists seek for the feature pages, unfolded like a third-rate detective story. In November—after Reagan's election—the Salvadoran police had allegedly captured a pile of documents in an art gallery owned by Toni Handal, the brother of Shafik Handal, leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party. They described an arms shopping trip Shafik Handal had made to Moscow and Eastern Europe, with numerous promises of military hardware. Toni Handal has since "disappeared," and is, of course, unable to challenge any of this "evidence."

But, said Glassman, these documents were unconvincing. He was not interested in promises of arms; he was looking for

deliveries of arms. On January 16 he was sent back to El Salvador to look for more evidence. He met with Defense Minister Guillermo Garcia and the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran Army. Was there anything else besides the Handal documents, he wondered. One security officer apparently pointed to a plastic bag sitting on a dusty desk, noting that the documents inside the bag had been captured ten days earlier, but that they had not been able to make anything of them. Glassman opened the bag, and, in his words, "found a gold mine." (According to the March 23 *Time* magazine, the bag was captured in a grocery store; neither *Uno Mas Uno* nor any other paper carried this bit of information.)

Glassman brought the papers back to Washington, and after "burning the midnight oil" night after night, produced the White Paper, the likes of which hadn't been seen in Washington since the Gulf of Tonkin fabrication. Glassman's main feat was to discover that the code name "Esmeralda" meant Cuba, and the code name "Lagos" meant Nicaragua. This great deduction stemmed from tricky references to the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory held in Lagos and meetings with "Comrade Fid.," the Prime Minister of Esmeralda. (Esmeralda is also the name for the island of Cuba in a famous Cuban folk song.) As De Young pointed out, "more than one State Department officer, harking back to suspicions of an over-zealous intelligence community, has referred to (the documents') discovery and contents as 'a little too convenient.'"

Hodding Carter also noted that, at best, the documents make a mountain out of a molehill. Even if genuine—which is extremely unlikely—the documents suggest an influx of approximately 200 tons of materiel. An unnamed Pentagon official had pointed out that 200 tons of military equipment "would be used up by a 200-man company in one week of hard fighting." Yet this, the administration said, "underscores the central role played by Cuba" in the "arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador." It is hard to imagine how one week's ammunition could be "central" in a war of many years' duration.

The relative insignificance of 200 tons of materiel is further underscored by the details of the \$5 million in military supplies which President Carter rushed to El Salvador just before the end of his term. That aid amounted to over 3000 tons, and it was delivered in less than a week.

Finally, there is the "evidence" of the documents themselves; some are completely illegible; some contain merely columns of numbers which must, on faith, be taken to represent arms or ammunition; some contain mixed writing and typing; some contain non-Spanish usages or non-Salvadoran slang. As Philip Agee pointed out, the entire operation bears the trademarks of CIA falsifications which have been practiced incessantly over some thirty years. That there is skepticism in Europe is to be commended; that there is a slavish acceptance of the administration's line in the United States is, as Hodding Carter noted, inexplicable. ●

The New York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran and Nicaraguan Elections

by Edward S. Herman *

Editors' Note: This article appeared in CAIB Number 21, Spring 1984. It documents a classic case of the double standard of American mainstream journalism and shows how effective this subtle propaganda can be in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The U.S. mass media present a diverse picture in their reporting on Central America, ranging from the almost pure dissemination of the administration's line in *Readers' Digest*, *Time* magazine, and many others, to a pattern of generous coverage of the official view plus occasional jarring deviations in much of the rest. An opportunity to test media bias under excellent experimental conditions is provided by the juxtaposition of elections in 1984 in both El Salvador and (prospectively) Nicaragua. The former is a U.S. client, and the election has been organized by the United States itself to demonstrate to its home population that the Salvadoreans want us there and that its rulers are moving toward democracy. Nicaragua, by contrast, is under U.S. attack and openly sponsored subversion and proxy invasion. An unbiased media would raise the same questions about both elections; a biased media will differentiate according to the propaganda agenda provided by its own government.

In the book *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El Salvador*, [authors Broadhead and Herman] spelled out the symbolic format, the suitable questions that the government wishes to advance, and the unsuitable ones that are to be avoided in its own sponsored elections. It tries to associate the election with democracy; it stresses the rejection of this democratic exercise by the rebels and their attempts to disrupt it; and it makes voter turnout the dramatic denouement of the struggle between the forces of good and evil. The government dispatches observers to watch the vote on election day, to testify to fairness on the basis of long lines, smiling faces, no beatings in the observers' presence, and the assurances and enthusiasm of the U.S. and client state officials. "Off-the-agenda" are the basic parameters that make the election meaningful or meaningless prior to the election-day proceedings — freedom of speech, assembly, organization of intermediate groups; the ability of candidates to qualify and to campaign without fear of murder; and the absence of state terror and a climate of fear among the public. Also off the agenda is the election day "coercion

package" that may explain turnout in terms other than devotion to the aim and its plans, including any legal requirement to vote and explicit or implied threats for *not* voting. Other issues that must be downplayed in conforming to the government propaganda format are the U.S. government role in organizing and funding the election, the internal propaganda campaign waged to buy the vote, outright fraud, and the constraints and threats to journalists covering the election.

In *Demonstration Elections* we showed that the U.S. mass media cooperated fully in portraying the 1982 Salvadoran election in accordance with the government's agenda. Rebel disruption and "turnout" reigned supreme. Almost no mention was made of a legal obligation to vote, and the background facts of a state of siege and over 700 civilian murders per month for the prior 30 months were deemed not relevant to evaluating electoral conditions or turnout.

The dissident Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) of El Salvador was off the ballot and underground in 1982, with those of its leaders not already murdered on army death lists — but the U.S. mass media never condemned the election as a meaningless fraud because the principal opposition was off the ballot entirely. Nor did the media point out that this exclusion was *by plan*, to isolate the rebels and use them as a dramatic foil in the staged ceremony for public relations purposes. The media were part of the staging props, and they played their role to perfection.

An ironic feature of the media treatment of Salvadoran elections and their less favorable view of the prospective Nicaraguan election is that both the threat to journalist safety and violations of press freedom are vastly greater in El Salvador than in Nicaragua. Over 30 journalists have been murdered in El Salvador since 1979, and four Dutch journalists were killed only 11 days before the March 1982 election. The foreign press corps was trooped to a morgue by the Salvadoran army to see the bodies, with ripped genitals exposed to media view. This episode was suppressed in the U.S. mass media, led to no large outcries and generalizations about the quality of the Salvadoran government, and many have contributed to the remarkable mass media silence on unfavorable media (as well as other) conditions in the incipient democracy.

U.S. reporters can report what they like from Nicaragua without fear of bodily harm. This is not so in El Salvador. But the media cannot admit that in our client state they must adjust reports and reporters because of literal threats of death for improper thoughts. There is the public and self-image to be maintained of a crusading president that pulls no punches. Furthermore, the U.S. government does not audibly object to

* Edward S. Herman is professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. His most recent book, with Noam Chomsky, is *Manufacturing Dissent* (New York: Pantheon, 1989). He expresses thanks to Howard Friel for his help in preparing this article.

violations of press freedom in client fascist states and even apologizes for literal murder and press closings. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton explained to Michael Massing in 1982 that the two papers closed by security force violence (in one case including murder) had "advocated revolution;"¹ a lie, but even more interesting as an expression of Hinton's commitment to an open society. On the other hand,



Credit: Ron Kinney

Salvadoreans at polling place.

we can observe the wild indignation of the Washington libertarians at encroachments on the freedom of the press of *La Prensa* in Managua. The media accommodate. And they suppress the facts about their own accommodation to anti-journalist terrorism by "friends."

The New York Times Coverage of the 1984 Elections

A comparison of the treatment of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections in news articles in the *New York Times* between February 1 and March 30, 1984 provides an experimental universe of 28 news articles on the El Salvador election and eight on that to be held in Nicaragua (with one overlapping article, its separate parts included in each of the two sets). Obviously, this is only a small sample of the media and will support only qualified generalizations.

An analysis of the sources used by the *New York Times* in its news articles on the two elections [the original of this article is accompanied by several lengthy tabulations, not reprinted here] shows that for the Salvadoran election there was overwhelming reliance on U.S. and Salvadoran officials, amounting to 80% of the source total. In 20 of the 28 articles official sources were not only dominant, they were uncon-

tested. Although the majority of Salvadoreans are peasants, only two of 263 identifiable sources used by the *Times* — under 1% of the total — were peasants. The Salvadoran rebels were cited 27 times, approximately 10% of the source total. But this modest fraction grossly exaggerates the importance of the rebels as a source. In the great majority of cases the rebels were asked about and quoted only on their disruption plans. This is in accordance with the government's dramatic formula, which portrays the rebels as bad guys refusing to participate in this step toward democracy and even threatening to upset it.

The rebels were not asked about or quoted on more substantive questions, such as the reasons why free elections were unfeasible in El Salvador. They were several times quoted as describing the election as an "electoral farce," but they were never allowed to expand on the details.² This made their words mere denunciations by the enemy, without force. The opponents of the Sandinistas, in contrast, were regularly quoted on substantive defects of the electoral plan in Nicaragua.

On the sources used by the *Times* in dealing with the prospective Nicaraguan election, the Sandinistas themselves accounted for only 39.5% of the sources used; critical U.S. officials and the Nicaraguan opposition to the Sandinistas accounted for 60.5% of the citations. The Sandinistas were usually used only as an indirect source, by paraphrase, which reflects a less authentic, less dramatic, and often more skimpy mode of conveying fact and opinion. Thus, whereas the U.S. sponsors and their on-the-spot managers of the Salvadoran election were given overwhelming space to define the election according to their vision, for Nicaragua both the volume and the quality of sourcing favored the critics of the election, not its organizers.

To summarize the topics covered, for the El Salvador election the *New York Times* focused largely on the terms compatible with the Reagan administration's agenda — i.e., rebel disruption, personalities, and political infighting among eligible parties, election mechanics, and turnout. It is even more impressive to see the level of suppression of inconvenient items that are off the government's agenda. There is no mention of fraud in the 1982 election, although there was considerable evidence in the spring of 1982 that there had been an inflated vote count and an admission that fraud might well have affected over 20% of the 1982 ballots.³ To acknowledge these claims and admissions would raise questions about the integrity of the election managers. Richard Meislin of the *Times* repeatedly stresses that various devices used in the election such as stamping fingers and transparent voting boxes were to "prevent fraud." He never once hints at the possibility that the managers may be less than honest. Suppressing coun-

2. A notable exception, though not a news article, was an OpEd column in the *New York Times* of March 22, 1984, by Guillermo Ungo on "Salvador's Electoral Farce."

3. See the discussion in Frank Brodhead and Edward S. Herman, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp. 130-33. The head of the Central Electoral Commission, Dr. Armando Rodríguez Equizabal, acknowledged that fraud might have affected over 25% of the 1982 ballots. Julian Preston, "1982 Vote Fraud Cited by Salvadoran Officials," *Boston Globe*, February 25, 1984.

1. The quote marks are around Massing's summary of what Hinton said to him. Michael Massing, "Central America: A Tale of Three Countries," *Columbia Journalism Review*, July-August 1982, p. 51.

ter-facts about the recent electoral past helps maintain this aura of electoral integrity.⁴

Most striking is the almost total suppression of any discussion of the basic preconditions of a free election. There is not a single mention in 28 articles of the issue of freedom of the press, freedom of organization, or limits on the ability of candidates to qualify and campaign freely. Only one article mentions constraints on free speech and three others hint rather gingerly at state terror as a possible negative influence on voter freedom.

This suppression package is thrown into bold light by the fact that it is precisely these issues that the *New York Times* "news" articles feature in the coverage of Nicaragua. Most dramatic is the dichotomy shown in the treatment of freedom of the press in the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections—the subject is not mentioned once in 28 *Times* articles on the El Salvador election; it is mentioned in six of eight articles concerning elections in Nicaragua!

As factual background for this dichotomous treatment, it should be noted that serious opponents of the Sandinistas can speak and publish in Nicaragua; no supporter of the rebels can do so in El Salvador, and even liberal papers seeking a middle path have been driven out of existence.

The *New York Times* essentially suppresses the election day coercion package. In only four articles does it mention the legal obligation to vote, in two the requisite stamping of the voter's identification card. In fact, when the factor of coercion is mentioned, it is with a defensive answer. Thus, Lydia Chavez says in the *Times* (March 13, 1984), "Under the election process in El Salvador, as in some other countries, citizens are obliged to vote or pay a fine. The system of fines has long been used in El Salvador, but no one can remember anyone actually having to pay a fine for not voting." Notice the defensive "in some other countries," without specification, and the assertion that fines have "long been used," which gives an aura of respectability to the practice. Note also that "no one remembers" a fine being paid; Chavez does not tell us to whom she spoke to reach this conclusion. And Charlie Clements has testified before Congress that Salvadoran church workers told him that people unable to show evidence that they had voted have been killed.⁵

Hedrick Smith manned the home front as an analyst of the Salvadoran election of 1984 for the *Times*, earning an advanced degree in official reporting, in recognition of distinction in the classic mode of handling an official beat—simply repeating the views of officials as objective news, without batting an eyelash at internal contradictions.

4. Rodriguez was perhaps prepared to acknowledge fraud because Salvadorans were widely aware that it had occurred in 1982; his admitting it showed his distance from the earlier perpetrators of fraud. For Meislin, acknowledging fraud in 1982 would only raise questions requiring painful explanation.

5. *U.S. Policy in El Salvador*, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and Western Hemisphere Affairs, March 17, 1983, p. 620.

...the U.S. mass media will always find an election staged by their very own government in its very own client state a "step toward democracy."

Reporting on the return of the official observers from the 1984 elections (March 27, 1984), Smith focuses on the pro-administration observers, their finding that the election was "impressive," and their view that this

will enhance administration prospects for getting money for El Salvador. There is not a word about what the observers saw, the substance of the election, or the selectivity of choice of observers by the administration.

In "Clear Choices in Salvador, Murky Plans In Nicaragua," Smith captures all the essential elements of bias. The objective in El Salvador is legitimization; the threat is polarization. In Nicaragua, Reagan presses for elections to "relax" the Sandinista grip; the "risk" is that they will relax just enough to win acceptance "without giving up significant power or control." This frame postulates that the Sandinistas would not win an election that was truly free.

On what ground does Smith regard the choices as "real" in El Salvador? It is because there are several parties; but if the real left parties are off the ballot, is not the choice restricted by military force?

But Smith talks *only* about substantive electoral conditions in Nicaragua. He provides significant detail on press censorship, Sandinista monopoly of power, and limits allegedly imposed on opposition candidates. Not a word on the death squads in El Salvador, nor on journalists killed or papers closed. These are off the agenda in U.S. staged elections.

Concluding Note

The dichotomous treatment of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections by the *New York Times* lends powerful support to the hypothesis tested here: that the mass media follow a patriotic agenda, advance certain facts, suppress others, and even tell outright lies. Sometimes the lies are government untruths objectively transmitted; sometimes they are developed independently. The package is impressive and is capable of making a staged fraud carried out in an environment of ongoing mass murder saleable to the public.

The 1984 Salvadoran election experience demonstrated, as did Vietnam in 1967 and El Salvador in 1982, that even where the real opposition is off the ballot by force, and none of the essential conditions of a free election are met in advance, the U.S. mass media will always find an election staged by their very own government in its very own client state a "step toward democracy."

It is clear from the propaganda chorus already under way in regard to the Nicaraguan election that there is nothing the Sandinistas could do short of turning their country over to the *contras* that would make their election other than a farce. The media will focus incessantly on U.S. official and Nicaraguan opposition claims of unfairness and abuse, until the Sandinistas are ousted. If a new Somoza is installed in their place, however, we may expect the media to resume the silence on the subject of free elections that prevailed from 1936 through 1978. ●

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




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




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




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